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Abstract 
This dissertation provides empirical insights into the issues related to the commercialization of 
agriculture and its socio-economic effects on farm households by addressing two main questions: 
(1) why some farm households produce crops for commercial purpose, but some others do not? 
and (2) how farm households’ participation in markets contributes to improving their household 
livelihoods?. To address these questions, the specific objectives of the dissertation are as follows: 
(1) to identify factors affecting farm households’ participation in markets, with a main focus on 
legal land rights that capture land security, and (2) to assess the socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm households.    
To analyze factors that determine farm households’ participation in markets, the study 
applies a double hurdle model to data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey carried out in 
2009. The analysis is conducted on all crops combined, and then by separating paddy from non-
paddy to examine how the determining factors affect the farm households’ behavior towards each 
market. The estimated suggest that legal land rights, the main variable of interest, captured by 
land ownership documents issued by the government authorities are significantly and positively 
correlated with farm households’ participation in markets. This is an indicative result that reveals 
that the legal land rights are very likely to promote the commercialization of agriculture. 
Furthermore, crop supply, particularly paddy, is positively determined by the paddy price. Non-
price factors such as the ownership of modern transportation tools, modern agricultural 
equipments, landholding, irrigation infrastructure, public transportation in the village and agro-
ecological conditions are also the main determinants of agricultural commercialization in 
Cambodia. Consistent with the findings by Heltberg and Tarp (2002), the lack of modern farming 
tools, limited access to irrigation and agro-ecological risk are obstacles to the transformation of 
subsistence agriculture into market-oriented agriculture.          
To quantify the socio-economic effects of participation in markets on farm households, the 
study puts a main emphasis on two main factors necessary for the farm households’ livelihoods. 
That is, the study evaluates the effects on farm productivity in terms of yields per hectare and per 
worker, gross margin per hectare and per worker, and on household food security in terms of 
household food consumption per capita and household dietary diversity score. A propensity score 
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matching approach is used with data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey conducted in 
2009 to evaluate the effects. This approach accounts for endogeneity of the decisions of whether 
to participate or not participate in markets, which arises from observed factors. The estimated 
results suggest that participation in markets exerts significant positive effects on farm 
productivity in terms of yields per hectare and per worker, gross margin per hectare and gross 
margin per worker. The findings also reveal that by integrating themselves into markets, rural 
farm households enjoy higher household food security in terms of household food consumption 
per capita and household dietary diversity score. However, the estimated effects on household 
food consumption per capita and household dietary diversity score are sensitive to unobserved 
factors that cannot be controlled for in the matching analysis.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The majority of low-income farm households, smallholders in particular, in developing countries 
rely on traditional and subsistence agriculture which is characterized by low productivity and low 
marketed surplus, thus leading to low level of agricultural commercialization. These farm 
households are very likely to be among the poorest and the most vulnerable. They mostly stay out 
of the mainstream exchange economy and cannot take advantageous opportunities provided by 
the exchange economy. This can cause the agricultural production to be far from efficient, thus 
lending the output level to stay far below what it otherwise would be. The subsistence farming is 
considered as farm households’ only means of surviving due to market failures resulting from 
uneven access to resources and specific socio-economic and agro-ecological conditions under 
which the farm households operate. Transforming subsistence agriculture into market-oriented 
agriculture by promoting the farm households’ participation in markets or commercialization of 
agriculture would be one of the most likely avenues to enhance the farm households’ livelihoods 
and reduce vulnerability in out-of-the-way areas. The commercialization of agriculture that 
transfers the farm households’ farming from subsistence production into market-oriented 
production has been considered as a characteristic of agricultural development. In this process, 
the adoption of agricultural technologies regarding the use of tradable inputs such as seeds and 
inorganic fertilizers indicates the agricultural shift towards the path of commercialization of 
agriculture.  
In the processes of agricultural commercialization, the structure of markets and agricultural 
households’ access to markets are crucial in shaping their behavioral responses to markets when 
they formulate the earning or livelihood strategy (Brooks, Dyer, and Taylor 2008). Yet, although 
markets for all goods and labor work perfectly, farm households are indifferent between 
consuming their own-produced goods and market-bought goods. Consuming all or a part of their 
own-produced goods, which could be sold at a given market price, means that they implicitly buy 
goods from themselves. Similarly, demanding leisure or allocating their available time valued at 
market wage to their own production activities means that they implicitly buy time from 
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themselves. Under these assumptions, they are not different from the firms that effectively 
behave towards profit maximization subject to the production technology constraints.  
Nevertheless, farm households, small-scale farm households in particular, are typically 
systematically subject to market failures due to market imperfections and constraints. In some 
cases, there is no even markets (no exchange), in remote localities of developing countries in 
particular. In other cases, although markets exist, the functioning of markets is constrained by 
high transaction costs. In addition, there are constraints on potential quantities of products that 
can be exchanged, more possibly because of the limited ability to invest in their farming. 
Furthermore, due to high transaction costs and price volatility, the farm households in developing 
countries are constrained from having access to resources necessary for adopting new production 
technologies (Yesuf and Köhlin 2008). There have been important theoretical frameworks for 
agricultural households’ behavior under market failures since the late 1980s. These frameworks 
have successfully explained and identified strategic variables and some of the binding constraint 
variables such as transaction costs, risk and other factors influencing subsistence farmers’ 
behavior towards markets in developing countries. The most important is that the implications 
derived from these efforts could be useful for effective policy designed for the alleviation of 
poverty and vulnerability (Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012). Nevertheless, as noted by de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2006, p. 177), many implications and predictions from theoretical models are blindly 
accepted as truths while they still need empirical verification.     
According to the literature on agricultural development, farm households face credit 
constraints on their investments in agricultural production due to the absence or imperfections of 
credit markets. In the context of imperfect credit markets, the roles of secured property rights and 
secured rights to land in facilitating the market functioning have been more discussed in the 
literature. The farm households’ access to credit for their investments in farming can be 
constrained by their property right insecurity, in particular land right insecurity. These insecure 
land rights issues have been not included in the household model frameworks to explain farmers’ 
marketing behavior. Feder et al. (1988) asserted that legalizing farmers’ land titles can promote 
farm productivity. The conventional view of the roles played by legal land rights is that they 
impede the agricultural development in developing countries. Titling land and registering land for 
farmers can help transfer land from less productive farmers to more productive ones, facilitate 
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their access to credit and provide them with incentives for investment in soil conservation, land 
improvement and new technologies (Atwood 1990; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Besley 1995; de 
Soto, 2000; Markussen 2008). In the market economy, the agricultural investment incentives are 
one of the main factors contributing to the transmission of subsistence agriculture into market-
oriented agriculture. Furthermore, the farm households’ participation in markets as sellers might 
be also affected by sale volume and price instability, technical inability and market imperfections 
(Roa and Qaim 2011). Moreover, such factors as inappropriate agricultural policies, limited 
knowledge, inadequate irrigation infrastructure and poor urban-rural road connectivity, and 
natural calamities such as drought, over-rainfall and flood, etc. may constrain the market-oriented 
farming. Thus, to introduce and effectively implement policy on agricultural development and 
rural livelihoods, it is worth identifying and addressing factors bringing about the subsistence 
farming and farm households’ poverty and vulnerability as well as livelihoods. 
One of the most likely pathways towards improving the farm households’ livelihoods, 
particularly rural smallholders’ livelihoods, is to integrate them into markets (Olwande, Smale, 
Mathenge, Place, and Mithöfer 2015). The commercialization of agriculture tends to promote the 
farm households’ earnings due to its comparative advantage over subsistence production 
(Kennedy and Cogill 1987; Dorsey 1999), then increasing investments in fertilizers, modern 
agricultural equipments etc, in turn, this would improve agricultural productivity. According to 
Barrett (2008), the importance of market entrance to farm household earnings and welfare can be 
shown based on productivity improvement and comparative advantage arguments. That is, once 
entering markets, farmers can not only reach economies of scales and use technologies that 
improve productivity but also can produce goods they are adept at producing and exchange the 
surplus for other goods they are not. Furthermore, the commercialization can reduce financing 
constraints and generate learning-by-selling effects that can improve the farming effectiveness of 
the farm households that participate in markets. Learning from markets, once participating in 
markets, can allow the farm households to produce in a more effective way to meet market 
requirements. The improvement in socio-economic conditions of the farm households by 
integrating themselves into markets can relax credit constraints and, thus, allow a way towards 
market-oriented agriculture options. Then, promoting the commercialization would help improve 
the farm households’ livelihoods by increasing farm productivity and household earnings. 
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1.2 General Context of Cambodia 
Cambodia, an agrarian country, is located in Southeast Asia, with the population of more than 14 
million; and the majority of them live in rural areas. The agriculture benefits more from the 
Mekong River flowing through the flat lowland plains in the middle of the country, and Tonle 
Sap Lake, the largest lake in Southeast Asia. The country, once colonized by France, has gone 
through political, economic and social ups and downs. In the past three decades, civil war and 
political conflicts destroyed and damaged the country’s social and physical infrastructure. 
However, Cambodia formed the first coalition government after the first post-conflict general 
election backed by the United Nations in 1993. This was a political system change, as an effort to 
bring the peace to the nation, allowing the country to undertake institutional and economic 
reforms aiming at promoting economic growth and development. The economy was, then, 
transferred from planning-based to market-based economy. The peace and reforms have 
encouraged savings and investments, improved governmental institutions and stabilized the 
macroeconomic environment, the most important factors in spurring the economic prosperity. As 
a result, Cambodia has achieved high economic growth with the averaged annual rate between 
2000 and 2008 being recorded at 9.80% (World Bank 2009). The growth rate exceeded the 
neighbors’, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as East Asian’s and the whole Pacific region’s (World 
Bank 2009). The steady economic growth allowed Cambodia to achieve GDP per capita level 
close to Vietnam’s 1993-2010 level. The strong economic performance has contributed to the 
poverty reduction from 47% in 1994 to 35% in 2004, to 30% in 2007 and to 18.60% in 2009. 
However, the country has, at the same time, faced an increasing income inequality driven by the 
widening disparity in rural areas where the share of poor population has been increasing. 
The agriculture plays a crucial role in Cambodia’s economy, absorbing up to 70% of the total 
labor forces. During the period 2004-2012, the annual growth rate of agricultural gross outputs 
increased by approximately 8.70%, with the value added growing at the rate of approximately 
5.30%, driven mainly by rice (annual growth rate of 9%), maize (20%), cassava (51%), sugarcane 
(22%), vegetables (10%), and the modest growth of livestock and fisheries, (World Bank 2015). 
The agricultural growth was pro-poor in rural areas. Over the past two decades, the total 
agricultural productivity has also improved remarkably. There were many factors contributing to 
the agricultural growth, among those factors were policy on market-oriented agriculture and open 
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trade. Although the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has focused the agricultural policy 
on rice production and exports, there has been an increasing belief that the transformation of the 
current rice-based traditional farming into modern and diversified farming is needed to sustain 
the improvement in rural livelihoods. The market-oriented and diversified agriculture is key to 
keeping the farming an attractive and sustainable source of agricultural households’ earnings and 
to promoting Cambodia’s economic development by exploiting the agricultural potential.     
More than 80% of the population lives in rural areas, earning living by farming under rain-
fed condition. The majority of the farmers engage in agricultural production with small plots of 
land to produce crops either for subsistence or small-scale commercial purposes. The crop 
diversification identification is very low. Paddy covered around 2.63 million hectare during 
2007-2011 (up to 90% of the cultivated land), and the production increased from 4 million tons in 
2000 to 6 million tons in 2007 (MAFF 2011; and MAFF and MWRM 2010). In general, over the 
past decade, rice paddy production grew remarkably through land expansion combined with an 
increase in yields. The paddy production increased from approximately 3.8 million tons in 2002 
to 9.3 million tons in 2009, with average growth rate of 9.30% per annum (World Bank 2015).  
In addition, the paddy rice yield per hectare had an increasing trend during the period 1994 - 
2008. Nevertheless, the production yields are still lower than other neighboring countries’ yields, 
or on average equal to 2.6 against 3.5 - 4 tons per hectare in the neighbors (EIC 2006). The rice 
production tends to have low productivity vis-à-vis neighboring countries’ production, because 
the farmers face the shortage of capital investments for inputs like seeds, fertilizers, and 
irrigation. Given the instability and relatively low productivity of agriculture, together with poor 
linkages between rural economies and the rest of the economy, rural households have not got 
much better off. Yet, it is still more possible to improve rural living standards by expending the 
agricultural production, because now only 0.90% of the total land area is permanent crop-land 
(Hem 2012); and other conditions can be improved with appropriate policies.  
As mentioned earlier, at least two thirds of the Cambodians live their life on agriculture, 
suggesting that land distribution is crucial to the development. The government considers land 
reform vital to promote social stability, develop efficient land market and increase agricultural 
productivity by titling land for Cambodians, especially farmers. Yet, some farmers are landless or 
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lost their land, as a result of the government’s economic land concession, unsecured land rights 
and tenure, lack access to information and due to land grabbing. In 2008, Amnesty International 
estimated that 150,000 people across the Kingdom were facing the threat of forced eviction. 
According to a study conducted by Cambodian Development Resources Institute (CDRI) in 
2008, 21.10% of the 2235 households surveyed were landless, and 26.30% held less than half a 
hectare of land (see e.g., Chan 2008). Poor institution, high corruption and land rights security are 
particularly serious problems in Cambodia (ADB 2013). This suggests that analyzing 
Cambodia’s agricultural development should not overlook the institutional matters, secure land 
rights in particular. 
Because the agriculture in Cambodia is the first-and-foremost ingredient for sustained 
economic growth and poverty reduction, the improvement in the agricultural production 
performance is a must. However, the improved sector-performance as a whole depends on the 
farmers’ production behaviors, especially whether they produce for subsistence or commercial 
purposes. The market-oriented farming has been considered a major strategy to reduce poverty 
and vulnerability in rural communities of developing countries. The need for the transformation 
of the subsistence-oriented agriculture into commercially-oriented one is problematic for 
Cambodia (Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012). Agro-ecological conditions get farmers to face either 
production risk or price risk. A study by ACIAR (2013) suggests that due to the lack of 
familiarity with and limited knowledge of non-rice crops as well as unpredictable rainfall, 
Cambodian famers had believed that farming puts them at high stakes. Nevertheless, it is more 
possible that they may, to adapt to the agro-ecological risky conditions, make certain production 
decisions and carry out various risk-mitigating strategies. Famers who possess legal land titles, 
have adequate knowledge and have access to a larger amount of market information would 
produce crops with the purpose of their home consumption and sale in markets. Legal land titles 
can secure their arable land that is very important to the agricultural activities. The farmers’ 
access to market information may be limited by many socio-economic factors such as low 
education and small social networks, and high transaction costs. Therefore, apart from the agro-
ecological conditions, such factors as land rights security, transaction costs, irrigation and 
transportation infrastructure, education, access to credit and information on markets, etc. should 
be taken into account when one analyzes the farm households’ behavior towards markets.  
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1.3 Motivation of the Study  
In Cambodia, agricultural development is generally considered as a crucial component in the 
government policy to promote rural households’ livelihoods. To realize this fact, the government 
adopted agricultural development policy to spur agricultural growth (MAFF 2015). Promoting 
the agricultural productivity, commercialization of agriculture and land reform are prioritized in 
the government policy on agricultural development. According to the 2014-2018 strategic plan of 
agricultural development, over the last decade, the agriculture has roughly increased on average 
by approximately 3% per annum. However, the desirable growth has not yet achieved to sustain 
the economic growth and reach rural poverty reduction goal that requires the agricultural growth 
rate of approximately 5% per year (MAFF 2015). Thus, an analysis of factors that influence the 
productivity and commercialization is very crucial to the formulation and implementation of 
agricultural development policies. 
A myriad of studies analyze factors determining farm households’ participation in markets in 
various developing countries, focusing on transaction costs (see e.g., Goetz 1991; Key, Sadoulet, 
and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Bellemare and Barrett 2006; Olwande, et al. 2015; 
Burke, Myers, and Jayne 2015). They found that high transaction costs constrain farm 
households, especially smallholders, from getting out of subsistence farming. This may not be an 
exception for Cambodian farmers. In addition to the literature on the transaction costs as the 
determinant of the agricultural commercialization, institutional issues should not be overlooked 
when it comes to the enhancement of the commercialization. The literature on institutional issues 
also shows that the secure rights to land have influence on agricultural investments and 
productivity (see e.g., Feder and Nishi 1999; Deininger 2003; Pande and Udry 2005; Markussen 
2008). This reveals that the security of land rights would be likely one of the main factors 
contributing to promoting the commercialization of agriculture. Nonetheless, the recent literature 
on the role of formal land titling in promoting agricultural growth shows that formal land titles 
seem to have mixed effects on the agricultural development (see e.g., Deininger, Jin, Xia, and 
Huang 2015; Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa 2014; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009; 
Deininger and Feder 2009; Markussen 2008). For example, studies from Africa show that legal 
property rights to land may produce no effect when institutions are weak because the 
governments are unable to enforce the rule of law. These inconclusive and controversial findings 
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raise doubts about the roles of legal land rights in promoting the commercialization of agriculture 
in developing countries such as Cambodia.             
As far as the advantages of the agricultural commercialization are concerned, the extent to 
which farm households can make depends on market environment and their production in the 
context of competitive markets. Although the farm households participate in markets, the 
participation would get them, especially smallholders, worse off if they cannot take advantages of 
the markets due to high production costs and market entry barriers such as high transaction costs 
and competitive market environment. In this case, the farm households’ livelihoods are very 
likely to suffer. Thus, to provide further evidence on the socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm households, the study extends previous studies, going beyond determinants 
of market participation and its effects on farming practice and household incomes, by analyzing 
the effects of market participation on farm productivity and household food security. The analysis 
is motivated by the rise of concern over the farm households’ food security and livelihoods in 
rural Cambodia due to an increase in vulnerable households and rural undernourishment 
prevalence among the poorest and vulnerable households. 
1.4 Objectives and Contribution 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to understand better factors contributing to promoting 
the commercialization of agriculture at the household level and quantify the socio-economic 
effects of agricultural commercialization on farm households. The commercialization of 
agriculture is measured by farm households’ participation in markets. The particular interest 
determinant of farm households’ participation in markets is the legal land rights which are a 
proxy for the security of land rights, being expected to promote the commercialization.  
  The empirical analysis in this dissertation is based on theoretical framework of household 
model under the assumption that markets are imperfect, allowing the application of farm 
household models. The agricultural household models are a useful tool to analyze how 
transaction costs affected by household characteristics influence households’ behavior towards 
markets and shape the effects of exogenous policy in rural localities (Taylor and Adelman 2002). 
This dissertation addresses the following research questions: (1) why some farm households 
produce crops for commercial purpose, but some others do not? and (2) how farm households’ 
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participation in markets contributes to improving their household livelihoods?. To address these 
questions, the specific objectives of the dissertation are as follows:  
• To identify factors affecting farm households’ participation in markets, with a main 
focus on legal land rights. 
• To assess the socio-economic effects of market participation on farm households. 
• To draw policy implication for promoting the commercialization of agriculture and the 
farm households’ livelihoods in Cambodia based on the findings. 
An increase in vulnerable and undernourishment in rural Cambodia, in particular among the 
poorest households, raises concern over food security issues among rural farmers and the poorest 
population (Seng 2015a and b). This shows that more attention should be paid to rural economic 
development, in particular by taking the agricultural potential into consideration. Because the 
majority of Cambodian households are famers living in rural communities, this dissertation 
focuses on the farm households in rural Cambodia. The empirical analysis is conducted with data 
from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) carried out in 2009, which is among the 
CSESs the largest sample data representing the nationwide household sample of the survey. 
This dissertation makes two main contributions to the literature. First, a large number of 
studies on the socio-economic effects of legal land rights discuss the effects of land titles, defined 
as state-issued land ownership documents, on the agricultural growth, with inconclusive and 
controversial arguments. They do not focus the discussion on the roles of land titles in promoting 
the commercialization of agriculture, which is the main component of the agricultural growth and 
development. The dissertation tries to fill this literature gap by analyzing the impacts of legal 
land rights on the commercialization of agriculture in a country where the effects have so far not 
been studied at the household level, in particular Cambodia. The main conclusion is that the legal 
land rights promote the commercialization of agriculture at the micro level. Second, numerous 
studies analyze the effects of agricultural commercialization on household incomes, farm 
productivity in terms of crop yields per hectare, household expenditure, and farming practice. In 
addition to these studies, the dissertation analyzes the effects of agricultural commercialization on 
farm productivity in terms of crop yields per hectare and per working-age household member, 
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gross margin per hectare and per working-age household member, and on household food 
security in terms of household food consumption per capita and household dietary diversity 
score. The dissertation concludes that the commercialization produces the productivity-enhancing 
effects and the food-security-improving effects on farm households. Furthermore, the dissertation 
contributes to the government’s policy on agricultural development and enhancement of rural 
livelihoods by providing evidence that land titling and certification programs can be effective 
policy measures to promote the commercialization that would improve the rural livelihoods.    
Cambodia is the main interest of the study because of its special circumstances. 
Approximately 80% of the population lives in rural areas, relying on agricultural activities. And a 
priori whether the formal land rights can be effective in terms of promoting the agricultural 
commercialization has yet to be evidenced. Traditional and formal institutions and property rights 
were completely destroyed by Khmer Rouge rule, civil war and social chaos, on the one hand. In 
this regard, the introduction of formal land rights would be very likely important for the 
agricultural growth, in particular the commercialization of agriculture. On the other hand, after 
the first election in 1993, formal institutions and institutional arrangements have remained poor 
due to the government’s limited capacity. If the authorities’ capacity to enforce the introduced 
rights is limited, the introduction of formal land rights would be ineffective in terms of promoting 
the agricultural development. At the policy level, the findings in this study contribute to the 
implementation of agricultural development policy which is prioritized by the government to 
promote rural livelihoods and reduce poverty. 
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides the general introduction, 
general context of Cambodia, study motivation, objectives and contribution of the study, and 
organization of dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on economic and agricultural 
development issues, focusing mainly on the roles of property rights in economic and agricultural 
development, determinants of agricultural commercialization and the socio-economic effects of 
market participation on farm households.  
Chapter 3 addresses the first objective and contributes to the existing studies and the 
government policy by examining the effects of legal land rights on the farm households’ market 
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participation in a country where the government’s capacity to enforce the introduced land rights 
is limited. The empirical analysis is conducted based on non-separable household model by 
including formal land rights to test whether they have positive correlation with market 
participation. To do so, the double hurdle approach is adopted with data from the CSES 
conducted in 2009. Although the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) has conducted the CSES 
annually since 2007, the 2009 dataset represents the nationwide sample of the household survey. 
Because it has the largest sample size, the 2009 dataset is employed for the analysis in lieu of an 
updated dataset. Furthermore, because the study is interested in Cambodian farmers, Phnom Penh 
city (the capital of Cambodia) and other provincial capital cities are excluded from the 
observations such that the focus is only on rural farmers in Cambodia. The estimated results 
indicate that legal land rights have positive correlation with the farm households’ participation in 
markets, indicating the important role of legal land rights in promoting the commercialization of 
agriculture in Cambodia.      
Chapter 4 addresses the second objective by quantifying the socio-economic effects of 
market participation on farm households. Specifically, this chapter evaluates the effects of market 
participation on farm productivity in terms of yields per hectare and per worker, gross margin per 
hectare and per worker and on household food security in terms of household food consumption 
per capita and household dietary diversity score. To assess the effects, a propensity score 
matching approach is used to account for potential endogeneity of the farm households’ decisions 
regarding market participation due to observed factors with the same data from the CSES 
conducted in 2009 used in Chapter 3. When participating in markets, the farm households can 
improve their farm productivity and enjoy higher household food security. This chapter 
contributes to the empirical analysis of the effects of agricultural commercialization on farm 
productivity and household food security by controlling for the potential endogeneity of the farm 
households’ decisions regarding market participation resulting from observed factors.     
Chapter 5, the final chapter, provides a summary of major findings and policy 
recommendation for promoting the commercialization of agriculture in Cambodia and 
requirements for further studies on the commercialization of agriculture and its socio-economic 
effects on farm households.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
The development, in particular in developing countries, needs necessarily economic growth. The 
economic growth is an indispensable condition for improving people’s living standards 
regardless of the distribution of the growth. Because of the importance of the growth, the 
economists, especially development economists, have tried to analyze factors affecting the 
economic growth in general as well as in a particular country. The recent arguments and evidence 
on the determinants of economic growth show that the quality of domestic institution has a strong 
correlation with the economic performance. According to Douglas North (1990) the institutions 
are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally the humanly-devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. The better quality of domestic institutions in a country promotes the 
sustained economic growth in the long term and human development as well as an efficiency of 
resources allocation in that country (see e.g., Douglas North 1990; Lal 1998; Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 2004; Bloch and Tang 2004; Bourne and Attzs 2005; Siddiqui and Ahmed 2009; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2010).   
The effects of institutional quality on the economic growth and development are mostly 
discussed based on general theories and aggregate views of economy, with the arguments that the 
high quality of institutions makes tremendous contributions the growth and development. 
Nonetheless, are the institutional arrangements such as legalizing farmers’ property applicable 
also to agricultural development, especially farm households’ commercialization of agriculture? 
There seems to be a relationship between property rights, legal land rights in particular for 
farmers, and the agricultural performance at the household level. This is because the legal 
property rights can secure the farm households’ private property, encouraging them to undertake 
more investments in agricultural production and so forth. In addition, according to the new 
institutional economics, transaction costs happening in markets are matter for economic 
performance (Coase 1937). The transaction costs distort the functioning of markets in allocating 
economic resources. Therefore, it is also very likely that agricultural markets, in particular in 
rural areas of developing countries, work more inefficiently due to the imperfection resulting 
from high transaction costs. That is, the transaction costs are also matter for agricultural markets.  
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Because the majority of people in developing countries lead their lives of engaging in 
agricultural activities, the development of agricultural markets has main role to play in enhancing 
their livelihoods. In particular, promoting the agricultural commercialization by making markets 
work for farmers can increase their earnings, thus improving their living standards and getting 
poor farmers out of poverty. These favorable effects are confirmed by several empirical studies 
(see e.g., Hernandez, Reardon, and Berdegue 2007; Rao and Qaim 2011; Rao, Brümmer, and 
Qaim 2012; Barrett et al. 2012; Bellemare 2012; Maertens, Minten, and Swinnen 2012; Asfaw, 
Lipper, Dalton, and Audi 2012; Michelson 2013; Muriithi and Matz 2015; Chege, Andersson, 
and Qaim 2015). This chapter reviews the literature on the relationship between institutional 
issues and agricultural development, with a particular focus on the commercialization of 
agriculture and the socio-economic impacts of agricultural commercialization on farm 
households. However, before going in detail to the discussion about factors determining the 
commercialization of agriculture and its socio-economic effects on farm households, this chapter 
also briefly reviews the development of institutional economics and the role of domestic 
institution in promoting economic performance.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews institutional issues 
and economic development, Section 3 provides reviews of the relationship between institutional 
factors and agricultural development, Section 4 investigates literature on the evaluation of the 
socio-economic effects of market participation on farm households. Section 5 concludes the 
chapter.              
2.2 Institutional Issues and Economic Development 
Economic growth is a main ingredient for the development and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. The growth is mostly attributed to the capital accumulation resulted from high national 
savings and technological improvement, according to conventional economic growth theories. 
However, those theories have many strict assumptions such as perfectly competitive markets, the 
rationality of economic agents, the same production technology functions among countries, and 
given institutional constraints etc. New growth theories try to incorporate technological factors 
and institutional issues into the analysis. Over these decades, institutional economics theories 
leaded by Douglas North have had more influence on the analysis of economic growth and 
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development. Typically, the institution is defined by Douglas North (1990, p. 3) as “the rules of 
the game in a society or, more formally the humanly-devised constraints that shape human 
interaction”.  
In general, there are two types of institutions: formal institutions (political, constitutional, 
property rights, contracts) and informal institutions (norms and customs). These institutions 
affect the functioning of markets. Now, development economists recognize the central roles of 
institutions and institutional change in the process of development. The formal and informal 
institutions have influence on economic institutions. Furthermore, the economic institutions 
determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors and, thus, shape economic 
outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004). The political institution affects how 
political powers are distributed and subsequently how the economic institutions are chosen to 
allocate resources in a society, then affecting economic performance and determining resources 
allocation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010). Therefore, the quality of institutions is the 
fundamental of economic growth and development, as suggested by many relevant studies (see 
e.g., Lal 1998; Bloch and Tang 2004; Bourne and Attzs 2005; Siddiqui and Ahmed 2009; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2010). 
The previous theoretical and empirical literature on institutional economics, starting with the 
influential work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), mostly uses governance and 
property rights security as the measurements of institutional quality to analyze the effects of 
institutions on economic development. The property rights are a complex of rights; each of them 
represents a different aspect of property ownership. Such a right includes the right to use an asset, 
the right to exclude others from using it, and the right to transfer the asset from one owner to 
another. With property rights, the owner can determine the utilization of the asset and be able to 
profit from the asset. According to de Soto (1989, 2000), the property rights that can be secured 
by land titles, for farmers in particular, can promote the development by providing ability and 
incentives for capital formation. Insecure property rights weaken the asset owners’ incentives to 
make medium- and long-term capital investments and impede the owners’ ability to use their 
property as collateral when they borrow from financial institutions to finance their capital 
investments. In the capitalism, capital and economic growth are hampered when there is no 
access to credit and investments in the future.  
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Furthermore, Van Dun (2007) argued that conflicts in a society are resulted from plurality of 
persons, diversity of their preferences, scarcity of resources and free access to scarce means. The 
introduction of property rights have, then, a crucial role to play in reducing conflicts in the 
society and encouraging investors to make more investments. People investing in new capital or 
new ideas tend to expect that they have freedom to utilize and benefit from these investments. If 
they believe that their capital and ideas will be expropriated or stolen or imitated, they will refrain 
from investing. It is more likely that the sovereign will alter property rights for his or her own 
benefits; that is, the lower the expected returns from the investments, the lower in turn the 
incentive to invest (North and Weingast 1989, p. 803). This incentive issue indicates that the 
well-defined and enforced property rights would be very likely to promote economic growth and 
development through the enhancement of investments and technologies. 
For new institutional economics (NIE), transaction costs are used as a criterion for the 
efficiency of institutions (Marinescu 2012). It is commonly recognized that the NIE started with 
Ronald Coase’s 1937 article entitled “The Nature of the Firm” with its explicit introduction of 
transaction costs into economic analysis (Coase 1998). The transaction costs occur when there is 
economic exchange among market participants. Caose argued that the markets are efficient only 
when do they work in the absence of transaction costs. The transaction costs include search and 
information costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement costs. Individuals have incomplete 
information and limited mental capacity and face the uncertainty about the events and the 
unforeseen results and, thus, incur the transaction costs of acquiring information. To reduce the 
risks and the transaction costs, the human beings create institutions by writing and applying 
constitutions, laws, contracts and regulations, and by structuring and inculcating the codes of 
conduct, belief and habits of thought and behavior. This also has something to do with legalizing 
private property rights such as land titling to reduce the risks and transaction costs, providing 
more incentives for capital investments. Moreover, Aron (2000) argued that under the situation 
where the transaction costs are high and rule of law is unreliable, private firms typically operate 
on a small scale, perhaps illegally in an underground economy, and may rely on bribery and 
corruption to facilitate their operations. Hence, the higher the transaction costs, the more 
inefficient the markets, consequently the lower the economic growth and development. Once 
transaction costs are significant, then institutions matter (North 1992).  
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2.3 Institutional Issues and Agricultural Development 
This section reviews the relationship between the institutional issues and agricultural 
development, with a main focus on effects of transaction costs on the commercialization of 
agriculture. The section also provides reviews of the roles of formal land rights in promoting the 
agricultural development in various developing countries. The section ends by reviewing the 
roles of market participation in promoting farm households’ livelihoods, which have something 
to do with its socio-economic effects on farm households.     
2.3.1 Transaction Costs and Commercialization of Agriculture 
The correlation between institutional quality and economic development reviewed above are 
based on general theories and aggregate views of economy. However, are institutional 
arrangements such as legalizing farmers’ property applicable also to agricultural development, in 
particular farm households’ market participation? The agricultural market participation can be 
explained by the material conditions and the specific imperfections of financial, insurance, 
markets in rural areas. The institutions in rural areas develop in response to specific material 
conditions and the imperfections in respective markets. The market imperfections create 
transaction costs that, if sufficiently high, cause farm households to find it unprofitable to 
participate in markets as either seller or buyer, thus staying autarkic (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and 
Sadoulet 1991). High transaction costs resulted from transportation costs, high search, 
recruitment and monitoring costs, and limited access to information, capital and credit cause rural 
markets to be poorly developed in developing countries (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 
1991; Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Benjamin 1996). In the non-separable household model, the 
transaction costs are generally categorized into fixed transaction costs (related to information 
costs) and proportional transaction costs (related to transportation costs) (see e.g., Goetz 1992; 
Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Henning and Henningsen 2007). Furthermore, high fixed and 
proportional transaction costs would cause the farm households to face liquidity constraints, then 
hampering the process of agricultural production and the commercialization of agriculture.  
A number of studies analyze both theoretically and empirically the effects of transaction 
costs on the farm households’ market participation in various developing countries (see e.g., Von 
Braun, Bouis, and Kennedy 1991; Goetz 1992; Omamo 1998; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 
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2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2003; Vance and Geoghegan 
2004; Carter and Yao 2002; Carter and Olinto 2003; Henning and Henningsen 2007; Omiti et al. 
2009; Jagwe, Machethe, and Ouma 2010; Olwande et al. 2015). For example, Key, Sadoulet, and 
de Janvry (2000) develop a farm household model to explain the supply response once the 
transaction costs lead some households to sell, others to buy and others not to participate in 
markets (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000, p. 245). Their model implies that proportional 
transaction costs determine both the decision to participate in markets and the transacted quantity, 
while fixed transaction costs determine only the decision conditional on already being in the 
markets. The empirical model estimation results support this hypothesis (see e.g., Heltberg and 
Tarp 2000; Maltsoglou and Tanyeri-Abur 2005; Henning and Henningsen 2007), suggesting that 
decline in market participation is attributed to high transaction costs. Because of high transaction 
costs, agricultural products are exchanged in the markets at low proportion (Staal et al. 1997 and 
Lapar et al. 2003). This is because the transaction costs affect market prices and, then, influence 
quantity of products transacted. As a result, the costs decrease the net benefit of exchange, 
causing the farm households to stay out of markets. Nonetheless, once participating in markets, 
the farm households may experience different transaction costs, depending on their 
characteristics and market characteristics (Omamo 1998; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000).  
Furthermore, by examining the effects of transaction costs in grain market in Senegal, Goetz 
(1992) separated farm households’ discrete decision regarding market participation from the 
continuous decision concerning how much to sell or buy conditional on participation. The author 
used a variety of factors such as cart ownership and distance from markets to capture the effects 
of transaction costs for both buyer and seller. Using a selectivity model to control for endogenous 
bias resulting from unobservable factors that potentially affect both discrete and continuous 
decisions, the author found that better access to information increases the likelihood of farm 
households’ market participation, consistent with the findings by Henning and Henningsen 
(2007). However, it is recognized that in practice it is very difficult to measure exactly the 
transaction costs, in particular fixed transaction costs. There is only one way to do is to use 
available variables as a proxy for such a cost as the above studies did.  
Heltberg and Tarp (2002) identified the main causal factors behind the farm households’ 
decision concerning marketing in Mozambique by using Heckman approach. The empirical 
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model is built on the theoretical framework developed by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) to 
include transaction costs into the model. They employ ownership of TV, radio and telephone to 
capture fixed transaction costs that are related to costs of searching information and ownership of 
transportation means and the distance from farm to market to capture proportional transaction 
costs that are related to transportation costs. Their findings also suggest that transaction costs are 
one of the main factors affecting the farm households’ marketing decisions. Nonetheless, the 
variables used to capture the fixed transaction costs are very likely endogenous, possibly 
producing inconsistent estimates. It is difficult in the reality to measure the fixed transaction 
costs.  
In addition, Omiti et al. (2009) found that, in the case of Kenya, the intensity of market 
participation was mainly constrained by the distance from farm to market place; and better price 
of produce and market information induced farmers to increase the sales. This finding suggests 
that the high transaction costs, proportional transaction costs in particular, hinder the process of 
agricultural commercialization in rural developing countries such as Kenya. Maltsoglou and 
Tanyeri-Abur (2005) analyzed the impacts of transaction costs categorized as information, 
negotiation and monitoring costs on the degree of market integration. Their findings suggested 
that the degree of farmers’ market integration is affected by transportation cost, information, 
negotiation and monitoring costs. Therefore, based on these findings, agricultural households’ 
market participation has negatively correlation with transaction costs. 
Other studies (see e.g., Green et al. 2006; Barrett 2008) concluded that the farm households’ 
assets such as land, livestock, labor, and agricultural equipments have significantly positive 
effects on their decision to participate in markets. In addition, geographical factors and 
production technology choices have also influence on market entry (Barrett 2008). Technology 
affects the market entry through affecting productivity which is the most important factor in 
enhancing marketable surplus. This argument is confirmed by Goetz (1992), Holloway et al. 
(2000a), Makhura (2001) and Lapar et al. (2003). Heltberg and Tarp (2002) also found the key 
importance of non-price factors such as transportation infrastructure, production technology, and 
agro-ecological risk have great impacts on farm households’ market participation. By 
distinguishing poor and nonpoor households, the authors also found that the differences in 
geographical characteristics, agro-ecological risk and technology in particular, have greater 
19 
 
effects on the process of commercialization than other factors that affect households’ decisions to 
participate in markets.   
Burke, Myers, and Joyne (2015) analyzed the factors associated with smallholder farm 
households’ decisions to participate in dairy production and markets in Kenya by adopting a 
triple-hurdle approach. The findings suggest that rural electrification, training and improved 
grazing practices play important roles in promoting the production and participation in markets. 
That is, smallholders are very likely to serve as a net-seller/net buyer if they are located near the 
source of electricity. Olwande et al. (2015) estimated supply functions of outputs for Kenyan 
smallholder farmers by distinguishing three commodities: maize, kale and milk, and comparing 
these commodities. The authors apply a double-hurdle model to a panel data covering a decade 
and found that although there is an improved market access over the decade, the improvement 
contributes less to the growth in market participation except the case of milk. A minority of farm 
households sell commodities from year to year; and the concentration of markets is still high for 
all commodities, suggesting that the production remains largely subsistence. For all commodities, 
the farm households’ participation in markets is strongly correlated with productive assets, 
technology use, access to cultivable land, expected prices, and rainfall level.   
These findings demonstrate that the agricultural production characteristics are directly 
responsible for farm households’ participation in markets. In the case of Cambodia, the 
availability of water for farming and cultivable land size are the important determinants of rice 
double-cropping (Tong, Hem, and Santos 2011). Ros, Nang, and Chhim (2011) analyzed 
determinants of agricultural productivity in Cambodia by identifying factors that cause low 
productivity which also somehow relates to Cambodia’s agricultural commercialization. They 
found that the low productivity in Cambodia’s agricultural sector is resulted from limited 
agricultural technology, poor inputs utilization, limited access to irrigation infrastructure and 
poor domestic market infrastructure. Azam, Imai, and Gaiha (2012) studied the farm households’ 
supply responses in Cambodia using Heckman approach with data from the Cambodia Socio-
Economic Surveys conducted in 2004 and 2007. Consistent with the results estimated by 
Heltberg and Tarp (2002), their findings suggest that such non-price factors as physical 
infrastructure in rural localities, technology of production and agro-ecological conditions are the 
major determinants of agricultural commercialization in Cambodia.     
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2.3.2 Land Titles and Commercialization of Agriculture 
The linkage between agricultural growth and formal land rights is not a new topic in the analysis 
and debate for developing countries such as Africa in the field of development economics. 
However, there are two strands of literature on the effects of legal land titles on agricultural 
growth and development. A group of literature supports the land titling programs and provides 
arguments for the beneficial socio-economic effects of land titles, while the other group is 
pessimistic about the socio-economic effects of land titles.   
(a) Proponents’ Land Titles Arguments  
Proponents of formal land titling program argue that agricultural growth is hindered by the 
underdevelopment of formal property rights on the continent, especially the limited share of land 
registered through legal documents to certify the rights to land, which perpetuates land as a “dead 
asset” (de Soto 2000). This argument depends theoretically on three economic advantages of 
formal land titling: (1) the legal land titles can be used as collateral to facilitate the access to 
loans for investments in agriculture; (2) the formal land titles can secure farm households’ tenure, 
whetting their appetite for undertaking medium- and long-term investments in land such as soil 
improvements or irrigation; and (3) the legal land titles may formalize land markets, facilitating 
transfer of land from nonproductive users to more productive ones (Feder 1988). As argued by 
Karlan, Robert, and Isaac (2013), smallholder farmers’ investment decisions in developing 
countries are constrained by their financial conditions, which can reduce their investments in 
highly-expected profit activities. This argument supports the introduction of legal land titles that 
can be used as collateral to improve the access to credit for such investments. It is recognized that 
these investments would improve farm productivity and stimulate farm households’ market-
oriented farming, thus simulating agricultural commercialization.  
Pingali and Rosegrant (1995) also argued that formal land titles can secure farm households’ 
land rights, providing incentives for them to invest in agricultural technology which is a main 
factor in improving farm productivity. If the land titles can secure the property rights as de Soto 
(1989, 2000) argued, it would likely allow farmers to have easier access to credit for their 
farming investments, which lay a main foundation for agricultural productivity growth. Feder and 
Nishio (1999) conducted the studies on land policies and farm performance in Thailand. Their 
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findings suggest that land titles induce higher farm investments, and titled land had significantly 
higher productivity per unit in comparison with the untitled land. Famers with legal land titles are 
very likely to invest more in land, and use more inputs and, thus, produce more output. 
Moreover, a study by Deininger, Jin, Xia, and Huang (2015) shows that land tenure insecurity is 
obstacle to structural transformation of Chinese economy through discouraging farm households 
from quitting the agriculture, thus having negative effects on agricultural productivity. 
Markussen (2009) investigated the impacts of land rights on farming output in Cambodia using 
data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey conducted in 2003/04. The findings show that 
formal land rights, defined as government-issued land ownership documents, have a significant 
impact on the output value in crop farming. In this case, the formal property rights are more 
effective in the least remote areas. Land plots with formal titles have higher productivity and 
value than untitled plots; however, formal land rights have weak effects on rural farmers’ access 
to credit. In addition, land security ensured by legal land rights can reduce conflicts, assure 
collateral availability, facilitate the bargaining power of the poor farm households and help 
reduce poverty (IFAD 2011).   
According to the international trade literature, the firms’ access to credit for their capital 
investments and technologies can improve the productivity, thus more likely to promote the 
firms’ exports. For example, high productivity firms tend to become exporters thanks to their 
production capacities, but entry into export markets does not necessarily bring about productivity 
growth (see e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1999; Bernard and Wagner 2001; Wagner 2007; Urata 
2014). Similarly, the farm households’ access to credit for capital investments in farming would 
be very likely to enhance their farm productivity. Thus, the legal land titles that provide not only 
incentives for farming investments but also facilitate the access to credit would promote farm 
productivity and farm households’ market-oriented farming. Through this channel, formal land 
titles would make it important to farmers’ market-oriented production and promote investments 
and productivity. Apart from the legal land titles, such institutional factors as culture and state 
governance would affect farming. For example, the agricultural production in Uganda is 
constrained by the socially-embedded institutional norms such as patriarchy and the governance-
related institutional flaws such as the coordination weaknesses within the sector line ministry 
(Bategeka, Kiiza, and Kasirye 2013). 
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(b) Opponents’ Land Titles Arguments  
On the opponent side, the legal land titles are argued to have small effects and even no effects on 
the agricultural growth and development. In spite of the strong theoretical arguments and some 
empirical evidence on the socio-economic advantages of formal land titling in developing 
countries, the suite of theoretical socio-economic advantages are contested (Biddulph 2014). For 
example, Cousins (2007) argued that poor landholders with land titles may be exposed to markets 
through distress sales of their land to wealthier actors at low prices, thus losing main productive 
assets and getting vulnerable. Moreover, using land titles as collateral can allow land owners to 
make benefits only if they have a realistic opportunity and the capacities necessary to get 
involved in beneficial business activity (Biddulph 2014). Worse still, the failure in investments 
secured by a farm households’ productive agricultural land will lead to impoverishment rather 
than enrichment (Bromley 2009). The benefits of land titling are based on the assumption that 
legally titling land is to substitute pre-existing informal systems that were not already effective in 
terms of providing for tenure security, access to credit and a means of transferring assets. But, if 
the informal institutions already provided such benefits, the advantages of formally titling land 
will be limited (Payne, Durand-Lasserve, and Radoki 2009). 
Furthermore, practically land titling schemes have often produced sub-optimal results, in 
particular for poor and marginal families and rural communities (Deininger and Feder 2009; 
Deinlnger and Binswanger 1999). These sub-optimal results are very likely caused by 
institutional arrangements. For example, the registration of land and land titling schemes are 
more often plagued by asymmetries of information between the haves and the have-nots, which 
give elites opportunity to acquire land at the expense of usufruct rights holders (Government of 
Kenya 2004; Jansen and Roquas 1998; Leuprecht 2004; World Bank 2003; Sitko, Chamberlin, 
and Hichaambwa 2014). Asymmetrical knowledge that brings about the elite land capture under 
the titling schemes may also lead to sub-optimal land use, because those who acquire the land 
titles may be engaging in speculative activities, rather than in productive activities such as 
production (Benjaminsen and Sjaastad 2002; Peters 2004; Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa 
2014). Furthermore, land titling schemes may reduce some of the benefits that can be generated 
from customary tenure systems, such as commune management of resources in localities and 
community grazing rights (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009). Therefore, the land titling 
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programs can cause wealth inequalities and undermine living standards of the poor and 
venerable, if one fails or ignores to address poor institutional arrangements that can lead to 
asymmetrical knowledge and power differentials in localities (Sitko, Chamberlin, and 
Hichaambwa 2014).  
Enabling the minority of elites to accumulate and alienate land is inconsistent with land 
titling programs’ purposes of promoting agricultural growth or comercialzation. The programs 
raise some concerns over their socio-economic effects on farm households, in particular small-
scale farmers. If the programs produce unwanted outcomes, speculative rather than productive 
land acquisition by the minority of elites in the society, the effects of such schemes on 
agricultural growth or agricultural productivity improvement will not be produced. Moreover, if 
the programs exclude or replace marginal farm households in rural communities, farmers’ 
enclosure process may take root, forestalling the potential for agriculture to contribute to poverty 
alleviation (Woodhouse 2003). Thus, the evaluation of the agricultural and socio-economic 
effects of land titling programs is complicated and may yield different results depending on each 
particular case. For example, the assessment of the effects of land titling schemes on agricultural 
growth in Africa has provided mixed results (mixed effects) (Sitko, Chamberlin, and 
Hichaambwa 2014).  
Yet, some studies found that formal land titling induces farm households to undertake long-
term investments in land, such as planting crops and tree and other investments in soil quality 
improvement; however, the magnitude of the effects is often small (Deininger, Ali, Holden, and 
Zevenbergen 2008; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Otsuka and Place 2001; Smith 2004). In 
addition to this small effects, a number of literature on formal land rights in Africa shows that 
land titling programs in many cases has weak or no effects on smallholders’ agricultural 
productivity, agricultural growth or investments in land (see e.g., Place 2009; Carter and Olinto 
2003; Deininger and Feder 2009; Place and Migot-Adholla 1998). The increasing evidence that 
the land titling schemes have failed to confirm the arguments by the proponents has caused some 
to suggest that land rights security within customary land areas does not constrain farm 
productivity growth in developing countries, such as Africa (Place and Hazell 1993). Instead, one 
may be concerned about access to technologies and underdevelopment of credit markets in rural 
communities (Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa 2014).  
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Although many land titling programs are likely to fail in some developing countries such as 
Africa to facilitate the process of famers’ production, predicted by the opponents of land titling 
programs, a priori whether formal land rights can be effective in terms of promoting the 
commercialization of agriculture has yet to be evidenced in Cambodia. Khmer Rouge rule, civil 
war and social chaos completely destroyed traditional, formal institutions, property rights 
included, on the one hand. In this regard, the introduction of legal land rights would be very 
likely important for the agricultural growth and the commercialization of agriculture in particular. 
On the other hand, after the first election backed by the United Nations in 1993, formal 
institutions and institutional arrangements have remained poor due to the government’s limited 
capacity to enforce the rule of law. If the authorities’ capacity to enforce the introduced rights is 
limited, the introduction of legal land rights would be ineffective in terms of promoting the 
commercialization of agriculture. 
Poor development of markets for agricultural products constrained by non-price factors 
discussed earlier leads the majority of agricultural production to be self-sufficiently oriented. 
Typically, the improvement in farm households’ living standards depends on the performance of 
agricultural sector. But, the improvement of the agricultural sector performance as a whole 
depends also on the farm households’ production behavior (Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012). The 
analysis of the effects of legal land rights capturing land security on subsistence farmers’ 
marketing behavior may pave the way for choosing appropriate policies to reduce the market 
efficiency gap and to promote the commercialization of agriculture. So too, with those policies in 
place, the farm households’ living standards, in particular for small-scale farmers, would very 
likely be improved through the commercialization of a variety of agricultural products. If the 
formal land rights are effectively enforced in Cambodia, they might have the significant effects 
on the farm households’ market-oriented farming. Moreover, the evidence of the linkages 
between institutional factors such as transaction costs and formal land rights and agricultural 
growth, in particular the commercialization of agriculture, at the household level has yet to be 
explored in the case of Cambodia, where most of the people are farmers living in the rural areas 
where poverty rates are still high. The current dissertation is also a part of a growing branch of 
literature on institutional economics that tries to scrutinize the effects of institutional factors on 
economic development. 
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2.4 Socio-Economic Effects of Market Participation on Farm Households 
The role of market participation to play in promoting agricultural diversity and increasing 
household earnings and welfare as well as household nutrition is discussed by many studies (see 
e.g., Hernandez, Reardon, and Berdegue 2007; Rao and Qaim 2011; Rao, Brümmer, and Qaim 
2012; Barrett et al. 2012; Bellemare 2012; Maertens, Minten, and Swinnen 2012; Asfaw, Lipper, 
Dalton, and Audi 2012; Michelson 2013; Muriithi and Matz 2015; Chege, Andersson, and Qaim 
2015). Their findings show that participation in markets can promote farm diversity, improve 
farm household nutrition and enhance household earnings. For example, Hernandez, Reardon, 
and Berdegue (2007) provided evidence that participation of tomato farmers in supermarkets has 
significantly positive association with the yields in Guatemala. Furthermore, Rao and Qaim 
(2011) found the significantly positive correlation between the farm households’ supply of 
vegetables to supermarkets and their household earnings in Kenya. In addition to the findings in 
the case of Kenya, Rao, Brümmer, and Qaim (2012) found that entrance into supermarket 
channels improves farm productivity in terms of technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The 
increased revenue from selling commodities in markets allows farm households to undertake 
more investments in productive capital and chemical fertilizers, then improving agricultural 
productivity as argued by Zhang and Fan (2004).     
Michelson (2013) analyzed the role of geographical location of supermarket supply chain 
during 2000-2008 in Nicaragua by using panel data. The author employed a difference-in-
differences method comparing growth of suppliers’ and non-suppliers’ assets overtime to 
evaluate impacts of market entry on smallholder well-being. The findings demonstrate that 
supplying to supermarkets augments the holdings of productive assets. Moreover, farm 
households with advantageous geographical location and access to water are very likely to enter 
the markets. Muriithi and Matz (2015) examined the effects of smallholders’ commercialization 
of horticulture on household welfare based on household income and wealth by using panel data 
on household survey from Kenya. By estimating an OLS regression and controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity across households, the authors found that the commercialization of 
vegetable has significantly positive impacts on household well-being. However, the effects 
depend on market channels, with export channel producing positive effects on income but not on 
wealth and with domestic channel producing unclear effects on wealth and income.  
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Chege, Andersson, and Qaim (2015) investigated the nutrition effects of supermarkets on 
farm households by estimating simultaneous equation models with data from a survey in Kenya. 
The estimation results show that entry into supermarkets is positively associated with 
consumption of vitamin A, calorie, iron and zinc. The findings indicate participation in 
supermarkets increases household nutrition. Moreover, the farm households that supply produce 
to supermarkets enjoy significantly higher incomes than those that do not. Bellemare (2012) 
analyzed the effects of contract farming on household welfare proxied by household income by 
using cross-sectional data and addressing self-selection issue with an instrumental variable 
approach. The author found that participation in farming contract stimulates household income 
and reduces the vulnerability of household earnings.  
Roa and Qaim (2011) studied the effects of supermarket participation on farm household 
income and poverty, by applying an endogenous switching regression method to cross-sectional 
data from a vegetable farmer survey in Kenya. The estimated results suggest that entrance into 
supermarkets increase household incomes and contribute to poverty alleviation. Asfaw et al. 
(2012) investigated factors affecting participation in input and output markets and evaluated the 
effects of market participation on crop diversity and household well-being in Kenya by using a 
propensity score matching (PSM) method with cross-sectional data. The results show that input 
market entrance is affected by access to off-farm income, transportation ownership and farm size, 
while the output market entry is determined by farm size, household characteristics and 
ownership of radio. The participation in output market is found to increase food security, while 
the significant effects of input market entry on household well-being is not found. Yet, one 
should recognize that this approach cannot control for unobserved characteristics, such as 
entrepreneurial skills and motivation, that potentially influence both the treatment and outcome, 
and then more likely to yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the welfare effects (Seng 2015). 
 Few empirical studies evaluate the impacts of market participation on farm productivity (see 
e.g., Govereh and Jayne 1999; Strasberg et al. 1999) and household food security (Asfaw et al. 
2012). In those studies, the farm productivity was measured by yields per acre which cannot 
represent the productivity well. The current study measures the farm productivity in terms of 
yields per hectare and working-age household member, gross margin per hectare and per 
working-age household member. In addition, the current study investigates the effects of market 
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participation on household food security in terms of household food consumption per capita and 
household dietary diversity score. Furthermore, a study measures the extent to which the market 
participation contributes to enhancing the farm productivity in terms of gross margins and 
improving household food security in terms of household food consumption and dietary diversity 
score other than income is rare to my knowledge. To analyze the potential for market-oriented 
farming to enhance the farm productivity and to improve household food security in rural 
Cambodia, one needs an unbiased and consistent estimation of its effects. In the current study, it 
is recognized that the differences in productivity and food security outcome variables between the 
market participants and the nonparticipants could be resulted from selection bias. This 
dissertation makes an attempt to reduce the bias and inconsistent estimation by accounting for the 
endogeneity of the decisions regarding participation in crop output markets, which arises from 
observed households and farm characteristics. To do so, following Asfaw et al. (2012), the study 
adopts the PSM approach to evaluate the effects of farm households’ participation in markets on 
farm productivity in terms of yields per hectare and per working-age household member, gross 
margin per hectare and per working-age household member and on household food security in 
terms of per capita food consumption and food security index. 
Nevertheless, it is better to control for unobserved effects resulting from unobserved 
household characteristics and farm characteristics when assessing the socio-economic effects of 
households’ market participation (Rao and Qaim 2011). There are few empirical studies that 
evaluate the socio-economic impacts of agricultural commercialization on farm households by 
addressing endogeneity arising from endogenous bias of decisions regarding market entry and 
structural differences between the market participants and nonparticipants with cross-sectional 
data. Furthermore, to my knowledge, a study measures the extent to which the commercialization 
contributes to the farm households’ livelihoods or poverty reduction in terms of agricultural 
productivity and household food security is still limited in number. To investigate the potential 
for the agriculture to improve the farm households’ living standards and reduce rural poverty in 
Cambodia, one needs an unbiased and consistent estimation of the socio-economic effects of 
farmers’ entrance to markets. Also, this dissertation makes attempt to reduce the bias and 
inconsistent estimation by accounting for systematic differences between the market participants 
and nonparticipants due to observed confounders.          
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While the commercialization of agriculture has been perceived as a contributor to poverty 
reduction in developing countries, the market environment may raise concern over small-scale 
farmers’ ability to compete in growingly-integrated markets. For example, when developing 
countries are increasingly integrated into international trade, farmers, especially smallholder 
farmers, are increasingly constrained by non-tariff barriers such as produce quality and safety 
standards (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Jaffee 2003; Henson and Reardon 2005; Jaffee et al. 
2005; Okello and Swinton 2007). This encourages exporters to move away from small-scale 
contract farming to either large-scale farmers or developing their own agro-businesses by 
diversifying into large-scale production (Graffham, Karehu, and McGregor 2007; Okello, Narrod, 
and Roy 2007; Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Adekunle et al. 2012; Maertens, Minten, and 
Swinnen 2012). This rational move may produce negative effects on smallholder farmers. 
Moreover, small-scale farmers may gain less from supplying produce to domestic supermarkets 
because they find it hard to meet the standard requirements and face high transportation costs 
(Neven and Reardon 2004; Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Neven, Odera, Reardon, and Wang 
2009). Then, they may get stuck in subsistence farming or supply their produce to traditional 
markets which, however, offer lower returns than do supermarkets (Muendo and Tschirley 2004). 
Apart from the standard requirements, Barrett et al. (2012) argued that limited access to 
productive assets and unfavorable geographical location place constraints on contract farming of 
small-scale farmers in five countries from Asia, Africa and Central America. Moreover, Barrett 
(2008) asserts that, to alleviate poverty in eastern and southern Africa, rural markets need to work 
more cost-efficiently in order that cereal farmers have easier access to modern technologies and 
productive inputs. Also, the deficiency in physical infrastructure (road, irrigation, information 
technology, and so forth), high production costs and transaction costs, limited access to credit and 
production technologies like fertilizer, irrigation equipment and so forth impose constraints on 
market participation of farmers (Jaffee 2003; Adekunle et al. 2012).  
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
It comes to conclude that high transaction costs affected by household specific characteristics are 
obstacle to farmers’ market participation, hindering the process of agricultural development in 
developing countries, in particular commercialization. To analyze farm households’ behavior 
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towards marketing-oriented farming, the transaction costs cannot be overlooked. However, other 
non-price factors such as infrastructure, irrigation system, technologies and agro-ecological 
conditions have also influence on farmers’ supply response. In addition, one should not ignore 
farmers’ incentives to make investments in farming, access to credit for agricultural investments. 
Nevertheless, these factors are very likely influenced by formal land titles. The proponents of 
land titling programs argue that the formal land titles are important to agricultural growth in 
developing countries. However, according to the opponents’ arguments, the effects of formal land 
titles on agricultural development are mixed, with some studies finding that there are weak or no 
impacts on agricultural productivity and growth. These results cast doubts on the effects of 
formal land titling on agricultural development in Cambodia, in particular the commercialization 
of agriculture.  
As far as the socio-economic effects of agricultural commercialization, the literature also 
shows that participation in markets is very likely to have socio-economic effects on farm 
households by promoting farm diversity, improving farm household nutrition and enhancing 
household earnings. Nonetheless, one is still concerned about small-scale farmers’ ability to 
compete in markets due to their limited access to productive assets and market standard 
requirements. In this case, smallholder farmers can make less benefit from their participation in 
markets. The next chapter of the dissertation will analyze main factors determining the farm 
households’ market-oriented farming in Cambodia, with a main focus on transaction costs and 
legal land rights captured by land ownership certificates issued by the authorities.     
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Chapter 3: Formal Land Rights and Market Participation 
3.1  Introduction 
The agriculture is a major income generator for rural households in less developed countries such 
as Cambodia. The well developing sector makes tremendous contribution to poverty and 
inequality reduction in out-of-the-way areas. The commercialization of agriculture has been 
considered one of the most likely avenues to promote agricultural development. Over the past 
two decades, Cambodia has recorded remarkable economic growth which was mainly driven by 
tourism and agriculture, making a tremendous contribution to reducing poverty from 
approximately 50% in 2004 to 20% in 2011 (ADB 2013). Still, inequality in income and food 
consumption between rural and urban populations has increased, with urban households enjoying 
higher income and consumption levels (Seng 2015a). The nationwide undernourishment 
prevalence declined from approximately 37% in 2004 to 33% in 2009; however, rural 
undernourishment, especially among the poorest households, slightly increased (NIS 2011), 
raising concern over food security issues among rural farmers and the poorest population. This 
result suggests that more attention should be paid to rural economic development.  
Related to arable land areas, only 0.90% of the total land areas are now permanently-farmed 
(Hem 2012), reflecting that the agricultural resources are not fully used, causing the agricultural 
output level to be below what it otherwise would be. The agriculture is dominated by paddy 
crops, with the system of rice-based farming having been used in the country for more than 2000 
years (Nesbitt 1997). Small-scale agriculture is still the main driving force for the growth of rural 
economies, serving as a pathway to improving livelihoods and lifting large numbers of the rural 
households out of poverty. The majority of farm households, especially smallholder farmers, 
make their living by farming, either for subsistence or small-scale commercial purpose, 
conditionally upon rain-fed water. Improving rural livelihoods requires a transformation from 
subsistence, semi-subsistence, low input, and low productivity agriculture which characterizes the 
farming systems in many developing countries (Olwande et al. 2015). The characteristic of 
farming in Cambodia is not an exception. Transforming from subsistence, semi-subsistence, low 
input, and low productivity farming into market-oriented farming can not only promote the full-
employment of agricultural resources but also bridge market efficiency gaps. The market-
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oriented agriculture has been equally considered as a major strategy to conquer many challenges 
facing rural farm households and to respond to opportunities.  
The commercialization of agriculture refers in general to the shift from subsistence 
production to market-oriented production with an increasingly complex farming system (Goletti 
2005), implying that a change in product choice and input use decisions are made based on 
market forces and the principle of profit maximization (Pingali and Rosegrant 1995). Vertical 
linkages between input and output markets are strongly reinforced through the 
commercialization, (Jaleta, Gebremedhin, and Hoekstra 2009). The pathways of 
commercialization in rural communities depend on the farming system, market institutions and 
government policy (Olwande et al. 2015). Several studies address the constraints to farm 
households’ market participation, particularly smallholders, with a main focus on transaction 
costs (see e.g., Von Braun, Bouis, and Kennedy 1991; Goetz 1992; Omamo 1998; Key, Sadoulet, 
and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2003; Vance and 
Geoghegan 2004; Carter and Yao 2002; Carter and Olinto 2003; Henning and Henningsen 2007; 
Omiti et al. 2009; and Jagwe, Machethe, and Ouma 2010; Olwande et al. 2015). Some other 
studies focus the analysis on limited resources and the types of interventions (see e.g., Bijman, 
Ton, and Meijerink 2007; Poulton, Kydd, and Dorward 2006; all compiled by ILRI 2011). The 
authors distinguish a variety of transaction costs (access to ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ infrastructure, risk 
(production, price, and income) and resource constraints (skills, land, and productive 
equipments)). Such factors have significant effects on the farm households’ market participation.   
Nonetheless, according to the above reviewed literature on legal land titling, land titling 
programs are likely to have mixed effects on agricultural growth and development, more possibly 
depending on the quality of institutional arrangements in individual countries. Thus, the legal 
land rights may be important to agricultural growth and development, in particular the 
commercialization of agriculture, in Cambodia where formal land titling programs have just put 
into practice and the enforcement of legal land rights has remained poor.1
                                                             
1 Because the enforcement of law is weak (week institution), causing high corruption in land sector (see also, 
Transparency International and FAO 2011; Oum 2013)   
  Some Cambodian 
farmers, especially low income farmers, are landless or lost their land, as a result of the 
government’s economic land concession, insecure land rights and tenure, limited access to 
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information, and land grabbing. Poor institution, high corruption, and land ownership and titling 
issues are particularly serious problems in Cambodia (Hill and Menon 2013). In 2008, 150,000 
Cambodians nationwide were intimidated into getting forcibly evicted;2
3.2 Overview of Land Rights Issues in Cambodia 
 and approximately 
21.10% of the 2235 households sampled were landless, and approximately 26.30% held less than 
half a hectare of land (Chan 2008). 
This chapter aims to provide new empirical insights into the question of why some farm 
households produce crops for sale purposes, but some others do not. In so doing, the study 
examines factors determining the farm households’ decisions of whether to participate or not 
participate in markets as sellers, with a main focus on the effects of legal land rights. The main 
conclusion of this chapter is that in addition to the transaction costs, legal land rights are very 
likely to promote the commercialization of agriculture. The finding is crucial to the government’s 
policies at micro and macro level in promoting rural livelihoods through the commercialization of 
agriculture.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the issues of land rights 
in Cambodia, Section 3 describes analytical framework and data used for the empirical analysis, 
Section 4 presents the results and discussion, and Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
This section overviews land disputes, development of land tenure security and history of land 
reform in the context of Cambodia. Due to domestic political ups and downs, Cambodia has 
experienced significant institutional changes from a regime to another, causing property rights 
issues, land tenure security issues in particular. Because the country is agrarian, land issues are 
important to the development, in particular in rural areas. In this context, the current government 
has paid attention to land reforms.    
3.2.1 Brief Historical Changes in Land Tenure 
To be aware of the development of legal land rights in Cambodia, it is necessary to understand 
historical changes in Cambodia’ land tenure systems. The following overview focuses on the 
                                                             
2 The data were estimated by the Amnesty International in 2008.  
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development of land tenure systems and the government’s major institutional arrangements for 
land reforms. 
In the pre-French colonization (pre-1863), technically land belonged to the sovereign, but 
practically people were able to freely do as much land as they wanted (So et al. 2001; Sar 2010). 
However, traditional cultivation with limited farming equipments restricted individual 
landholdings to 1 - 3 hectares or less. Because the population was small and land market did not 
exist, farmers could move from one area to another freely and acquire land ownership. Land 
owners had exclusive right to own, utilize and inherit agricultural land, without having to fulfill 
any formal requirement other than a feudal tribute (Thion 1993).  
During French colonial period (1863-1953), French colonist changed the traditional land use 
system by creating the first law in 1884 to introduce the system of private property and formal 
land ownership, but not fully implanted due to Cambodian farmers’ resistance. By 1930, rice-
farming fields were registered as private lands and farmers were permitted to sell their lands, with 
lands mostly divided into plots of 5 hectare or less (Sar 2010). After French colonial period, 
during independence period (1953-1975) Cambodia continued the existing system of land rights 
introduced by the French, and land transactions increased but still limited. According the Census 
conducted in 1962, 84% of 800 000 farm households were land owners (Sar 2010). During the 
Khmer Rouge (1975-1979), land tenure and cadastral records were completely destroyed, all 
private properties were collectivized, and thus all land belonged to the state.  
After the collapse of the Khmer Rouge, during People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979-
1989) all land still belonged to the state officially, with three types of collectives being 
established which used land for residential and agricultural purposes. The collective group 1 
consisted of 30 households, the collective group 2 consisted of 20 households, and the collective 
group 3 consisted of 4 - 5 households (Sar 2010). However, from 1985 the government started 
land reform by keeping the collective group 3 in effect and granting the remainders to individuals 
by share cropping. By 1989, the government started reforming economic system, transforming 
the planning economy into free-market economy. Also a new land management policy was 
formulated, confirming that the state was the default owner of the land of the country and 
affirmed rights to acquire residential land ownership. Since then, the government has 
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reintroduced private land rights, with farmers and non-farmers having been able to own private 
land.3 Unused land for three years or more has gone back to the state. The Ministry of 
Agriculture implemented the policy, being in charge of establishing a cadastral department to 
manage the utilization of nationwide agricultural land.4 The ministry received 3.7 million 
applications by the end of 1990.5
In 1999, the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) 
was established, being in charge of governing and administering the issues concerning land 
management, urbanization and construction under the Law on the Establishment of the Ministry 
of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction, adopted in 1999. Under this law, a new 
 However, by the mid-1990s, only approximately 518,000 land 
titles have been granted (Chan, Saravy, and Acharya 2001).  
Nevertheless, the distribution of land in the late 1980s was partly for a de facto recognition 
of land already possessed by people under the collective group 1, there was also new land 
distribution. But, the transition from the collective to private ownership was not uniformly 
recognized by either the population or administrative agents; moreover, plots demarcation was 
not clearly and officially due to limited capacity of the authorities (Grimsditch, Kol, and 
Sherchan 2012). According to Article 59 of the Land Law adopted in 1992, the ownership 
acquisition could in principle be made through succession, contract or conversion of temporary 
ownership into full possession. Land was registered on a sporadic basis following individual 
landholders’ application. With no centralized national land register, local authorities’ capacities 
to maintain the registers of detailed land ownership were limited. Moreover, the process of 
registration was costly, with the system of payment, both official and unofficial, for the issuance 
of titles. The registration was reported to cost the applicants by as much as US$ 300 - 400 
(Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 2012). Furthermore, the application for a certificate of title was 
very time-consuming, routinely going through at least 8 - 10 offices in at village, commune, 
district, provincial and national level (So et al. 2001; Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 2012). 
                                                             
3 See also, People’s Republic of Kampuchea, Council of Ministers, Sub-decree No25 on Providing House Ownership 
to the Cambodian Population, 22 April 1989. 
4 People’s Republic of Kampuchea, Council of Ministers, Instruction No. 03 on Implementation of Land Use and 
Management Policy, 3 June 1989. 
5 State of Cambodia, Council of Ministers, Instruction No. 03 on the Amendment of Instruction No. 03, dated 3 June 
1989, of the Council of Ministers, 8 December 1990. 
35 
 
land law with technical supports from development partners such as ADB was adopted in 2001 to 
replace the 1992 land law. The 2001 law paved the way for a new national land register and 
systematic land registration (Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 2012). According to Article 29 of the 
2001 law, acquiring land ownership through possession may be changed into full ownership, but 
only the possession prior to the date of the law being in effect. Any possession after 2001 is 
considered invalid.6
3.2.2 Land Conflicts and Tenure Security  
 Moreover, in accordance with Article 30 of the law, any person who, for five 
years or more prior to the date of the law being in effect, enjoyed undisputed possession of land 
that can be legally privately possessed, is given legal rights to request a title of land ownership 
from the authorities. Therefore, the provisions for the lawful possession rights stated in the 2001 
land law serve as the basic for Cambodian people who have not yet received legal land titles to 
claim the titles.    
By the mid-1990s, the government succeeded in the strategies to integrate the Khmer Rouge 
fighting force into the mainstream. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, land conflicts have 
emerged and become a cause of potential unrest. Typically, the conflicts happened between 
villagers and military commander, or senior government officials, or a shadowy company with 
difficult-to-be-identified connections that took the land claimed by the villagers to belong to them 
(Biddulph 2014). Very often, the groups of these villagers travelled to Phnom Penh to ask the 
national parliament or the prime minister to resolve their conflicts. However, most of the 
conflicts have been unsolved; and these dispossessed villagers just wait for the government’ 
appropriate intervention which never came. The hard-to-settle conflicts are mostly related to 
political and/or business elites or their relatives that have controlled the land claimed by the 
dispossessed villagers.        
As mentioned earlier, at least two thirds of the Cambodians live their life on agriculture, 
suggesting that land distribution is crucial to the agricultural development. It was estimated that 
agricultural land as a percentage of the country’s total land area increased from 32% during the 
period 2000-2005 to 32.60% during the period 2006-2010 and 32.90% during the period 2011-
                                                             
6 Royal Government of Cambodia, Notification No. 43 on Cessation of Acquisitive Possession of Immovable 
Property, 6 September 2001. 
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2015, while arable land increased during the corresponding periods from 22.70% to 23.20% and 
23.50%.7
Over the last two decades, arable land competition has increased, and thousands of hectares 
of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) have been granted by the government for agricultural 
industry development, and many were reported in violation of residents’ rights to land 
(Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 2012).
 Furthermore, approximately 20% of the rural households are landless, while 25% of the 
rural families own arable land of less than 0.5 ha (World Bank 2004, p. 60).  
8 Approximately 2 million hectares of ELCs (forestry 
concessions and special economic zones) have been granted to private companies (World Vision 
2012). It was approximately 5.20% of Cambodian land (59 concessions) that has been granted as 
the ELCs, with 36 of these concessions having been granted to foreign companies or profile 
political or business elites.9
                                                             
7 World Development Indicators, agricultural land, 
 Moreover, 21% of the total land has been granted as the forestry 
concessions (GTZ 2006), while Pheapimex, the most powerful company in the Kingdom, has 
controlled up to 7.40% of the total land (Global Witness 2007, p. 10). At the same time, the 
development of infrastructure has caused residential and agricultural land expropriation (Bugalski 
and Medallo 2012); many households have been reported to lose their land after the dispute with 
powerful elites that engaged in land speculation (So 2010, p. 3). The ELCs with total land areas 
of 1 million hectares have been granted to 60 companies, and most of the areas are non-flooded, 
degraded forests and cover a variety of such crops as rubber, palm oil, sugar cane, cashew, 
coffee, and forest plantations (IFAD 2011). However, most of these land concessions are very 
often disputed and still unresolved, causing overlapping land claims of the affluent and local 
villagers (Gaiha and Azam 2011). The disputes have resulted from poor and patchy assessment of 
environmental effects, inefficient business plans implementation, few instances of consultation 
with the localities before the project approvals, and the disruption of traditional lives of the 
disadvantaged groups of farm households in remote communities (Gaiha and Azam 2011; IFAD 
2011). The farm households that have experienced land disputes usually possess land without 
legal titles issued by the authorities. One notes that the disputed land is mostly the bequest land 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.AGRI.ZS/countries 
(access November 2015).  
8 See also UN. 2007. Economic Land Concessions in Cambodia: A Human Rights Perspective. Cambodia Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Phnom Penh. 
9 Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia: Land concessions for economic 
purposes in Cambodia. A human rights perspective, Phnom Penh, June 2007, p. 1 
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that is traditionally transferred from one generation to another. Over these two decades, the 
untitled land issues, which have caused the majority of the farm households’ land to be insecure, 
have contributed to systematic land disputes that are difficult to be resolved.       
Nevertheless, official statistics on the eviction numbers have in recent years been 
unavailable, and it is difficult to have a reliable estimates. In 2008, the Amnesty International 
estimated that 150,000 people across the Kingdom were facing the threat of forced eviction. 
According to a Cambodian media that indicated main figures extracted from LICHADO, 654 
disputes have recently been recorded with the land of 85,000 households or 400,000 citizens 
being involved in the disputes (Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 2012). According to ADHOC, 
since 2000 disputes involving 150,000 households or approximately 700,000 people have been 
recorded nationwide.10
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) recognizes that providing secure land tenure is 
vital for Cambodia to ensure social stability and alleviate poverty, in particular in rural 
communities. In this regard, the RGC formulated the guiding strategy behind the current policies 
and reforms, which are the Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency 
in Cambodia, often referred to as “the Rectangular Strategy”. One of the strategy’s rectangles is 
the “Enhancement of the Agricultural Sector”, for which the RGC’s first priority is “to strengthen 
land tenure rights of the people (Hun Sen 2004, p. 14).”
 Not only do the rural populations be affected by the tenure insecurity and 
land conflicts, but also the urban populations suffer. A survey by So et al. (2001) shows that up to 
12% of all rural families are landless; and in particular female-headed households’ landlessness is 
higher than male-headed households’ landlessness. Between 1998 and 2003, approximately 
11,000 households and between 2003 and 2008 approximately further 30,000 citizens were 
forcibly evicted from Phnom Penh (World Bank 2006, p. 48; AI 2008, p. 7). The recent data from 
a civil society organization shows that, between 1990 and 2011, approximately 146,800 residents 
have been evicted, resettled from their home in Phnom Penh (Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 
2012). 
11
                                                             
10 Paul Vriaze and Kuch Narin, Sold: In the race to exploit Cambodia’s land and forests, new maps reveal the rapid 
spread of plantations and mining across the nation, Cambodia Daily, 10-11 March 2012.  
11 Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, The Rectangular Strategy 
for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia, address to the First Cabinet Meeting of the 
Third Legislature of the National Assembly at the Office of the Council of Ministers, July 2004, p. 14. 
 The RGC published the National 
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Strategic Development Plan built on the Rectangular Strategy, which among the key priorities re-
stresses the necessity of land reform: 
“The Royal Government of Cambodia recognizes that land reform is crucial to promoting 
social stability, development of an efficient land market, environmental sustainability, and 
increasing agricultural productivity through the issuance of legal land titles to the citizens; 
in particular, to farmers who are cultivating land that they have been occupying. The 
issuance of legal land titles is important to improving the management of land use, 
especially the management of state-owned lands to ensure the security of land tenure in a 
transparent and equitable manner and to further reduce poverty by enabling citizens to have 
access to financial markets with their land titles as collateral.”12
3.2.3 Land Reforms: Land Management and Administration   
  
In fact, the institutional arrangements for Cambodia’s land reform were not clear during 1990s. It 
seemed that two land laws were developed: one was under the Ministry of Justice with technical 
assistance from one donor, and the other one was under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
supported by another donor. Meanwhile, some major donors were proposing various pilots of 
procedures that might be adopted to carry out a new round of mass land titling. In 1999, the 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction was established and in charge 
of developing a new land law. The law was developed with civil society consultation through the 
Bar Association of Cambodia, which was responsible for coordinating comments on the drafts of 
the new law by several NGOs concerned about land issues. 
(a) 2001 Land Law 
In 2001, the new land law with technical supports from development partners such as the ADB 
was adopted to replace the 1992 law. The 2001 law paved the way for a new national land 
register and systematic land registration (Grimsditch, Kol, and Sherchan 2012). According to 
Article 29 of 2001 law, acquiring land ownership through possession may be changed into full 
ownership, but only the possession prior to the date of the law being in effect. Any possession 
                                                             
12 Royal Government of Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan Update 2009-2013, June 2010, 
p. 33. 
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after 2001 is invalid. In accordance with Article 30 of the law, any person who, for five year or 
more prior to the date of the law being in effect, enjoyed undisputed possession of land that can 
be legally privately possessed, is given legal right to request a title of land ownership from 
authorities. Therefore, provisions for the lawful possession rights stated in the 2001 Land Law 
serve as the basic for Cambodians who have not yet obtained legal land titles to claim the titles. 
(b)  Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP) 
To achieve the land reform, the RGC needed support, both financial and technical, from 
international organization partners. In 2002, the World Bank Group’s Board of Executive 
Directors approved the Land Management and Administration Project proposed (LMAP) by the 
RGC. The project was established to improve tenure security for the poor and reduce land 
disputes in the Kingdom by systematically registering land and granting certificates of land titles 
to the land owners across the country. Under this project, the new titles were granted to people 
who got already application receipts or similar documents. 
The objective of LMAP were to help the government in implementing its program of actions, 
objectives and policies formulated to improve land tenure security and develop efficient land 
markets. The program of the government includes: (1) the development of appropriate national 
policies, regulation and institutions for land management and administration; (2) the issuance and 
registration of land titles in rural and urban communities in the projected provinces; and (3) the 
development of an efficient and transparent land management and administration system. To 
accomplish these objectives, LMAP provides financial support for five inter-related components 
(Biddulph 2014):  
Component 1: formulation of land policies and development of regulatory framework 
Component 2: development of institutions 
Component 3: land titling program and development of land registration system 
Component 4: strengthening of dispute resolution mechanism 
Component 5: land management and administration  
The land titling program is closely related to systematic titling which has something to do 
with the implementation of mass titling. In this program, households were not required to apply 
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for title, surveyors were sent to a village where they mapped every plot of land in the village and 
temporarily assigned an occupier to each plot. The procedure created a village map that was then 
put in public for 30 days. During this period, anyone who wanted to dispute any case of the 
assignments was welcomed. Then, cadastral officials and local authorities would resolve the 
disputes as many as possible within this period of display. After the public display, land 
ownership titles would be issued for all of the plots that were not contested. By using 
computerized system, the recipients of titles were charged a fee of 1 riel and 100 riels per square 
meter of agricultural land and residential land, respectively (Biddulph 2014). However, plots that 
were contested would be still untitled; and the disputes would be settled through a separate 
process of adjudication. The surveys conducted by Deutsch (2006) and Deutsch and Makathy 
(2009) found that the vast majority of recipients were satisfied with the titling procedure.  
Nevertheless, according to a report produced by Grimsditch and Henderson (2009), there had 
been increasing land-grabbing and forced evictions over the last ten years, while many victims 
and vulnerable households have been arbitrarily out of the land titling system. The report also 
showed that due to the exclusion from the titling system, these households could not be protected 
against the land-grabbing, and the inappropriate compensation for their expropriated land, often 
getting plunged into extreme poverty conditions. The reasons behind the exclusion can be 
resulted from the corruption issues in the process of land registration and time-consuming 
process and well as high costs.  
In 2009, the World Bank urged the RGC to consider appropriate measures to bring the 
LMAP project back to the compliance. In the same year, the government ended the LMAP 
project agreement with the World Bank, claiming that the World Bank’s conditions were 
complicated to be implemented in Cambodia. According to the World Bank, the failure of the 
project was attributed to the fact that the government has been unwilling to cooperate with the 
bank to continue the project. This suggests that the land tiling and registration are still 
problematic in the society because the important project was frozen. Moreover, until now most of 
the land disputes have been solved inappropriately, and some cases have been unsolved, making 
some poor farmers in remote communities unable to engage fully in their farming activities. 
Worse still, some of them remain landless.  
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3.2.4 The Prime Minister’s Land Titling Program 2012-2013 
After 2009, the government continued the mass titling without the World Bank’s involvement by 
carrying out the same procedures of titling, making rapid progress in small-scale farming areas 
but slow progress in urban areas. Still, the titling program has not yet been completed, with 
small-scale farmers engaging in farming with untitled land and in some cases seeing land 
disputes. However, one year before the national elections in 2013, the Prime Minister took 
unexpected initiative indicating the political currency investment in land titling and in the ability 
to reduce land disputes (Milne 2013).  
Facing increasing criticism of the non-transparent granting of large-scale ELCs on former 
commons claimed by the government, the Prime Minister announced his personal program of 
land titling to deal with the tenure insecurity of poor households, in particular farm households, 
living on and farming such land. This program was financed by the Prime Minister’s office. To 
implement the program, 5000 student volunteers were recruited and given military uniforms. 
They were dispatched to out-of-the-way provinces accompanied by cadastral officers who have 
LMAP experiences to study the land occupied by poor households. As de Soto argued, the Prime 
Minister explained that land titles would secure tenure, thus any concessions granted by the state 
in the future would not replace them, and that the issued land titles would allow the landholders 
to have easier access to credit for their investments in farming (Milne 2013). The program was 
well-known in Cambodia, with the students involved being regularly interviewed on the national 
television and being motivated by promoting them to the government officials without taking any 
entrance exam.  
Nonetheless, there have been little studies on whether this program is effective in addressing 
land disputes and tenure security. Given that the rate of migration from resolved farming areas 
into agricultural-forest frontier has been increasing rapidly; and the incentives for business and 
government official elites to claim and trade land have got stronger locally and nationally, it is 
very unlikely that the Prime Minister’s program will be effective in this complicated policy issue 
(Milne 2013; Biddulph 2014).          
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3.3 Analytical Framework and Empirical Approach 
This section begins with a discussion of theoretical framework following by econometric 
approaches to the empirical analysis and ends with a description of the source of data and 
variables used in the analysis. A rigorous econometric approach is used to analyze factors 
determining the farm households’ decision to participate in markets. 
3.3.1 Theoretical Framework  
If all markets are perfect, households will trade their products at exogenous prices without 
transaction costs. At these prices, the decision regarding production and consumption can be 
taken. However, there is no such thing as perfect markets in the real world, more particularly in 
rural economies of developing countries. At least one market works imperfectly; and 
consequently the others will fail to perfectly function accordingly. Typically, a number of 
markets for agricultural products fail, due to in the extreme case the absence of market. This is 
because the transaction may be made with very high costs to farmers, more likely due to limited 
information on the markets; and because farmers lack incentives to produce for commercial 
purpose. In addition to prices, the incentives are likely affected by such non-pecuniary factors as 
secure rights to land, price risk and risk aversion.    
A particular household may face wide price band of a product, the price margin between the 
low price he sells a commodity and the high price he buys it, caused by high transaction costs. 
The household may be better off producing that good only for self-sufficiency, if the price 
equating the supply and demand falls inside the band. The transaction costs and other 
institutional factors would be responsible for the agricultural market failure. Such factors are to 
be included in the analysis of agricultural markets in this chapter.   
The transaction costs are typically categorized into proportional transaction costs and fixed 
transaction costs (Goetz, 1992; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002). The 
former vary dependently upon the quantities of goods traded, but the latter do not. The fixed 
transaction costs include the costs of: (a) search for a market or a buyer or trade partner with the 
best price; (b) negotiation and bargaining; and (c) screening the best buyer or trade partner, 
enforcement and supervision of contracts. The proportional transaction costs include such costs 
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of transferring the goods to be transacted as transportation costs and costs of spending time 
delivering or receiving the goods to or from the market. The proportional transaction costs are, 
therefore, the per-unit costs of getting access to the markets. They augment the price effectively 
paid by a buyer and reduce the price effectively received by a seller, causing a price band within 
which some households choose self-sufficient production.  
With the presence of transaction costs and land titles, the analysis of Cambodian farmers’ 
behavior towards market participation is based on a static non-separable household model 
proposed by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000). The household model derivation is detailed in 
the Appendix. Household decisions whether or not to enter markets as a seller get made based on 
the decision prices determined by household-specific and location-specific transaction costs. 
Then, the decision prices depend on public goods and services, household location 
characteristics, and household characteristics affecting information search costs such as family 
head’s education level and information asset ownership (Barrett 2008). Therefore, following Key, 
Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000), Barrett (2008) and Owande et al. (2015), the reduced form 
equation of marketable surplus can be written as follows: 
                                                𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘,𝑃𝑃,𝐴𝐴,𝑍𝑍,𝐺𝐺)                                                             (1) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐   is vector of crop quantities sold by household i (in general, M= Q – C), k refers to 
decision to enter markets (k=1, 0), P is vector of market prices that are observed. The remaining 
vectors represent the determinants of transactions costs, and through which the household-
specific characteristics, crop- and location-specific characteristics, would affect the decision 
price.  
Moreover, as discussed in the literature, secure land rights would contribute to the 
agricultural development because of at least three main economic advantages (Feder 1988; 
Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Feder and Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989, 2000; Markussen 2009; 
Deininger et al. 2015). First, the legal land titles can be used as collateral to facilitate access to 
loans for investments in agriculture. Second, the legal land titles can secure farm households’ 
tenure, whetting their appetite for undertaking medium- and long-term investments in land such 
as soil improvements or irrigation. Third, the legal land titles may formalize land markets, 
facilitating transfer of land from nonproductive users to more productive ones. The next section 
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lays out the empirical approach to the analysis of the determinants of farm households’ crop 
marketing for total crops, paddy crops and non-paddy crops in Cambodia. 
3.3.2 Empirical Approach 
In imperfect markets, according to the non-separable model, the decision prices are endogenously 
affected by market prices and factors influencing transaction costs in the markets. These decision 
prices are household-specific prices and heterogeneous across farm households and cannot be 
observed (Owande et al. 2015). Moreover, due to household heterogeneity, the empirical model 
of market participation used in this study is built on the non-separable household model.  
In the non-separable household model, a farm household decides to produce crops for home 
consumption or sale in markets. As mentioned earlier, the households’ decisions whether to enter 
or not enter markets as sellers get made based on the decision prices determined by household-
specific and location-specific transaction costs. Then, the decision prices depend on public goods 
and services, household location characteristics, and household characteristics that determine 
information search costs such as family head’s education level, social networks and information 
equipments. According to the theoretical model of farm households’ market participation 
decision developed by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) and Barrett (2008), a household is 
considered entering markets as a seller if making a positive crop sale volume. The sale volume 
(𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ) is defined as total value of post-harvest crops at selling prices plus the crops value in the 
beginning inventory less values of post-harvest crops loss, payment as crop quantity (values are 
evaluated at selling prices), value of crops in 2009 inventory and own consumption.13
Similar to previous empirical studies (see e.g., Owande et al. 2015), based on the reduced 
form given by Equation (1), the farm households’ decisions are modeled as a market participation 
(sale) decision (k) and sale volume decision 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 . There are two methods that commonly used to 
estimate equations with data that contain a large number of zero observations in the explanatory 
variable, such as in the current case study for crop sale volume. The first method (see e.g., 
Makhura, Kirsten, and Delgado 2001; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Boughton et al. 2007; Alene et al. 
2008) is the sample selection bias model developed by Heckman (1979), which treats the zero 
 
                                                             
13 It is defined based on the available data from the CSES carried out in 2009. 
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observations as unobserved data. That is, in Heckman selection approach, selling prices are 
assumed not to affect zeros. Thus, this model is suitable to non-random samples that arise from 
survey design or sample attrition (Owande et al. 2015). Moreover, because the Heckman model is 
characterized by treatment effects model, the model identification needs the instrumental variable 
restriction. However, in the current study of the farm households’ marketing decisions, it is 
practically difficult to identify an appropriate instrument due to the nature of the data used in the 
analysis. Although the above theoretical model proposed by Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) 
can be used to identify variables (fixed transaction costs) that affect the decisions to participate in 
markets but not the sale volume, practically it is difficult to measure the fixed transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the sample selection model poorly fits the current empirical framework and the data 
used in the analysis, in which both aspects of market entrance (participation in markets and sale 
volume) are treated as a choice variable arising from farm production. In addition, the zero sale 
volume is not the outcome of the latent variable (the decisions of whether to participate or not 
participate in markets) and unobserved decisions.  
The second procedure treats the observed zeros as a corner solution representation. There are 
two commonly employed models for the corner solution issues: Tobit and Cragg’s double hurdle 
models (Cragg 1971). The Tobit model was built to be used with censored dependent variables; 
however, it imposes the constraints due to the same process of the two decisions. Nonetheless, 
the factors affecting the farm households’ decisions of whether to sell or not to sell may be 
different from those that influence the decision concerning the quantity sold or sale volume. In 
such cases, the double hurdle model is more suitable (Omiti et al. 2009; Mather, Boughton, and 
Jayne 2013; Owande et al. 2015). In the double hurdle model, once a household is observed to 
make zero sales, these selling results from either the participation or selling decision; that is, the 
potential sellers may make zero crop sales (Aristei and Pioroni 2008). The possibility of zero 
selling is that the crop harvest damage may reduce the quantity of crops to be sold after the farm 
household has decided to participate in markets. Therefore, the factors that potentially affect the 
decisions to participate in markets may have different effects on the quantity of crops sold. In this 
case, the double hurdle model provides different mechanisms both for determining the likelihood 
of market participation (𝑘𝑘 = 1, 0) and the sale volume (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ). In the double hurdle model, the 
second stage is generally defined by a truncated normal distribution (Rao and Qaim 2011; 
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Owande et al. 2015). Moreover, the double hurdle model also addresses the selection issue, 
sometimes it is called Tobit selection model.  
3.3.3 Empirical Model Estimation 
Similar to Owande et al. (2015), the regression equations that define a market participation model 
and the sale volume model can be therefore given as follows: 
                                     𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘 = 1) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 0) = 𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖                                                (2) 
                                     𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖                                                                                  (3) 
with 
                                      𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖∗ = �𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐    if   𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 0 and 𝑘𝑘 = 10        Otherwise                                                                       (4) 
where Equation (2) is the first hurdle (first stage) representing the market participation model 
where k is equal to 1 for a farm household that generates positive crop sale volume (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 0) 
and 0 for a farm household that makes no sale (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0). 𝛼𝛼 is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and 𝑣𝑣 is error term under the assumption that 𝑣𝑣~𝑁𝑁(0,1). Z defines factors that 
determine the discrete probability of participating in markets, including household characteristics 
that can capture transaction costs, farm characteristics, village public transportation conditions, 
agro-ecological risks and legal land rights captured by land ownership documents, according to 
Equation (1). Equation (3) is the second hurdle (second stage) defining the model of sale volume 
Mcs. 𝛽𝛽 is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  is error term assumed to be normally 
distributed, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2). X are factors that affect the sale volume. According to the explanatory 
variables in Equation (1), X and Z may or may not be the same. 
 Equation (4) reveals that positive sale volume is observed if only if  𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 0 and 𝑘𝑘 = 1. 
Because this dependent variable is left-censoring, using the ordinary least square (OLS) for the 
estimation produces inconsistent estimates. Tobit estimator is commonly used to estimate such 
censored models. Nevertheless, in the Tobit model, there is an assumption that a corner solution 
is represented by zero observations; that is if there was any change in crop price, positive sale 
volume would be realized (Rao and Qaim 2011; Blaylock and Blisard 1992). In the reality, 
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although the price relatively changed in the cases of zero observations, it would not stimulate 
positive sale volume. The zero observations may be due to the fact that farm households desire 
not to sell any crops (deliberate zero), producing only for consumption or due to the harvest 
damage. The Tobit model has another limitation that the coefficients in the two stages are 
assumed to have the same sign (Wooldridge 2002). 
To overcome these econometric challenges, the current study employs the double hurdle 
model that recognizes the two-stage decisions and controls for the deliberate zero observations. 
The model assumes that both decisions (decision to enter markets and decisions on how much to 
sell) are independent conditional on observables. This assumption is based on the fact that if a 
farm household is going to sell, the decision of how much to sell may not correlated with the 
original decision if the household grows for markets at the time of growing and the decision on 
how much to sell is based on how well the harvest. Therefore, assuming that the error terms are 
independent and following the models specified in Equations (2) through (4), the double hurdle 
model is estimated by using the maximum likelihood (ML) method with the following function 
(Jones 1989):  
                     𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝜃𝜃) = ∏ [1 − Φ(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼/𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣)]Φ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=0   
                                            × ∏ Φ(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼/𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣)]Φ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢) 𝜙𝜙[(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐−𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢Φ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢 )𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐>0                  (5) 
where Φ and 𝜙𝜙 are the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution and the 
probability density function, respectively. 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣  is the standard deviation of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  in Equation (2) and 
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢  is the standard deviation of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  in Equation (3). The last term 1/Φ(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢) in Equation (5) 
indicates that the density integral is unity over 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 0. Thus, the solution of Equation (5) yields 
𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 and 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 through the ML estimation. 
 Because the Tobit model is nested in the double hurdle model, one can choose which model 
is more suitable to a particular situation by conducting a likelihood ratio (LR) test (Rao and Qaim 
2011). Due to the assumption that the error terms are independent, the double hurdle log-
likelihood is equal to the sum of log-likelihood of the truncated regression and that of the probit. 
Then, the LR test for the Tobit restriction can be conducted as follows (Greene 2008; Rao and 
Qaim 2011): 
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                                        𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = −2[ln(𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇) − (ln(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃) + ln(𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿)]                                             (6) 
where LT, LP, and LTR represent the likelihood of the tobit model, the likelihood of the probit 
model and the likelihood of the truncated regression model, respectively. The LR statistic 
exhibits a 𝜒𝜒2 distribution. 
3.3.4 Data Used in Empirical Analysis 
The data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) conducted in 2009 by the National 
Institute of Statistics (NIS) are used in the current study’s empirical analysis. The survey was 
sampled based on the preliminary data from the General Population Census conducted in 2008 
using a three-stage cluster procedure. Villages and enumeration areas were selected in the first 
and second stages, respectively; households were selected in the last stage. A total of 12,000 
households within 24 provinces (all provinces in Cambodia) were selected as the sample, which 
is the largest sample size among the CSESs. However, 29 households were dropped due to their 
absence at the time of the enumerators’ visit. Then, the remaining 11,971 households participated 
in the survey.  
Although the NIS has conducted the CSES annually since 2007, the 2009 dataset represents 
the nationwide sample of the household survey. Because it has the largest sample size, the 2009 
dataset is employed for the analysis in lieu of an updated dataset. Furthermore, because the study 
is interested in Cambodian farmers, Phnom Penh city (the capital of Cambodia) and other 
provincial capital cities are excluded from the observations such that the focus is only on rural 
farmers in Cambodia. After excluding the capital and the provincial capital cities and deleting 
some missing observations, the final sample count is 5243 households. 
3.3.5 Variables  
Dependent variables include a binary variable for market participation and the value of sale 
volume. As indicated earlier, a household is considered entering markets as a seller if making 
positive market surplus (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ). The market surplus is defined as the total value of post-harvest 
crops at selling prices plus the value of crops in the beginning inventory less values of post-
harvest crops loss, payment as crop quantity (values are evaluated at sale prices), value of crops 
in 2009 inventory and own consumption. The study uses aggregate values evaluated at village 
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prices to compute the market surplus. This aims at using all information in the data such as the 
information on farmers who sell other crops than rice or maize, which are more likely important 
to farm household well-being. Using the aggregated quantities with multiple crops is impractical. 
Nonetheless, the drawback of this aggregation is that it may conceal differences in the 
mechanisms of causality related to the farm households’ decisions on individual crops due to 
different views of the farm households about different crops. Yet, because Cambodia’s 
agriculture is characterized by mono-cropping with predominant paddy, aggregating crops is 
basically the aggregation of paddy crops in wet and dry seasons (Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012).14
The study uses the village average price of paddy to capture commodity price because of the 
dominance of paddy in Cambodian farming. According Mather, Heltberg and Tarp (2002), 
Azam, Imai, and Gaiha (2012), Boughton, and Jayne (2013) and Owande et al. (2015), the village 
average price is very low endogenous. Thus, using the village average price of paddy as an 
explanatory variable in cross-sectional data can avoid the endogeneity of commodity price. 
According to the literature on farmers’ supply response (see e.g., Goetz, 1992; Key, Sadoulet, 
and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Mather, Boughton, and Jayne 2013; Owande et al. 
 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the aggregation would create serious problem for this study. 
However, the study also disaggregates the total sample into paddy sample and non-paddy 
samples to examine separately how the farm households respond to price and non-price factors 
such as legal land rights in paddy market and non-paddy markets.  
A set of independent variables include variables theoretically expected to determine the 
decision on whether to participate or not participate in markets, and potentially affecting the 
quantity supplied. In the theoretical framework, the decision regarding market regimes selection 
is a function of commodity price captured by village average price of paddy, household 
characteristics and households’ endowments that affect transaction costs, farm characteristics and 
agro-ecological conditions, legal land rights captured by land ownership documents issued by the 
government authorities, and village public transportation conditions. These factors are 
theoretically expected to affect both the market regime decision and quantity sold (sale volume in 
the current study) according to Equation (1).     
                                                             
14 See also Figure 3.1 
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2015), the price is expected to have positive coefficient for paddy crop and negative coefficient 
for non-paddy crops. That is, the higher expected price is a strong incentive for farm households 
to produce and sell paddy.  
Household characteristics that affect the transaction costs include household head’s age and 
age squared, gender, ethnicity, and education level, household size, dependency ratio, a dummy 
for other languages than Khmer that can be used by any family member, the ownership of 
transportation equipment and the ownership of TV & radio as well as the ownership of telephone. 
The household head’s age can be also a proxy for the farmer’s experiences in farming. In 
addition, the squared age is also included as an independent variable to control for the life-cycle 
effects on the decisions of whether to participate or not participate in markets. After reaching a 
certain age, a person would gradually start losing energy, motivation and employment 
opportunities (Seng 2015a and b), thus being discouraged from producing crops for marketing 
purpose.  
The ethnicity can equally capture mutual trust and common belief; it may then influence the 
decision on the market-oriented farming. This is because the ethnicity can facilitate the sharing of 
information among farmers. In the context of Cambodia’s economy, it can, moreover, capture the 
effects of rural in-labor-force population migration to the capital and to other regional countries. 
The mass migration may engender a shortfall in labor forces available for agriculture, and then 
affecting the agricultural production.  
The household size can induce farm household to make efforts to produce more crops for 
sale, because of family needs. Also, the household size somewhat can capture the information 
effects; the big family would have easier access to large amount of information, in particular on 
agricultural markets. The dependency ratio15
                                                             
15 A ratio of non-working-age family members (the number of members under the age of 15 + the number of 
members over the age of 64) to working-age members (the number of members of 15 - 64 years old). 
 is included to capture the effects of farm 
households’ dependent members who contribute less or even nothing to household earnings. 
Dependency ratio can produce mixed effects on the farm households’ market participation. On 
the one hand, with higher dependency ratio in a farm household, high household incomes are 
needed to satisfy food consumption and other necessary expenditures. On the other hand, the 
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farm households with the higher ratio need to spend more time taking care of the dependents, 
reducing the time available for on-farm employment. However, older members may help care for 
children, possibly allowing the parents to engage in on-farm production (Seng 2015a and b). 
Household head’s education level captures the effects of household human capital. The 
education level is an indicator for human capital, and then high education level would improve 
farm productivity (Alene and Manyong 2007). It is reasonable that a household head with high 
education can generally gain more easily access to information than does the head with low 
education. Moreover, better-educated head would have easier access to a large amount of 
information and be able to have better networks in communities (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 
2000; Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012; Seng 2015a and b). Therefore, including household head 
characteristics and household characteristics in the model, one can control for observable 
characteristics differences between the market-participating farmers and the non-participating 
farmers. 
The transaction costs are typically categorized into variable transaction cost (VTC) which is 
proportional to quantity of goods trades and fixed transaction cost (FTC) which is related to 
information-on-market costs (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp, 2002; and 
Goetz, 1992). However, it is difficult to empirically measure the transaction costs, because the 
latter are not easily recorded in a survey (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000). Based on previous 
studies (see e.g., Goetz, 1992; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; 
Mather, Boughton, and Jayne 2013; Owande et al. 2015), the ownership of modern transportation 
equipments is used as a proxy for the VTC, while the ownership of information equipments such 
as TV & radio and telephone are proxied for the FTC. An increase in transportation costs and 
time of travelling is expected to have negative impacts on farm households’ market participation 
decision. Therefore, any household possessing the transportation equipments can reduce the 
transportation costs, and then being induced to produce crops for commercial purpose. Access to 
information and social networks can reduce the FTC. In this regard, the information equipments 
such as TV & radio and telephone can facilitate the information on markets, more likely 
encouraging farmers to engage in crop production for commercial purpose. Therefore, variables 
of ownership of TV & radio and telephone are expected to contribute to the farm households’ 
participation in markets.  
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The farm household’s endowments include landholding per worker in hectares and the 
ownership of modern agricultural equipment. Following the literature (see e.g., Goetz, 1992; 
Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Mather, Boughton, and Jayne 2013; 
Owande et al. 2015), such endowments simulate the farm households to participate in markets as 
sellers. Then, they are expected to have positive effects on the market regime decisions and 
quantity sold. 
Farm characteristic is captured by the availability of irrigation infrastructure in the village. 
The more availability of the infrastructure in the village can allow the farm households to have 
more access to water that is very crucial to the farming, thus allowing them to generate more 
marketable surplus. So too, it would provide farmers incentives to produce crops for selling 
purpose, in dry season in particular. The cultivated land damage in hectares and a dummy for 
yield damage are used to control for agro-ecological conditions that are uncontrollable natural 
risk for the farm households. Similar to variables used by Azam, Imai, and Gaiha (2012), 
Muriithi and Matz (2014) and Owande et al. (2015), agro-ecological conditions are captured by a 
dummy for yield damage caused by rot, eaten by birds/other insets, and rodents, and by cultivated 
land areas damaged by over-rainfall/flood. These factors are expected to wreak havoc on both the 
farm households’ decisions regarding market participation and quantity supplied (sale volume).  
Availability of public transportation in the village is used to capture the village transportation 
conditions. According to Rao and Qaim (2011), it is expected to have positive effects on the farm 
household marketing. Furthermore, the legal land rights, which are the main interest variable, 
captured by land ownership documents issued by the government authorities can secure rights to 
land, providing farmers with economic incentives to make more investments in farming and also 
allowing them to have easier access to credit for the farming investments and technologies (Feder 
1988; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Feder and Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989, 2000; Markussen 2009; 
Deininger et al. 2015). The investments can increase the production, then generating more 
marketable surplus of crops. Therefore, the legal land rights would have positive effects on both 
the decisions to enter markets and quantity supplied. All variables used in the regression analysis 
are summarized in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Summary description of variables 
Variables   Description   Ex. Sign   
Dependent         
Sale volume   Natural log value of crop sale volume, proxied for crop quantities sold    
Market participation   =1 if the farm household makes positive sale volume   Independent     Village average price of paddy    Natural log of  village average price of paddy +/-   
Farm household’s characteristics         - Household head’s age   Natural log of household head’s age   +/-   
    - Household head’s education     Natural log of household head’s schooling years   +  
    - Household size  Total household member  +/- 
    - Dependency ratio  Household member no.<15 + no.>64/Number of working age (15 – 64)  +/- 
    - Ethnicity   =1 if the farm household head is Khmer   +/-   
    - Household head’s gender =1 if the farm household is male-headed +/-   
    - Foreign language   =1 if any household member can use other language than Khmer language   +/-   
Farm household endowments     
    - Landholding per worker    Natural log of landholding per working-age household members in hectares   +   
    - Modern agricultural equipment 
=1 if the farm household owns modern agricultural 
equipments such as harrow/rake/spade, hand tractor, 
rice mill and water pump etc. 
+   
    - Transportation equipment  
=1 if the farm household owns transportation 
equipments such as car, van/jeep, motorcycle, bicycle 
etc.    
    - TV & radio  =1 if the farm household owns TV & radio, (capturing fixed transaction costs)  
    - Telephone  =1 if the farm household owns telephone (capturing fixed transaction costs)  
Risk and farm characteristics       
    - Yield damage      
=1 if the farm household suffered post-harvest damage 
caused by drought, rot, birds/other insets and/or 
rodents etc. 
+/-   
    - Cultivated land damage   =1 if the farm household experienced cultivated land loss caused by  caused by excessive rainfall/flood  +/- 
    - Irrigation availability     =1 if the farm household lives in the village where irrigation infrastructure is available for cultivation  +   
Village public transportation conditions    
    - Village public transportation      
=1 if the farm household lives in the village where 
there is public transportation such as taxi, bus and 
motorbike taxi etc.  
+ 
Variables capturing institutional effects    
    - Legal land rights      =1 if the farm household receives land ownership documents issued by the authorities +/- 
Source: Author 
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3.4 Results and Discussion 
This section starts with a description of summary statistics of main variables used in the analysis 
and a descriptive statistical analysis of the main socio-economic factors in the agricultural sector 
and the differences between farm households that participate in markets and those that do not in 
terms of their characteristics, farm characteristics and other characteristics. The section ends by 
presenting the econometric analysis results. 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis  
(a) Main Crops Planted by Farmers 
In 2009, approximately 70% of the farmers engaged in rice production. Paddy rice in dry season 
and wet season accounted for approximately 9.28% and 60% respectively. Sticky paddy rice 
accounted only around 1% (Figure 3.1). Maize is also a main crop planted by the farmers, 
especially those living along the Mekong River such as Kandal province, Kampong Cham 
province and Krate province, which accounted for approximately 2.97%. Other non-paddy 
products such as sugarcane, soybean and vegetables accounted for approximately 27%.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation from the 2009 CSES dataset 
Figure 3.1 Main crops planted by Cambodian farmers 
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(b) Variables Used in Regression 
Table 3.2 summarizes the statistics of variables used in the econometric analysis. The table 
demonstrates that, on average, approximately 60% of the farm households make a positive sale 
volume, suggesting that these 60% farm households participate in markets by selling crops with 
the farm-gate paddy price averaging approximately 765 riels (the figure in the table is only in 
natural log). On average, approximately 88% of the farm households are male-headed with the 
head completing 5-year formal education (the figure in the table is only in natural log). 
Approximately 47%, 77%, 39% of the farm households own transportation equipments, TV & 
radio and telephone, respectively. On average, the household size is approximately 5 members.  
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of variables used in regression 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sale volume   8.378 6.955 0 23.431 
Market participation   0. 662 0.473 0 1 
Village average price of paddy 6.655 0.400 2.080 14.257 
Household head’s age 3.736 0.309 2.708 4.466 
Household head’s age squared 14.051 2.298 7.334 19.944 
Household head’s gender 0.875 0.33 0 1 
Household head’s education 1.589 0.534 0 2.944 
Ethnicity 0.977 0.151 0 1 
Household size 4.770 1.937 1 15 
Dependency ratio 0.728 0.619 0 5 
Foreign language 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Modern transportation equipment 0.496 0.500 0 1 
TV & radio ownership 0.772 0.419 0 1 
Telephone ownership 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Landholding per worker -1.207 1.102 -7.195 5.011 
Modern agricultural equipment 0.265 0.442 0 1 
Yield damage  0.75 0.433 0 1 
Cultivated land damage in ha 0.097 0.855 0 37.775 
Availability of irrigation infrastructure  0.156 0.363 0 1 
Availability of village public transport 0.552 0.496 0 1 
Legal land rights 0.512 0.500 0 1 
Note: Because some households possess land area of less than one hectare, some values of the natural log of 
landholding are negative, thus producing negative mean value of the natural log of landholding. 
Source: Author’s computation 
Nevertheless, approximately 16% of the farm household can have access to irrigation due to 
the availability of irrigation infrastructure in the village. On average, approximately 55% of the 
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households live in the village where public transportation is available. Furthermore, 
approximately 51% of the households hold land ownership documents issued by the authorities to 
certify their legal land rights. 
According to Figure 3.1, the majority of the farmers engaged in paddy farming, with wet 
season paddy rice of approximately 60% and dry season paddy rice of only approximately 9%; 
and maize farming accounted for approximately 3%, while other non-paddy farming 
approximately 27%. This suggests that Cambodian farmers mostly produce paddy rice one time a 
year, more possibly because paddy farming suffers from drought in the dry season. Thus, 
promoting farming productivity needs necessarily irrigation infrastructure.   
3.4.2 Characteristics of Market Participants and Nonparticipants 
Table 3.3 describes general differences between market participant and nonparticipants. The 
summary statistics reported in Table 3.3 indicate some remarkable differences between market 
participants and nonparticipants, which are confirmed by simple statistical tests of difference in 
means. The household characteristics of the participants are statistically and significantly 
different.  
On average, for example, the participants’ household head’s age is approximately 46 years, 
while the nonparticipants’ household head’s age is approximately 45 years. Approximately 82% 
of the participant households are male-headed, while approximately 78% of the nonparticipant 
households are male-headed. However, the participant households’ dependency ratio is 
statistically and significantly lower than that of the nonparticipant households. Approximately 
87%, 77% and 39% of the participants own transportation equipments, TV & radio, and 
telephone, respectively. The percentages are significantly higher than those of the nonparticipants 
who possess such equipments, suggesting that these equipments would more likely contribute to 
the farm households’ market participation. The transportation equipments help facilitate the 
process of transporting agricultural products to market places, while the VT & radio and 
telephone can facilitate the access to information regarding agricultural production and/markets.     
Furthermore, Table 3.3 indicates that there are also statistically significant differences in 
terms of household’s endowments. For example, the market participants own average land areas 
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of approximately 0.80 hectare per working-age family member, significantly higher than the 
average areas of 0.35 hectare owned by the nonparticipants. Moreover, about 29% of the 
participants own modern agricultural equipments, significantly higher than the percentage of 
nonparticipants that own such equipments. 
 Related to farm characteristics, approximately 18% of the market participants can have 
access to irrigation because of the availability of irrigation infrastructure in the village, while only 
around 9.80% of the nonparticipants are able to do. Due to limited access to irrigation, the 
farmers tend to face deficiency of water for their farming, especially in the dry season. This 
indicates that the irrigation infrastructure, one of the factors contributing to farming productivity 
enhancement, is a main determinant of rural farmers’ commercialization of agriculture. 
Table 3.3 Comparison of characteristics of market participants and nonparticipants 
Characteristics Market Participants Nonparticipants 
Difference 
in Means P-value 
Household’s Characteristics 
       - HHH’s age 45.684 45.147 0.537* 0.096  
   - HHH’s gender  0.819 0.788 0.031*** 0.001  
   - HHH’s schooling years 5.701 5.444 0.256*** 0.000  
   - Ethnicity 0.962 0.957 0.004 0.343 
   - Household size 4.836 4.880 0.050 0.244 
   - Dependency ratio 0.699 0.775 -0.075*** 0.000  
   - Foreign language   0.145 0.117 0.028*** 0.000  
Farm Household Endowments 
       - Landholding per worker  0.801 0.366 0.435*** 0.000  
   - Modern agricultural equipment  0.287 0.151 0.231*** 0.000  
   - Modern transportation  0.500 0.390 0.110*** 0.000  
   - TV & Radio ownership 0.767 0.699 0.04*** 0.000  
   - Telephone ownership 0.386 0.296 0.091*** 0.000  
Ecological Risk & farm Characteristics  
      - Yield damage 0.712 0.736 -0.024** 0.021  
   - Cultivated land damage  0.123 0.085 0.038* 0.086 
   - Irrigation availability in the village  0.181 0.098 0.083*** 0.000  
Village public transportation conditions          - Village public transportation      0.650 0.381 0.270*** 0.000 
Variables capturing institutional effects          - Legal land rights  0.520 0.473 0.048*** 0.000  
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistically significant difference at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Source: Author’s computation 
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On average, approximately 65% of the participant households can have access to public 
transportation services, because of the availability of public transportation in the village where 
they live, while approximately 38% of the nonparticipants can do. This demonstrates that the 
means of transportation to facilitate the supply chains between farmers and markets is one of the 
main factors contributing to promoting the commercialization of agriculture in the rural 
communities. Regarding legal land rights, on average, approximately 52% of the participants 
hold land ownership documents issued by the governmental authorities to certify their legal rights 
to land. This percentage is statistically and significantly higher than that of the nonparticipants 
who possess such a document, suggesting that the legal land rights would be important to the 
commercialization of agriculture.  
3.4.3 Households’ Borrowing and Market Participation by Legal Land Rights 
Table 3.4 presents the farm households’ borrowing from both formal and informal credit 
providers by legal land rights. According to theoretical arguments and some empirical evidence, 
the farm households with secure land rights would have easier access to credit than do those 
without secure land rights to finance their agricultural investments (see e.g., Feder 1988; Pingali 
and Rosegrant 1995; Feder and Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989, 2000; Markussen 2009; Deininger et 
al. 2015). Then, the legal land rights secured by land ownership documents issued by the 
governmental authorities would facilitate the farm households’ ability to borrow from credit 
providers such as microfinance or banks. Nonetheless, Table 3.4 shows that the percentage of 
farm households with legal land rights that borrow from both formal and informal credit 
providers is significantly lower than that of those without legal land rights. For example, 
approximately 21% and 25% of the farm households without legal land rights borrow from 
formal and informal financial institutions, respectively, while only approximately 18% and 19% 
of those with legal land rights borrow from those financial institutions. 
Related to the borrowing purposes, approximately 15% of those without legal land rights 
borrow for investments in agricultural activities, while 13% of those with legal land rights do. 
This result suggests that the percentage of those without legal land rights that borrow for 
agricultural purposes is significantly higher than those with legal land rights. Furthermore, the 
borrowing for household consumption is also not an exception. 
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Table 3.4 Borrowing, farming expenditure and market participation by legal land rights 
 
With legal 
land rights 
Without legal 
land rights 
Difference in 
Means P-value 
Borrowing 
       - From formal institutions 0.184 0.209 -0.025*** 0.004 
   - From Informal institutions 0.194 0.254 -0.060*** 0.000 
Borrowing purposes     
   - For agricultural activities 0.126 0.152 -0.025*** 0.001 
   - For household consumption 0.136 0.161 -0.025*** 0.001 
Borrowing amounts in riels     
   - Formal amounts  2,654,832.00 2,251,632.00 403,199.90 0.233 
   - Informal amounts 2,346,308.00 172,1785.00 624,522.30** 0.014 
Farming expenditure in riels     
   - Total expenditure 1,082,415.00 873,149.50 209,265.40*** 0.000 
Market participation      
   - Market participation   0.609 0.563 0.046*** 0.000 
Note: ** and *** denote statistically significant difference at 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Source: Author’s computation 
However, when looking at the borrowing amounts, those with legal land rights are very 
likely to be able to borrow on average a larger amount than those without legal land rights are. 
For example, for those with legal land rights, the borrowing amounts from informal credit 
institutions are on average approximately 2,346,308 riels (US$ 586.58), which is significantly 
larger than the amounts borrowed by those without legal land rights that are approximately 
172,1785 riels (US$ 430.45).16
Moreover, on average, the farming expenditure of approximately 1,082,415 riels (US$ 
270.60) by the farm households with legal land rights is significantly larger than the expenditure 
of approximately 873,149.50 riels (US$ 218.29) by those without legal land rights. Furthermore, 
on average, approximately 61% of the households with legal land rights participate in markets, 
 For the borrowing amounts from formal credit institutions, albeit 
nonsignificant larger than the amounts borrowed by those without legal land rights, the amounts 
borrowed by those with legal land rights remains huge. On average, the amounts borrowed by 
those with legal land rights are approximately 2,654,832 riels (US$ 664) that is still larger than 
the amounts of approximately 2,251,632 riels (US$ 563) borrowed by those without legal land 
rights.  
                                                             
16 The amount is converted into US dollar at the exchange rate of 1 USD = 4000 riels 
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which is significantly higher than the households without legal land rights with approximately 
56% participating in markets. These results seem to support some of the theoretical arguments on 
the socio-economic advantages of legal land titling (see e.g., Feder 1988; Pingali and Rosegrant 
1995; Feder and Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989 and 2000). That is, the legal land rights are very 
likely to promote the commercialization of agriculture by securing the farm households’ tenure, 
thus whetting their appetite for undertaking medium- and long-term investments in land such as 
soil improvements or irrigation. Furthermore, the legal land rights may formalize land markets, 
facilitating transfer of land from nonproductive users to more productive ones. 
3.4.4 Econometric Analysis  
(a) Model Specification Test 
Before presenting the econometric results, the diagnostic test results on model selection of 
whether the tobit model or double hurdle model is appropriate are reported in Table 3.5. 
Following Greene (2008) and Rao and Qaim (2011), the likelihood ratio (LR) test is conducted. 
Due to the independent error terms assumption, the double hurdle log-likelihood is equal to the 
sum of log-likelihood of the truncated regression and that of the probit. The null hypothesis in 
each pair wise comparison of models is that the tobit model is appropriate for all crops combined, 
paddy and non-paddy samples. Table 3.5 shows that the null hypotheses for each sample are 
rejected, suggesting that the double hurdle model is preferred for the empirical estimation of the 
determinants of market participation for all crops combined, paddy and non-paddy.  
Table 3.5 Results specification tests to justify double hurdle model specification 
Test against Tobit specification (Null hypothesis: Tobit specification is appropriate)  
 P-value Conclusion 
All crops combined  0.000 H0 Rejected 
Paddy  0.000 H0 Rejected 
Non-paddy 0.000 H0 Rejected 
Note: the test is conducted to justify the model specification using the likelihood ratio (LR) test given in Equation 
(6).   
(b) Estimated Results of Double Hurdle Model  
The estimation results are separated for each commodity and presented in Table 3.6. All 
parameters of the regressions in the double hurdle model are simultaneously estimated with the 
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maximum likelihood method by using craggit command developed by Burke (2009). In Table 
3.6, the first two columns present the market participation for all crops combined, the second two 
columns present the market participation for paddy crop, and the last two columns present the 
market participation for non-paddy. For each sample, the first column presents the results of the 
first stage or tier corresponding to the first hurdle that is the discrete decision of whether to 
participate or not participate in markets, while the second column presents the results of the 
second stage or tier corresponding to the second hurdle that is the sale volume.    
The estimated results in Table 3.6 show that the village average price of paddy has a 
significantly positive correlation with farm households’ market participation for all crops 
combined and paddy. For all crops combined, the significantly positive coefficient of village 
average price of paddy is plausible because the agriculture in Cambodia is characterized by 
mono-cropping with predominant paddy (see also Figure 3.1). Thus, aggregating crops is 
basically the aggregation of paddy crops in wet and dry seasons (see e.g., Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 
2012). These results confirm the theoretical arguments on supply-demand models; that is, am 
increase in prices provides producers with incentive to increase their production and supply of 
products. The results also support the agricultural household theory discussed in the above 
section (theoretical consideration), with the conclusion that the supply of agricultural products 
responds positively to the price.  
The nonsignificant correlation between the village average price of paddy and non-paddy 
market participation suggests that the latter is not influenced by the former; that is, non-paddy 
supply does not respond to any change in paddy price. In other words, there is no a substitute 
effect between paddy and non-paddy commodities when there is any change in paddy price. 
These results are consistent with the previous empirical studies (see e.g., Goetz, 1992; Key, 
Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Mather, Boughton, and Jayne 2013; 
Owande et al. 2015). The positive effects of paddy price on the likelihood of participating in 
markets can explain the fact that if the farm households expected high paddy price, they would be 
more likely motivated to undertake investments in more widespread utilization of inputs to 
increase the production for marketing purposes (Mather, Boughton, and Jayne 2013; Owande et 
al. 2015).  
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The coefficient of age in the first tier of market participation for the non-paddy sample is 
significantly negative. However, the coefficient of age squared term is significantly positive, 
suggesting that after the household head reaches a certain age, the likelihood of participating in 
non-paddy market start to gradually increase. These results are consistent with the recent findings 
by Muriithi and Matz (2015) in the case of Kenya. In the case of Cambodia, the estimated results 
show that after the head reaches the age of 43, the households start to be gradually motivated to 
produce non-paddy commodities for commercial purpose. After the heads turn 43, the farm 
households are likely to start to gradually diversify their agricultural activities by engaging in 
non-paddy farming.  Furthermore, the coefficient of household head’s gender for the non-paddy 
sample is significantly negative, revealing that male-headed households are unlikely to 
participate in non-paddy markets. The estimated results, similar to the results found by Mather et 
al. (2013), Owande et al. (2015) and Chege et al. (2015), also show that the household head’s 
education level has a significantly positive correlation only with the likelihood of participating in 
markets for the total crops sample. This result suggests that education is somehow likely to 
promote the commercialization of agriculture. The significantly positive coefficient of household 
head’s education for all crops combined indicates that farm households headed by highly-
educated persons are very likely to produce crops for marketing.     
The coefficient of household size is significantly positive in the second tier for all crops 
combined and paddy sample, suggesting that larger households are more likely to produce a 
larger amount of sale. For non-paddy sample, the coefficient of household size is significantly 
positive in both tiers, indicating that larger household size stimulates the probability of 
participating in non-paddy markets and increase the amount of sale. This result is consistent with 
the findings by Azam, Imai, and Gaiha (2012) and Chege et al. (2015). This significantly positive 
coefficient can explain the fact that the larger households may have more access to the larger 
amount of formation on agricultural markets than do the smaller households. In addition, the 
larger households may have more labor force available for production and have higher household 
demand, thus being motivated to produce more crops for sale to gain high earnings.  
The coefficient of dependency ratio is significantly negative for all crops combined and 
paddy, suggesting that high dependency ratio is more likely to discourage farm households from 
producing crop for marking purpose. This result is consistent with the findings by Azam, Imai, 
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and Gaiha (2012) and Owande et al. (2015). The farm households with high dependency ratio 
may see the shortage of labor force for their farming, in particular when some family members 
get aging. The households with more dependents need to spend more time taking care of these 
dependents, more likely to reduce the time available for farming activities as argued by Seng 
(2015a). The coefficient of foreign language in the quantity decision tier (second stage) is 
significantly positive for all samples, indicating that the farm households whose any member can 
speak other language than Khmer language are very likely to produce larger quantity of crops for 
sale. This can explain the fact that the foreign language can facilitate the access to broader 
information on agricultural markets, particularly information on markets in neighboring countries 
such as Thailand and Vietnam which are Cambodia’s main importers of agricultural products. 
In a similar fashion to foreign language, the households that possess TV & radio and 
telephone are more likely to produce a larger quantity of crops for marketing purpose. These 
results are consistent with the findings by Heltberg and Tarp (2002) and Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 
(2012). These informative equipments may stimulate the participation in market through 
facilitating the households’ access to information on markets, thus reducing the fixed transaction 
costs as argued by Key et al. (2000) and Barrett et al. (2008). However, one should pay attention 
to the endogeneity issue of these variables (ownership of TV & radio and telephone). There 
might be a reverse causal correlation; that is, participation in markets would also lead to the 
probability of possessing such tools because it allows the farm household to get richer.  
Furthermore, farm households’ production endowments are very likely to determine the farm 
households’ market participation. For example, the coefficient of landholding per worker is 
significantly positive in both tiers for all samples, suggesting that the farm households that 
possess larger agricultural land area are encouraged to participate in markets and produce larger 
quantity of crops for sale. In addition, modern agricultural equipments have a significantly 
positive correlation with the farm household’s market participation decision in both the first tier 
and second tier for all crops sample and paddy sample, revealing that modern agricultural 
equipments contribute to promoting the commercialization of agriculture. These results are 
consistent with the previous findings by a number of studies (see e.g., Goetz, 1992; Key, 
Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012; Mather, 
Boughton, and Jayne 2013; Owande et al. 2015).  
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Table 3.6 Determinants of market participation 
 All Crops Combined Paddy Non-paddy  Independent Variables Market Entry Sale V Market Entry Sale V Market Entry Sale V 
Village average price of paddy 0.796*** 0.943*** 0.813*** 0.976*** 0.130 -0.166 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.305) Household head’s age -0.102 1.270 -1.682 0.516 -7.906** 2.237 
 (0.939) (0.428) (0.215) (0.716) (0.013) (0.609) Household head’s age squared -0.006 -0.166 0.220 -0.086 1.050** -0.264 
 (0.972) (0.441) (0.227) (0.652) (0.014) (0.651) Household head’s gender -0.052 0.101 -0.071 0.067 -0.338** 0.082 
 (0.368) (0.162) (0.226) (0.296) (0.016) (0.670) Household head’s education 0.016** 0.013 0.012 0.011 -0.020 -0.016 
 (0.029) (0.136) (0.110) (0.172) (0.228) (0.518) Ethnicity -0.043 -0.224 0.038 -0.046 -0.001 0.122 
 (0.749) (0.143) (0.773) (0.751) (0.998) (0.671) Household size 0.012 0.170*** -0.011 0.157*** 0.057** 0.091** 
 (0.362) (0.000) (0.411) (0.000) (0.024) (0.014) Dependency ratio -0.248*** -0.340*** -0.215*** -0.346*** -0.052 -0.099 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.479) (0.338) Foreign language 0.030 0.151** 0.011 0.136 0.033 0.301* 
 (0.625) (0.031) (0.866) (0.033) (0.787) (0.089) Modern transport. equipment 0.078* -0.002 0.012 -0.036 0.159* 0.522*** 
 (0.066) (0.974) (0.779) (0.433) (0.080) (0.000) TV & radio ownership 0.058 0.149** 0.030 0.124** 0.014 0.157 
 (0.213) (0.011) (0.528) (0.018) (0.899) (0.333) Telephone ownership 0.042 0.088* 0.028 0.088* -0.115 -0.001 
 (0.336) (0.082) (0.525) (0.056) (0.225) (0.994) Landholding per worker 0.444*** 0.805*** 0.345*** 0.686*** 0.335*** 0.594*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Modern agricultural equipment 0.225*** 0.328*** 0.164*** 0.407*** 0.268*** 0.130 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.338) Yield damage  -0.222*** -0.144*** -0.220*** -0.217*** -0.130 -0.107 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.173) (0.432) Cultivated land damage in ha -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.033 -0.065** -0.085 -0.355*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.335) (0.014) (0.453) (0.005) Irrigation infrastructure  0.485*** 0.537*** 0.467*** 0.474*** 0.191* 0.192 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.209) Village public transportation 0.173*** -0.029 0.276*** 0.068 0.274*** -0.055 
 (0.003) (0.681) (0.000) (0.254) (0.008) (0.739) Legal land rights 0.105*** 0.152*** 0.073* 0.102** 0.194** 0.131 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.059) (0.011) (0.019) (0.287) Constant -4.142* 5.007* -1.304 6.360** 15.048** 9.940 
 (0.099) (0.094) (0.611) (0.016) (0.012) (0.226) Observations 5243   5243   1083   
Prob > chi2   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) Sigma        (P-value) 1.228 (0.000) 1.170 (0.000) 1.485 (0.000) 
Log likelihood -8131.289   -8450.385   -1815.574   
Note: Sale V refers to sale volume. P-values are in the parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistically significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   
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Moreover, the coefficient of modern transportation tools is significantly positive in the first 
tier for all crops combined, suggesting that farm households that own modern transportation 
equipments are very likely to participate in markets. The estimate results show in particular that 
the modern transportation equipments such as bike and car stimulate the likelihood of 
participating in non-paddy market and promote sale volume. These transportation tools can 
facilitate the transportation of agricultural products from farm to market places (Azam, Imai, and 
Gaiha 2012). However, one should note that the ownership of such transportation tools might be 
also endogenous because of the possibility of reverse causal relationship between the quantity 
sold and the possession of such tools. The higher the sale volume is, the higher the revenue is. 
Thus, this would bring about the higher possibility of possessing such tools.   
In addition, the availability of irrigation infrastructure in the village is a significantly positive 
determinant of both the likelihood of participation in markets in the first tier and the sale volume 
in the second tier for all crops combined, paddy and non-paddy. This result is quite consistent 
with the earlier findings by Azam, Imai, and Gaiha (2012) in the case of Cambodia. This result 
indicates that the development of rural irrigation infrastructure is very important to the 
commercialization of agriculture.  
The cultivated land damage in hectares and dummy for yield damage that used to capture the 
agro-ecological conditions are significantly and negatively correlated with the probability of 
market entry in the first tier and sale volume in the second tier of the model. These results 
suggest that agro-ecological conditions, such as excessive rain fall or drought, discourage farm 
households from producing for marketing purposes. These results are also consistent with the 
findings by earlier empirical studies (see e.g., Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 
2012; Mather, Boughton, and Jayne 2013; Owande et al. 2015).  
Similar to the study by Rao and Qaim (2011), the estimated results indicate that the 
availability of public transportation in the village is very likely to determine both the probability 
of entering markets in the first tier and sale volume in the second tier of the model for the all-
crops sample and the paddy sample. Better development of public transportation in the village 
can contribute to reducing transaction costs through facilitating product transportation and 
connecting the economic activities across the village and the whole economy.   
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In a similar fashion, for the main variable of interest, the coefficient of legal land rights is 
significantly positive for all crops combined, paddy and non-paddy, indicating the positive 
correlation between the legal land rights and farm households’ market participation. This result is 
very likely to support the arguments that the legal land titles promote agricultural growth and 
development (see e.g., Feder et al. 1988; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Feder and Nishio 1999; 
Deininger et al. 2014). Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the legal land rights promote the 
commercialization of agriculture through facilitating farm households’ access to credit according 
to the descriptive statistics results reported in Table 3.4. The legal land rights (land titles) are 
unlikely to be important to the farm households’ access to credit. This is because although 
without land titles, the farm households can borrow from financial institutions. In some case, 
without land titles, they can still borrow with other persons acting as the guarantors.  
However, the legal land rights may promote the commercialization through other channels as 
argued by the proponents of land titling programs. In Cambodia, due to land dispute, the legal 
land rights may secure the farmers’ rights to their land, providing incentives for them to make 
more investments in farming. They may encourage the farmers to undertake medium- and long-
term investments in land such as soil improvements or irrigation. Land security ensured by legal 
land rights can reduce conflicts, facilitate the bargaining power of the poor farm households 
(IFAD 2011), thus providing the farm households, in particular smallholders, with incentives to 
engage in market-oriented farming. Furthermore, the legal land titles may formalize land markets, 
facilitating transfer of land from nonproductive users to more productive ones. Therefore, the 
estimated results are likely to support the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the 
economic advantages of land titles (see e.g., Feder 1988; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Gavian and 
Fafchamps 1996; Feder and Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989, 2000; Otsuka and Place 2001; Smith 
2004; Deininger et al. 2008; Markussen 2009; Deininger et al. 2015). Nevertheless, one needs to 
recognize that the variable of legal land rights used in the double hurdle model can be 
endogenous, possibly causing an over/under estimate of the effects. For example, the endogeneity 
resulting from the effects of market participation on the possibility of acquiring land titles (legal 
land rights), which cannot be controlled for by the model. That is, the participant households get 
the legal land titles more easily than the nonparticipant households because participating in 
markets allow them to enjoy higher earnings, thus they can afford the titles and land registration.   
67 
 
Although the legal land rights are very likely to contribute to the commercialization of 
agriculture in Cambodia, one should not overlook the potential adverse socio-economic effects if 
the institutional arrangements get worse. Thus, one needs to address such potential adverse 
impacts to maximize the beneficial socio-economic effects. Such an effect is, for example, that 
the registration of land and land titling schemes are more often plagued by asymmetries of 
information between the haves and the have-nots, which give elites opportunity to acquire land at 
the expense of usufruct rights holders (Government of Kenya 2004; Jansen and Roquas 1998; 
Leuprecht 2004; World Bank 2003; Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa 2014). Asymmetrical 
knowledge that gives the elites a chance to mobilize land from the poor households under titling 
schemes may also lead to sub-optimal land use, because those who acquire the land titles may be 
engaging in speculative activities, rather than in productive activities such as production 
(Benjaminsen and Sjaastad 2002; Peters 2004; Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa 2014). 
Enabling the minority of elites to accumulate and alienate land is inconsistent with land titling 
programs’ purposes of promoting agricultural growth. If the programs produce unwanted 
outcomes, speculative rather than productive land acquisition by the minority of elites in the 
society, such schemes will not be very effective in promoting the commercialization of 
agriculture.  
Moreover, if the programs exclude or replace marginal farm households in rural 
communities, farmers’ enclosure process may take root, forestalling the potential for agriculture 
to contribute to poverty alleviation (Woodhouse 2003). Such an issue has been also happening in 
some areas of Cambodia. Thus, the land titling programs can be a double-edged knife that also 
brings about wealth inequalities and undermine living standards of the poor and venerable, if one 
fails or ignores to address such poor institutional arrangements that can lead to asymmetrical 
knowledge and power differentials in localities (Sitko, Chamberlin, and Hichaambwa 2014). For 
example, due to the poor implementation of the introduced legal land rights, which results from 
the poor enforcement of rule of laws that leads to nepotism and corruption, the effects of legal 
land rights might be not more beneficial or even adverse in terms of promoting the 
commercialization of agriculture. Therefore, the effectiveness of legal land rights in enhancing 
the commercialization might depend on the quality of institutional arrangements in individual 
countries.      
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter addresses the question of why some farm households produce crops for commercial 
purpose, but some others do not. In doing so, the study analyzes the factors determine the farm 
households’ market participation, with a main focus on legal land rights issues, by applying the 
double hurdle model to data from the CSES conducted in 2009. The analysis is conducted on all 
crops combined, and then by separating paddy from non-paddy to examine the how the 
determining factors affect the farm households’ behavior towards each agricultural market. The 
findings suggest that legal land rights captured by land ownership documents issued by the 
government authorities are very likely to promote the farm households’ participation in markets. 
Legal land rights are more likely to provide the farm households with incentives to make more 
investments in market-oriented farming. Households with legal land rights are very likely to 
produce crops for commercial purposes. More possibly, legal land rights can be an effective 
mean to reduce land dispute, making the households with legal land rights feel that their land is 
secured. Moreover, legal land rights can facilitate the transfer of land from non-productive users 
to more productive users, as well as from one generation to the next. This implies that reducing 
land registration costs and facilitating the process of land registration to promote the acquisition 
of land titles can contribute to the commercialization of agriculture. However, the effectiveness 
of legal land rights in enhancing the commercialization is likely to depend on the quality of 
institutional arrangements in individual countries.     
Furthermore, crop supply, particularly for paddy, is positively determined by the paddy 
price. Non-price factors such as the ownership of modern transportation means, modern 
agricultural equipments, landholding, irrigation infrastructure, public transportation in the village 
and agro-ecological conditions are also the main determinants of commercialization of 
agriculture in Cambodia. Consistent with the findings by Heltberg and Tarp (2002), the lack of 
modern farming tools, limited access to irrigation and agro-ecological risk are obstacles to the 
transformation of traditional subsistence agriculture into market-oriented agriculture.  
Disadvantaged farmers, mostly small-scale farmers, tend to face constraints on offering 
produce to markets. The analysis suggests that the farm households that have more access to 
irrigation infrastructure available in village are very likely to supply produce to markets. 
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Therefore, the development of irrigation infrastructure in rural communities is a must to promote 
the commercialization of agriculture in Cambodia. In addition, access to public transportation and 
infrastructure are also the main factors facilitating market participation. In Cambodia, there are 
some NGOs, which, among them Centre d’Etude et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien 
(CEDAC) is more active, provide training on production techniques and agricultural market 
information. These activities contribute to reducing transaction costs and making farmers, small-
scale farmers in particular, more market-oriented and reliable suppliers to markets. Farmers 
joining such a NGO program are much more likely to produce crops for marketing purpose, 
especially in supermarket channels (Rao and Qaim 2011). However, in the current study, this 
factor is not included in the analysis due to unavailability of the data. 
However, this study has its limitation: first, related to the transaction costs, it is difficult to 
measure the costs in practice due to the unavailable data and relevant information. The study 
considers only the factors that are expected to affect the transaction costs following the previous 
studies. Second, regarding the legal land rights, the variable (land titles) used in the analysis may 
be endogenous. For example, the endogeneity resulting from the effects of market participation 
on the possibility of acquiring land titles representing the legal land rights. Yet, due to the limited 
data, appropriate instrumental variables cannot be found to address the endogeneity issue. 
Therefore, the finding of the effects of legal land rights on the farm households’ participation in 
markets is indicative rather than conclusive.  
Theoretically, the living standards of people are determined by their economic productivity. 
The improved livelihoods mean not only the households enjoy higher income but also higher 
consumption and better food security. Then, an increase in farm productivity can improve 
farmers’ livelihoods. Based on international trade literature, exporting firms tend to enjoy higher 
productivity. Thus, the next chapter will analyze the socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm households, putting an emphasis on the productivity effects.  
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Appendix  
Household i maximizes the utility by consuming the quantity amount of goods Ci and produces 
the quantities Qi of agricultural products by using inputs Xi. Let’s simply define Mi as the 
household’s marketed surplus for the quantities of the commodities, expressed in monetary terms 
in cash constraint with a presence of the transaction costs. The PTC is added into the market price 
for the goods purchased (buyer, Mi < 0), and deducted from the market price for the sale (seller, 
Mi > 0). Then, let’s define 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  and 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏   as a seller’s per-unit PTC and a buyer’s per-unit PTC, 
respectively; 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  and 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏  a seller’s and buyer’s FTC. The transaction costs, both the PTC and FTC 
costs, are expressed as a function of exogenous characteristics, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  and 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  that can affect the 
transaction costs when there is a transaction in the market (selling and buying). Assume that 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 = 1 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 = 0, if a household is a seller (Mi > 0); and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 0 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 = 1,  if a household is 
a buyer (Mi < 0). 
The household’s problem is to maximize the utility function given by Equation (1), subject to 
constraints given in Equations (2) through (5) as follows: Max𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖;𝑍𝑍ℎ),        where 𝑖𝑖 is household 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 …𝑛𝑛                                       (1)            𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡.: 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 0                                                                                                             (2) 
��𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)�𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + (𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 �𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� + 𝐼𝐼 = 0                  (3) (cash constraint) 
𝐺𝐺�𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞� = 0       (production technology constraint)                                                 (4) 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0                                                                                                                          (5) 
where Ei is an endowment in commodities; I is other endogenous incomes; and 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚  is the market 
price of good Qi. Zh is the household’s characteristics, which is an exogenous shifter in utility. Zq 
is the characteristics of production, which is an exogenous shifter in production technology. For 
Equation (2), the amount produced and the endowment must equal the amounts consumed, used 
as inputs and sold. Equation (3) is the cash constraints, which restrict the payment for all buying 
to not exceeding incomes from sales and other incomes.        
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The lagrangean function for household i facing both FTC and PTC is defined to derive 
supply and demand equations and written as follows: 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍ℎ)  +𝜇𝜇(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) +𝜆𝜆 ��𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)�𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 �𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�� 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 �𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� + 𝐼𝐼 +𝜂𝜂𝐺𝐺(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞)                                                                                                             (6) 
where 𝜇𝜇, 𝜆𝜆 and 𝜂𝜂 are lagrangean multipliers. Because of the discontinuities generated by the 
FTCs in the lagrangean function, the optimal problem is solved by decomposing into: first, 
finding the optimal solution conditional on market regime; and second, choosing a market regime 
with the highest utility (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000).  
Solving the first order conditions (FOC) allows us to obtain the optimal supply and demand 
as follows:  
 
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
= 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
− 𝜇𝜇 = 0,      𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 > 0      (for consumption good)                                    (7)  𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
= 𝜂𝜂 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜇𝜇 = 0,   𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 > 0      (for outputs)                                                       (8)  𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
= 𝜂𝜂 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
− 𝜇𝜇 = 0,     𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 > 0    (for inputs)                                                          (9)    
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
= 𝜆𝜆 ��𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚)� 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 )� 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� − 𝜇𝜇 = 0,    𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ≠ 0     (10)    
(for marketed surplus or traded goods) 
The household’s decision price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  can be defined as:  
                       𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)            if 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 > 0, seller                        𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)            if 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 < 0, buyer                        
?̅?𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇
𝜆𝜆
                         if 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 0, self − sufficient                          (11) 
When the household is self-sufficient, the decision price cannot be observed, with the 
shadow price ?̅?𝑝 = 𝜇𝜇
𝜆𝜆
. But, when the household decides to either sell or buy a good, the PTC are 
included in the decision price.  
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With the decision price, the household’s output supply, input demand and consumption 
equations are to be found with two separable solutions as follows:  
1. Profit maximization 
As a producer, household i produces the quantity amount Qi of commodities and maximizes the 
profit subject to the production technology constraint. The optimization problem can be, then, 
written as follows: 
                                    Max𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  𝜋𝜋(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖                                                        (12) 
                                      𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡:       𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝑄𝑄�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�,                                      
With the FOC for inputs: 
                          𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
= 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 0  =>  𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖                                             (13) 
This equation is used to compute the level of inputs to be used in the production; it expresses 
the optimal level of input X as a function of decision price pi, pxi, and Zq. The optimal level of X 
can be hence derived as follows:  
                                        𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑋�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�                                                                               (14) 
which presents the derived demand function for inputs.      
 The optimal output level can be obtained, by substituting Equation (14) into the production 
function. Then, the optimal output can be derived as follows:  
                                        𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑄𝑄�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�                                                                              (15) 
The indirect profit function can be obtained and represents the optimal profit that can be 
derived as follows:  
                        𝜋𝜋∗ = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖∗   𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  𝜋𝜋∗ = 𝜋𝜋�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�                                           (16) 
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The partial derivative of the indirect profit function in Equation (16) with respect to pi and px 
allows us to obtain the household’s profit maximizing output supply and input demand functions 
as follows:    
                          𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑄𝑄�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�,   and   𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑋�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�                                         (17) 
2. Utility maximization  
As a consumer, the household maximizes the utility subject to the income constraint. The 
optimization problem is, then, written as follows:                              Max𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖   𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖;𝑍𝑍ℎ)                                                                                                 (18) 
                                  𝑆𝑆. 𝑡𝑡. :   𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 �𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� + 𝐼𝐼            (19)     
The solution of the problem has the same process as that of the above profit maximization 
problem solution, allowing us to derive the optimal consumption level and indirect utility which 
is a function of pi, pxi, Zh and income Y measured at decision price pi. The consumption equation 
is, hence, derived as follows:  
                                      𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌;𝑍𝑍ℎ)                                                                            (20) 
Now, let’s solve the household’s problem of market regime choices. The household chooses 
any market regime from which the highest utility is obtained. With the defined decision price and 
the above optimal indirect utility, the optimal utility that can be reached in each market regime 
can be defined as the same indirect utility function 𝑉𝑉(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌;𝑍𝑍ℎ).  
By defining 𝑌𝑌0(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼  as the household’s income with no FTC, the 
utility levels for each regime to be compared can be derived as follows:  
                                   𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 ,𝑌𝑌0�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐� − 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐;𝑍𝑍ℎ�        if seller                         (21) 
                                           𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏 = 𝑉𝑉�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 ,𝑌𝑌0�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏� − 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 ;𝑍𝑍ℎ�       if buyer                        (22) 
                                    𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎 = 𝑉𝑉(?̅?𝑝,𝑌𝑌0(?̅?𝑝);𝑍𝑍ℎ)                                           if autarkic                    (23) 
  With no fixed transaction costs, Equations (21), (22) and (23) show that the household will 
be indifferent between being a seller and self-sufficient, if  ?̅?𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐  . FOCs given by 
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Equations (7) through (10) show that the utility is increasing and decreasing in the decision price 
for seller and buyer, respectively. Then, the household would be better off being a seller if 
?̅?𝑝 < 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐  . The household will be indifferent between being a buyer and self-sufficient if 
?̅?𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 , and would be better off being a buyer if  ?̅?𝑝 > 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 . In Figure A.1, the vertical 
line 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎  represents the autarkic household’s attainable utility independent of the market price; the 
line 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐  represents the utility for the household as a seller; and the line 𝑉𝑉0𝑏𝑏  represents the utility for 
the household as a buyer. At point A, the household is indifferent between being a seller and 
autarkic, but for the market price above point A it will be better off being a seller whose the 
utility is increasing in the price.  
Figure A.1 Farm household’s Utility and supply of crops   
 
        
   
 
 
Now let’s assume that the household faces both the PTC and FTC. When incurring FTC, the 
household’s income given by Equation (19) decreases, and then shifting the utility line from  𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐   
to  𝑉𝑉1𝑐𝑐  for the seller and from  𝑉𝑉0𝑏𝑏  to  𝑉𝑉1𝑏𝑏  for the buyer. The household is, then, discouraged by the 
FTCs from participating in markets, waiting for a sufficiently high or low level to cover the FTC 
for the seller or buyer. Equation (17) indicates that the output supply is a function of the decision 
price pi, which is endogenously dependent on the PTC. With both the PTC and FTC being 
incurred, the supply functions can be derived with three distinct market regimes for different 
prices:  
                                     𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑄𝑄�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 − 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�,      for seller                                                   (22) 
                                     𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 = 𝑄𝑄�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�,      for buyer                                                 (23) 
                                            𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 = 𝑄𝑄�?̅?𝑝;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞�,                    for self − sufficient                              (24) 
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Then, the household’s supply curve is not affected by the FTC, because the latter do not 
affect the production decision but the marginal return on production does. However, the PTC 
shifts the seller’s supply curve upward and the buyer’s downward. The higher the transaction 
costs, the larger the price range within which the household decides to be self-sufficient. High 
transaction costs mean that the household face either high FTC or PTC constraints or both. The 
marketed surplus can be expressed in a reduced form, by taking the difference between output 
supply and consumption. Then, the reduced form for marketed surplus can be derived as follows:  
                           𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑄𝑄(. ) − 𝐶𝐶(. ) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 ,𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ;𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞 ,𝑍𝑍ℎ�                                     (25) 
 The market surplus given by Equation (25) is a function of all variables 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 ,𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞  and 𝑍𝑍ℎ  determining the household’s consumption and/or production decision. 
This suggests that the standard form of supply and demand functions is not theoretically 
restricted, as noted by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) that the estimation of full system of supply 
and demand is not required for all commodities. Furthermore, Equations (19) and (22) through 
(24) imply that the FTC affects also the decision to participate in markets.  
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Table 3A.1 Correlation matrix 
Variables   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Sale volume   1                                       
2. Market entrance   0.99 1                                     
3. Av. paddy price  0.16 0.13 1                                   
4. HHH’s age   0.03 0.02 0.01 1                                 
5. HHH’s education 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.09 1                               
6. Household size 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.23 -0.06 1                             
7. Dependency ratio  -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.19 -0.03 0.330 1                           
8. Ethnicity   0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 1                         
9. HHH’s gender 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.20 0.17 0.15 0.04 -0.01 1                       
10. Forei. language   0.05 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.20 0.11 -0.12 -0.34 0.02 1                     
11. Transport equip.  0.13 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.15 -0.12 0.00 0.18 0.21 1                   
12. TV & radio  0.09 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.11 -0.12 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.30 1                 
13. Telephone     0.11 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.29 0.13 -0.15 0.01 0.09 0.28 0.49 0.31 1               
14. Landholding  0.30 0.25 -0.02 -0.14 0.02 -0.11 0.18 -0.05 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.04 1             
15. Modern Agr. Eq. 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.16 -0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.16 1           
16. Yield damage      -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.12 0.02 1         
17. Cul land damage 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.17 0.02 -0.02 1       
18. Irrigation      0.13 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.21 -0.04 0.01 1     
19. Public transp. 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.15 -0.03 -0.04 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.61 0.20 0.10 0.10 -0.01 1   
20. Legal land rights      0.05 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 1 
 Source: Author’s computation from the 2009 CSES data-set
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Chapter 4: Socio-Economic Effects of Market Participation 
“Better livelihoods are not only associated with enjoying higher income and having 
something to eat today but also with having something to eat whenever it is needed” 
4.1 Introduction 
Cambodia is an agrarian country, with approximately 80% of the population living in rural areas 
(NIS 2011). Over the past two decades, Cambodia has recorded a remarkable economic growth. 
The growth, which was mainly driven by tourism and agriculture, made a tremendous 
contribution to poverty reduction from 50% in 2004 to 20% in 2011 (ADB 2013), with poor 
populations, mostly in rural communities, decreasing from 7 million to 3 million (World Bank 
2015). The agriculture employs over 70% of the labor force (ADB 2013), making the sector the 
most important in the economy. The majority of farmers, especially smallholder farmers, make 
their living by farming, either for subsistence or small-scale commercial purpose, conditionally 
on rain-fed water. Paddy fields are dominant, with six months for wet season paddy and six 
months for dry season paddy, accounting for approximately 2.63 million hectares during 2007-
2011 (up to 90% of the cultivated land); and the yields went up from 4 million tons in 2000 to 6 
million tons in 2007 (MAFF 2011; MAFF and MWRM 2010).    
The expansion of cultivated land has contributed to the growth of agricultural production 
(World Bank 2015). Moreover, an increase in global food prices has created opportunity for 
Cambodian farmers to make more money from selling rice although the per hectare profits 
increased at lower rate due to an increased production costs (World Bank 2015). The agriculture 
has been recognized as a main contributor to the poverty reduction in rural Cambodia, with more 
than 60% of the poverty alleviation being attributed to the agricultural growth (World Bank 
2015). Theoretically, the living standards of people depend on their productivity. Thus, the farm 
households’ livelihoods also depend on farm productivity. The agricultural productivity has 
increased during the period 1993-2013, suggesting that the rural living standards have over the 
past two decades got improved.  
Although the agriculture is dominated by paddy production, among 5 ASEAN agricultural 
countries as indicated in Figure 4.11, Cambodia enjoyed the lowest paddy yields per hectare 
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during the period 1994-2012, below the ASEAN average yields.17
Barrett (2008) argued that by participating in markets as sellers, farm households can enjoy 
better likelihoods and gain comparative advantage. That is, once entering markets, the farm 
households can not only reach scale economies and use technologies that improve farm 
productivity but also can produce goods they are adept at producing and exchange the surplus for 
other goods they are not. Because market-oriented farming has comparative advantages over the 
subsistence, the former typically boost the farm households’ earnings (Kennedy and Cogill 1987; 
Dorsey 1999). The increased incomes allow farm households to undertake more investments in 
productive capital and chemical fertilizers, thus spurring farm productivity growth. So too can 
they reduce credit constraints faced by farmers by augmenting household net worth and, then, 
enable them to have easier access to credit for their investments. Moreover, entrance into markets 
would likely generate learning-by-selling effects that would improve the productivity. Farmers 
can learn from market demand by improving farming techniques or making specific investments 
in a specific production for markets. That is, they can learn how to produce more efficiently in a 
way that the produce meets market requirements. Nonetheless, farm households’ participation in 
markets as sellers might be affected by sale volume and price instability, technical inability and 
market imperfections (Roa and Qaim 2011). Moreover, such factors as inappropriate agricultural 
policies, limited knowledge, inadequate irrigation and poor urban-rural road connectivity, and 
 The paddy yield remains 
relatively low vis-à-vis neighbors’ yields, with around 2 tons per hectare on average in 
Cambodia, compared to 2.74 - 4.89 tons in Thailand and Vietnam (Yu and Diao 2011). Due to 
slow improved productivity of agriculture and poor connectivity between rural economies and the 
rest of the economy, the rural households do not get much better off. The improvement of rural 
livelihoods needs more attention to be given to the agricultural development through promoting 
the commercialization of agriculture. It is well recognized that promoting market-oriented 
agriculture is one of the most likely pathways towards better living standards of the farm 
households in developing countries (Olwande et al. 2015). Given the potential for the 
commercialization of agriculture to spur agricultural growth and improve the farm households’ 
livelihoods in developing countries such as Cambodia, it is worth analyzing its effects on farm 
productivity and household food security at the household level in the rural communities.  
                                                             
17 See also in ADBI working paper 542 by Rillo and Sombilla (2015). 
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natural calamities like drought, excessive rainfall and flood may constrain market-oriented 
farming. 
A myriad of studies pay attention to such aspects, by analyzing factors determining farmers’ 
participation in markets in various developing countries with a main focus on transaction costs 
(see e.g., Goetz, 1992; Key Sadoulet, and Janvry 2000; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Bellemare and 
Barrett 2006; Olwande et al. 2015; Burke, Myers, and Joyne 2015). However, the estimated 
results reported in Chapter 3 suggest that legal land rights are also crucial to promoting the 
commercialization of agriculture. Some studies try to evaluate the effects of supplying 
agricultural products to either supermarkets or traditional markets on farm households’ income 
(see e.g., Hernandez, Reardon, and Berdegue 2007; Neven et al. 2009). Some others quantify the 
effects of market participation on farm productivity (see e.g., Govereh and Jayne 1999; Strasberg 
et al. 1999) and the effects on household food security and on-farm crop diversity (see e.g., 
Asfaw et al. 2012). The findings by Govereh and Jayne (1999) and Strasberg et al. (1999) 
indicate that participation in markets enhances farm productivity in terms of yields per acre. 
Asfaw et al. (2012) provided evidence that output market participants enjoy higher food security 
status than do the nonparticipants, suggesting that output market participation improves farm 
households’ well-being. However, to appropriately quantify the potential for participation in 
markets to enhance household livelihoods in developing countries such as Cambodia, one needs 
an unbiased and consistent estimation of the effects of such activities. Yet, the farm households’ 
living standards are determined by farm productivity. Furthermore, better livelihoods are not only 
associated with enjoying higher income and having something to eat today but also with having 
something to eat whenever needed. Thus, the improvement in household food security reflects the 
improvement in household livelihoods.  
The aim of this chapter is to address the second question of how farm households’ 
participation in markets contributes to improving their household livelihoods by quantifying the 
effects of participation in crop output markets on farm productivity and household food security 
by using data from the CSES conducted in 2009. The study tests a hypothesis that the 
commercialization of agriculture enhances farm productivity and household food security. The 
productivity is measured in terms of crop yields per hectare and per working-age household 
member, gross margin per hectare and per working-age household member. The food security is 
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measured in terms household food consumption expenditure per capita and household dietary 
diversity score (HDDS). In addition to the measurement of household food security, per capita 
food consumption somewhat represents farm households’ productivity following Di Falco, 
Veronesi, and Yesuf (2011). From the econometric point of view, analyzing the agricultural 
productivity implication of market participation at the household level is subject to potential 
endogeneity due to endogenous bias in the farm households’ decisions regarding market 
participation. To an extent, the current study accounts for selection bias potentially affecting the 
differences in productivity and food security outcome variables between the market participants 
and the nonparticipants. Failure to differentiate between the causal effects of market entrance and 
the impacts of other factors could bring about biased estimates and misleading policy 
implications (Asfaw et al. 2012). The study uses a propensity score matching (PSM) method to 
control for the endogeneity of the decisions concerning crop output market participation, which 
arises from observed factors. The results confirm the productivity-enhancing and food-security-
enhancing hypothesis. Then, the commercialization contributes to improving the household 
livelihoods through the enhancement of farm productivity and household food security.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly poverty 
reduction achievement and agricultural development in Cambodia, Section 3 describes analytical 
framework and empirical approach used in the analysis and data used for the analysis, Section 4 
presents and discuss the results, and Section 5 concludes the chapter.  
4.2 Overview of Poverty Reduction and Agricultural Development in Cambodia  
This section provides overviews of the achievement of poverty alleviation, agricultural 
development and food security issues in Cambodia in Cambodia. Over the last decade, Cambodia 
has been experienced a rapid growth of agriculture and a deep transformation of rural society, 
with an increase in agricultural exports. The rapid economic growth has made tremendous 
contribution to poverty reduction in the country. Along with the reduction in poverty, there are 
also increasing concerns over household food security issues, in particular among the poorest and 
vulnerable households that are mostly found in rural communities. The agricultural sector has 
been developed in absolute terms; however, the relative share in the economy has been 
decreasing, making room for manufacturing industry and services sector. Farmers utilize more 
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inputs and relative modern production technologies to substitute a diminishing agricultural labor 
and start produce commodities based on market incentives. 
4.2.1 Poverty Reduction Achievement in Cambodia  
One of the developing countries, Cambodia has achieved rapid poverty reduction in the world. 
This achievement is of course resulted from the economic growth with average annual growth 
rate of approximately 7% over the past two decades, which is a result of what the World Bank 
called “peace dividend”. The peace fully won since 1997 by unifying all Cambodian political 
factions has brought socio-economic development to the Kingdom, allowing the Kingdom to 
enjoy the economic growth and poverty alleviation. The overall poverty headcount at $US 3.10, 
$US 1.90 and at national poverty lines decreased from approximately 66.13% in 2004 to 
approximately 61.64% in 2007, from approximately 32.00% in 2004 to approximately 29.40% in 
2007, and from approximately 48.37% in 2004 to approximately 38.70% in 2007, respectively 
(Figure 4.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from the World Development Indicator 2015  
During the period 2007-2012, the overall poverty headcount at $US 3.10, $US 1.90 and at 
national poverty lines fell at a higher rate than the previous periods. During this higher rate 
period, the poverty alleviation mostly resulted from the improvement in households’ conditions 
in rural communities (World Bank 2015).  
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Figure 4.1 Overall poverty rate in Cambodia during 2004-2012 
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At the same time when the overall poverty headcount declined, the overall poverty gap was 
also reduced during the same period, with the same trend as that of the overall poverty headcount 
(Figure 4.2). The overall poverty gap at $US 3.10, $US 1.90 and at national poverty lines 
decreased from approximately 24.53% in 2004 to approximately 22.67% in 2007, from 
approximately 7.64% in 2004 to approximately 7.10% in 2007, and from approximately 14.17% 
in 2004 to approximately 10.45% in 2007, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from the World Development Indicators 2015  
The overall poverty alleviation came from 3.60% reduction in Phnom Penh, 8.10% in other 
urban areas and the remaining 83% in rural localities, with the most of poverty alleviation 
occurring (approximately 80%) during 2007-2009 (World Bank 2015). It is remarked that from 
2004 to 2007 the poverty in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, and other urban areas was 
reduced more than that in other rural areas; however, from 2007 to 2009, the poverty rate in other 
urban and rural areas decreased significantly, while the poverty in Phnom Penh slightly increased 
(Figure 4.3). From 2009, the poverty incidence in other urban areas has slightly increased, while 
that in Phnom Penh and other rural communities have had a declining tendency. 
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Source: World Bank 2015 
According to the World Bank, one of the Asian countries, Cambodia enjoyed the largest 
growth elasticity of poverty. For example, in 2005 Cambodia achieved the growth elasticity of 
poverty of approximately 5.20 measured in purchasing parity power (PPP) for the poverty line at 
$US 1.25 per day (Table 4.1). This elasticity implies that the poverty was reduced by 5.20% 
when the GDP per capita increased by 1%.  Among selected ASEAN countries represented in 
Table 5.1, Cambodia is the second to reach the large growth elasticity of poverty following 
Thailand whose the elasticity was approximately 7.2.    
Table 4.1 Growth elasticity of poverty in selected ASEAN countries  
Country Poverty rate (PPP 2005 $1.25/day) 
Growth elasticity 
(PPP 2005 $1.25/day) 
Annual per capita 
GDP growth rate 
(%) 
Thailand 0.10 7.50 1.40 
Cambodia 7.20 5.20 3.30 
Vietnam 2.90 3.50 4.60 
Indonesia 9.70 2.40 4.50 
Philippines 17.80 0.80 4.20 
Lao PDR 28.80 0.50 5.90 
Source: World Bank 2015  
Figure 4.3 Poverty rate by region in Cambodia during 2004-2011 
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4.2.2 Agricultural Growth and the Contribution to Economy 
Over the past two decades, Cambodia has achieved real agricultural GDP growth rate of 
approximately 4.11% annually, with the share as a percentage of GDP averaging 38% (Figure 
4.4). The average annual growth rate was 5.10% between 2002 and 2012 and 5.30% during 2004-
2012 (World Bank 2015). However, from 2006 to 2014, the annual growth rate had a declining 
trend, raising concerns over the continuity of rural poverty reduction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Agriculture (% of GDP) is the agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP. Agricultural growth 
is the growth of agricultural value added.  
Source: Author’s computation from the World Development Indicators 2015 (access on December 2015)18
 
  
The gross agricultural production grew by 10% per annum during the period 2002-2012, 
which was the highest rate in the world (Table 4.2). The growth of gross agricultural production 
per capita was 8% during the same period, which was also among the highest in the world (World 
Bank 2015). Nevertheless, the share of the agriculture in the GDP had a decreasing trend from 
1993 to 2014. The decreasing share of agriculture in the economy reflects the structural 
transformation in the economy, making room for development of manufacturing industry and 
services sector (see also Figure 4.5). At the same time, the agriculture is on the path of rapidly 
transitioning from a primitive subsistence to a modern market-oriented sector.  
 
                                                             
18 World Development Indicators (2015). http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators  
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Table 4.2 Gross agricultural production growth in selected countries during 2002-2012  
Country/Region Average Annual Growth (%) 
Bangladesh 2.00% 
Thailand 2.60% 
China 3.50% 
Vietnam 4.10% 
India 4.30% 
Indonesia 4.40% 
Lao PDR 5.30% 
Cambodia 9.60% 
    
Asia 3.40% 
European Union -0.30% 
World 2.50% 
Source: World Bank 2015 based on FAOSTAT 2014 
Over these two decades, the composition of the economy has significantly changed, with the 
share of agriculture declining and the industry and services having increasing role in the 
economy. This trend clearly shows that Cambodia’s economy has seen a structural 
transformation, improving the agricultural productivity by transferring excessive labor in the 
agricultural sector to the industry and services sectors. Although the agricultural production and 
the value added increased at high rate, the share of agriculture in GDP steadily declined from 
approximately 46.52% in 1993 to approximately 29.82% in 2014 (Figure 4.5). However, the 
share of agriculture in GDP seemingly unchanged during the period 2002-2007. From 2007 to 
2011, the share increased and has decreased since 2011. Although the share of agriculture has 
decreased, the contribution to the GDP is still higher than the industry, suggesting that the 
agriculture remains a main factor in promoting the development, in particular in rural 
communities.   
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Source: Author’s computation from the World Development Indicators 2015 
In general, the economic growth has made tremendous contribution to the poverty reduction 
in Cambodia. By taking a look at the role of the growth by economic sectors in alleviating 
poverty, the impressive growth in agriculture over the last decade has been a main contributor to 
the poverty reduction in Cambodia (World Bank 2015). During 2004-2011, the rice price was one 
of the main factors explaining the reduction in poverty in rural communities of Cambodia. Figure 
5.4 shows that by approximately 24%, rice price contributed to the alleviation of poverty in rural 
Cambodia. In Cambodia, the net sellers of rice are more than the net buyers (Ivanich and Martin 
2014). This suggests that with a relatively increased price of rice, producing rice for sale purpose, 
Cambodian farmers can enjoy better living standards.   
The increase in global price of rice in 2008 passed through to domestic prices in Cambodia, 
allowing many farm households, in particular smallholders, to enjoy higher household earnings. 
The increased price of rice had direct effects on household earnings, by increasing the per unit 
value of production and encouraging the total production level because of an increase in 
cultivated land areas and use of inputs. As indicated by Figure 4.6, due to these direct effects, the 
increase in rice production made a contribution of approximately 23% to poverty reduction in 
rural Cambodia. 
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Source: World Bank 2015 
The increase in agricultural production absorbed some excessive agricultural labor force, 
augmenting farm wages. The figure indicates that farm wages made a contribution of 
approximately 16% to the poverty alleviation in rural localities of Cambodia. Overall, the 
increase in farm wages and rice production were responsible for the poverty reduction by almost 
a half. Due to limited data on agricultural wages, it was impossible to identify the sources of 
agricultural wages from different activities. However, it is certain that the main share of farm 
wages increase came from the rice production. The production of rice represents approximately 
80% of total cultivated land area in the country, and approximately 80% of the farm households 
in rural localities grow rice (World Bank 2015). Furthermore, according the World Bank, rice 
increased in price during 2007-2009 by 39%, while all other domestically produced products 
such as beef, chicken, fish and seafood, fresh eggs, fresh fruits, and vegetables increased by 
approximately 25%, 24%, 24%, 14%, 27% and 22% respectively. During the same period, the 
agricultural earnings from the wage-paid labor grew by approximately 49%.  
In addition, during the period 2004-2011, the increased earnings from nonfarm activities 
contributed almost one-fifth to the poverty alleviation. During the same period, the salary-paid 
employment augmented, accounting for approximately 4% of the decrease in poverty accidence. 
Finally, other factors were responsible for approximately 14% poverty alleviation, in particular 
during the period 2009-2011.  
Rice price
24%
Rice 
production
23%
Nonfarm wage
19%
Farm wage
16%
Urban salaries
4%
Others
14%
Figure 4.6 Drivers of poverty reduction in Cambodia during 2004-2011 
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4.2.3 Drivers of Agricultural Development by Agricultural Subsectors  
Taking a look at the main drivers of the agricultural development in Cambodia, the agricultural 
growth was mainly driven by crops that are dominated by paddy rice (Figure 4.7). According to 
World Bank (2015), during the period 2002-2012, the average growth of value added crops was 
recorded at 7.8% per annum, while the average growth rate of livestock value added was 3.6% 
per annum. During the same period, the fisheries and forestry subsectors grew by 3.7% and 0.7%, 
respectively (World Bank 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2015 based on NIS 2014 
Crops still have main role as a subsector to play in stimulating the agricultural growth. 
Because of their steadily high growth rate, the share of crops in the total agricultural value added 
grew from 43% in 2002 to 54% in 2012 (Figure 4.8). Cereals, in particular paddy rice, have made 
a tremendous contribution to generating the crop production value; however, the non-cereals 
production has increased faster than paddy over the last decade (Table 4.3). Nonetheless, the 
important role of livestock production in the agricultural value added decreased from 
approximately 17% in 2002 to approximately 14% in 2012 (World Bank 2015). So too did the 
fisheries and forestry subsectors also reduce their roles in the agricultural value added (Figure 
Figure 4.7 Growth of agricultural subsectors (constant prices) during 2002-2012 
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4.8). Because crops are dominant in the agricultural value added, the analysis of 
commercialization in this dissertation is also dominated by the crop production, in particular 
paddy rice production.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2015 based on NIS 2014 
Over the past ten years, rice production has doubly increased with a combination of an 
increase in yields and expansion of cultivated land area (World Bank 2015). During the period 
2000-2012, paddy production increased from approximately 3.8 million tons in 2002 to 
approximately 9.3 million tons in 2012, with the annual average growth rate of 9.30% (Table 
4.3). The wet season paddy accounted for 75% of the total paddy farming. Because Cambodia’s 
farming remains largely dependent on rain-fed condition and very vulnerable to climatic events, 
during the wet season, farmers often do not face the shortage of water but sometimes suffer 
excessive rainfall or/and flood. However, during the dry season, the farmers often see the 
difficulty in having access to water for their farming due to insufficient development of irrigation 
infrastructure in the country. During the dry season, only approximately 8% of Cambodia’s total 
cultivable land is estimated to be irrigated, which is the lowest rate in Asia (World Bank 2015).  
In fact, not only did rice production growth contribute to the growth of crops subsector, the 
production of other main crops augmented even more than the rice production (Table 4.3). For 
Figure 4.8 Share of subsectors in agricultural GDP during 2002-2012 
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example, the production of cassava, sugarcane and maize all increased by more than 20% per 
annum, while soybean and vegetables grew by approximately 12% and 10%, respectively. The 
growth is resulted from both an increase in cultivated land area and yields (World Bank 2015). 
Although the current yields remain relatively low, their annual average growth over the past 
decade has been steady at the rate between approximately 3.90% for soybean and 13.70% for 
cassava, reflecting the improvement in productivity.             
Table 4.3 Production, yields, cultivated area and growth of main crops 2002-2012 
  2002 2012 Annual Average Growth Rate (%) 
Crop Production (ton) 
Cultivated 
Area (ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ha) 
Production 
(ton) 
Cultivated 
Area (ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ha) 
Production 
(ton) 
Cultivated 
Area (ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ha) 
Rice  3,822,509 1,994,645 1.916 9,290,940 2,980,297 3.117 9.30% 4.10% 5.00% 
Maize 148,897 80,470 1.85 950,909 215,442 4.414 20.40% 10.30% 9.10% 
Cassava 122,014 19,563 6.237 7,613,697 337,800 22.539 51.20% 33.00% 13.70% 
Vegetables 163,175 34,438 4.739 411,435 54,155 7.597 9.70% 4.60% 4.80% 
Soybean 38,661 33,438 1.156 120,165 70,972 1.693 12.00% 7.80% 3.90% 
Sugarcane 173,105 9,581 18.068 1,220,255 36,722 33.23 21.60% 14.40% 6.30% 
Source: MAFF 2014 and World Bank 2015 
Regardless of crops, the growth in agricultural production is driven by the expansion of 
cultivated land areas (Table 4.3). In accordance with the MAFF, the cultivated land expansion 
made a contribution to 42% of the rice production growth during the period 2003-2012. The land 
expansion contributed to vegetables, maize and cassava by approximately 37%, 76% and 84% 
respectively (World Bank 2015). From 2002 to 2012, cultivated land area in hectares increased 
by approximately 4.10% for rice production, 10.30% for maize production, 33% for cassava 
production, 4.60% for vegetables, 7.80% for soybean and 14.40% for sugarcane production 
(Table 4.3).       
4.2.4 Agricultural Exports 
The RGC’s commitment is to promoting diversified exports to reduce the economic vulnerability 
to international markets, by going beyond exporting garment and textile products. In doing so, 
the government has made efforts to enhance the exports of agricultural products based on 
Cambodia’s agricultural potential. Because of the government’s agricultural export policy, the 
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exported agricultural products are mostly crops, for which rice, cassava and other cereals are the 
main agricultural export products.    
Table 4.4 Evolution of formal trade of selected commodities, Cambodia, 1996-2011 
  
Quantity (000 tons) Annual Growth Rate (%) 
1996 2001 2006 2011 1996-2001 2001-2006 2006-2011 
Commodity exports        
Cereals 10.4 7.1 38.0 180.3 -7.4 39.9 36.5 
Rice 5.6 7.0 5.2 174.0 4.6 -5.8 101.8 
Coarse grain 4.8 0.0 32.6 6.3 -100.0 n/a 28.0 
Commodity imports               
Cereals 41.8 59.8 65.2 44.4 7.4 1.7 -7.4 
Source: World Bank 2015 based on NIS 2014 and FAOSTAT 2014 
However, the formal  cereal exports fell from 10,400 tons in 1996 to 7100 tons in 2006, 
decreasing by approximately 7.40% per annum; however, they increased from 7100 tons in 2001 
to 38,000 tons in 2006 and to 180,300 tons in 2011 (Table 4.4). The cereal exports grew at the 
rate of approximately 40% and 36.50% per year during 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 respectively. It 
is remarked that rice exports increased significantly from 2006 to 2011, with the annual growth 
rate of approximately 101.80% on average. Nevertheless, there is no formal data on cross-border 
trade that allow the estimation of the right volume of agricultural exports. In 2013, while the 
volume of formal exports of rice was estimated to be approximately 378,850 tons, the volume of 
informal cross-border exports was estimated to be approximately 1,536,000 tons (World Bank 
2015). The vegetables, maize and cassava are also informally exported through cross-border 
trade. Therefore, the official statistics cannot control for such informal trade information, which 
also include imports of agricultural products in likely hug volumes from neighboring countries, in 
particular Thailand and Vietnam.   
4.2.5   Agricultural Productivity 
Agricultural value added per hectare increased from approximately $US 257 thousands in 1993 to 
approximately $US 463 thousands in 2012, while agricultural value added per worker grew from 
approximately $US 349 in 1993 to approximately $US 524 in 2012. The agricultural productivity 
has steadily increased over the past two decades (Figure 4.9). Furthermore, the ratio of 
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nonagricultural value added per worker to the agricultural value added slightly decreased from 
approximately 3.2 in 2004 to approximately 2.1 in 2012, suggesting that income gap between the 
populations engaging in agricultural activities and the populations engaging in nonagricultural 
activities has been narrowing. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation from the World Development Indicator 201519
  
 
Along with the increase in agricultural value added per hectare, Figure 4.6 indicates that the 
paddy yield per hectare had a steadily increasing trend during the period 1994-2008. The annual 
average growth rate of the yields per hectare was approximately 5%, while the average growth 
rate for maize, cassava, vegetables, soybean and sugarcane was approximately 9.10%, 13.70%, 
4.80%, 3.90% and 6.30% respectively (Table 4.3). The growth in these crops production has 
driven the total agricultural productivity to grow steadily over the past two decades. 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 World Bank indicators, data online. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed on November 2015).  
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Source: Calculated from the 2008 USDA Dataset  
Nevertheless, the production yields are still lower than other neighboring countries’ yields, 
or on average equal to 2.54 against 2.74 - 5 tons per hectare in the neighbors, Thailand and 
Vietnam (Table 4.5). Although there was an improvement in agricultural productivity, Table 4.5 
shows that during the period 200-2008, the production still had low productivity vis-à-vis 
neighboring countries’ production, because the farmers face the shortage of capital investments 
for such inputs as seeds and fertilizers, and for irrigation. Although there was an increasing use of 
fertilizers in Cambodia, the rate of use remains below the average at regional level (World Bank 
2015). During 2006-2008, Cambodia used the fertilizer of approximately 36-68 kg per hectare, 
while Thailand and Vietnam used the fertilizers of approximately 108.2 kg per hectare and 221 
kg per hectare respectively (Table 4.5).  
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Figure 4.10 Cambodia’s paddy yields per hectare 
94 
 
Table 4.5 Rice yields in Cambodia and neighboring countries during 2000-2008 
  Thailand  Cambodia Vietnam 
 Yield 2006-2008 average (tons/ha)  2.74 2.54 4.89 
 Land-labor ratio (ha/person)  0.96 0.81 0.33 
 Input use 2006-2008         - Fertilizer (kg/ha)  108.20  34-68  220.90 
    - Irrigation (% of agricultural area)  33 20 46 
    - Tractor (per ha)  14.20 0.60 24.90 
 Trade 2005-2007 average         - Export quantity (thousand tons)  6483 2 4817 
    - Export value (million $)  2359 1 1391 
    - Export price 2006-2007 average ($/ton)  364 517 289 
Source: Yu and Diao (2010)  
Among five ASEAN agricultural countries, during 1994-2012, Cambodia achieved paddy 
yields per hectare at the lowest level, and below the ASEAN average yields (Figure 4.11). By 
comparing Cambodia’s paddy yields per hectare with those of four ASEAN agrarian countries 
such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Lao, and Thailand, Cambodia’s yield stayed below Thailand, Lao 
and Myanmar. This lower level may be because of limited use of fertilizers and modern 
agricultural capitals such as tractors and limited access to irrigation as indicated in Table 4.4.  
However, the average crop yields of cassava was approximately 22.1 tons per hectare, which was 
higher than those of other ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines and 
Indonesia, although the yields of maize was only approximately 4.1 tons per hectare, which was 
above only Philippines (World Bank 2015). 
Furthermore, the gap in paddy yields between Cambodia and two main competitors, 
Thailand and Vietnam, is very like to get larger. Cambodia’s yields are estimated to be 
approximately 4 tons per hectare, and very rare to be above this level, although there is the best 
managed irrigation in the production process (World Bank 2015). For example, farmers in the 
better growing areas in the central region of Thailand can enjoy rice yields of approximately 5.7 
tons per hectare in dry season (Bordey et al. 2014). In Mekong Delta of Vietnam, the provincial 
rice yields are on average between 6 to 7 tons per hectare, with some smallholders enjoying the 
yields above this level (World Bank 2015). These high-yielding provinces make the most 
contribution to the rice exports of Thailand and Vietnam. These larger differences in rice yields 
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lead to the larger yield disparity between Cambodia and these main competitors, thus causing a 
larger gap in rice exports between Cambodia and the competitors.      
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT online20
                                                             
20 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). FAOSTAT online. 
  
Although the agricultural productivity is very likely to be determined by the cultivated land 
expansion, the increase in cultivated land per se cannot sustain the improvement in agricultural 
productivity because the agriculture usually exhibit the decreasing returns to scale. The utilization 
of modern agricultural tools, inputs such as fertilizers and manure, and the improvement in 
irrigation infrastructure would be very likely to promote the commercialization of agriculture, 
and in turn improve the productivity. Farm households can increase their earnings through 
increasing sale in markets, and in turn the revenue from selling commodities allow them to make 
more investments in modern agricultural tools and in land and use more inputs. These processes 
are more likely to improve farm productivity, thus enhancing their living standards. This chapter 
focuses on this linkage at the household level, by analyzing the socio-economic effects of farm 
households’ market participation on farm households.    
http://faostat.fao.org/default.aspx (accessed on November 2015) 
Figure 4.11 Paddy yields in comparison with 4 ASEAN agrarian countries 1994-2012 
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4.2.6   Food Security Issues 
In general, the economic growth has contributed to the overall poverty reduction, but whether the 
growth can sustain the poverty reduction and make a large contribution to the improvement in 
household food security should also taken into account. Although Cambodia’s poverty 
headcounts were significantly reduced, the vulnerability and the risk of getting back to the 
poverty trap are still relatively high (World Bank 2015). The number of poor population 
decreased from approximately 7 million in 2004 to approximately 3 million in 2011 (Figure 
4.12). The recent substantial reduction in poverty was characterized by the large concentration of 
Cambodians just below the 2004 poverty line and Cambodians just above the 2011 poverty line, 
with most of people who get out of poverty trap doing so with a small benefit (World Bank 
2015). In accordance with the World Bank, if there is a loss of only 1200 riels ($US 0.30) a day, 
the poverty rate is estimated to double to approximately 40%. The hight rate of vulnerability 
indicates that the increase in agricultural productivity remains modest. Therefore, the sustained 
agricultural and nonagriculatural growth is necessarily needed to reduce the risk and 
vulnerability.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2015 
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The number of near poor or vulnerable (those who live above $US 1.15 a day but below $US 
2.30 a day (World Bank 2015)) increased from approximately 5 million in 2004 to approximately 
8.1 million in 2011 (Figure 4.13). The increase in the number of vulnerable people is hug, raising 
concerns over food security issues, in particular in rural communities. The smallholder famers, 
with cultivable land areas of less than one hectare, are among the poorest and the most 
vulnerable. Small-scale farm households find it hard to integrate themselves into the emerging 
modern food value chains and consume health-friendly foods due to the fact that their earnings 
have increased slower than the price of such a food. This largely increased number of vulnerable 
suggests that a special attention should be given to the agricultural development conducive to the 
improvement of agricultural productivity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2015 
The increasing vulnerable households have happened alongside landholding inequality 
among farm households. In 2011, approximately 48% of the rural farm households were 
smallholder farmers, with the share of smallholders in the total farm households in rural areas 
having an increasing trend (World Bank 2015). Over the last decade, the inequality in possessing 
land has widened, with the large farm households (possessing land of more than 3 hectares) 
owing larger and larger land and the small-scale farm households (possessing land of less than 1 
Figure 4.13 Vulnerable people from 2004 to 2011 
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hectare) holding smaller and smaller land.21
The prevalence of stunting declined from approximately 44% in 2005 to 40% in 2010, and 
continued declining to approximately 33% in 2014, according to the World Bank and the results 
of Cambodian Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 2014. However, the prevalence is 
 According to the World Bank, the smallholder farm 
households’ agricultural land size on average decreased from approximately 0.99 hectare in 2008 
to 0.88 hectare in 2012, while the medium farm households’ (between 1 and 3 hectares) farm 
land size increased from approximately 1.55 hectare to 2.38 hectares and the large farm 
households’ farm land size increased from 3.61 hectares to 7.03 hectares during the same period.  
Although the productivity of some small farms got improved, most of primitive small farms 
have still had low productivity because they have been unable to have access to agricultural 
extension and other public services at a large scale. It is more likely that the smallholder farm 
households’ earnings over the last decade largely have come from high value of agricultural 
production, stimulated by high agricultural prices, and the supply of their labor force to larger 
farm households at higher wages, rather than from farm land expansion and productivity. 
Nevertheless, nutritional security issues have lagged behind the substantial reduction in 
overall poverty in Cambodia. According to the report on Cambodia Socio-economic Survey 
conducted in 2009 by the NIS, one third of the population was undernourished; they consumed 
less than the minimum energy requirement (MDER). Although the nationwide prevalence 
declined from approximately 37% in 2004 to 33% in 2009 and there was also a decrease in the 
undernourishment prevalence among the poorest at the first quintile from approximately 80% in 
2004 to 59% in 2009 (NIS 2011), the rates were still high. In particular, the undernourishment in 
the third and fourth quintile remained increasing from approximately 22% in 2004 to 25% in 
2009 and from approximately 13% in 2004 to 19% in 2009, respectively. In spite of a decrease in 
children’s stunted growth and poor nourishment (under the age of 5 years) by approximately 7% 
during 2010-2012 (World Bank 2015), Cambodia has faced a malnutrition, costing the economy 
approximately $US 400 million per annum, according to the news from the Voice of America 
(VOA) in 2015.  
                                                             
21 The change is agricultural land distribution was independent of the government’s economic land concessions 
(World Bank 2015).  
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still at high rate in regional comparison. The stunting rate was still higher than 40% in four 
provinces including Kampong Chhnang, Kompong Speu, Preah Vihear, and Stung Treng (World 
Bank 2015). The stunting resulted not only from the deficiency in food intake but also from poor 
sanitation or malnutrition and health care. Nonetheless, the agricultural development can do more 
to address the issues of undernourishment and multidimensional nature of malnutrition. This 
chapter puts a main emphasis on farm households’ food security improvement through promoting 
farm households’ participation in markets.   
4.3. Analytical Framework and Empirical Approach 
This section provides overviews of econometric approaches to the empirical analysis. A rigorous 
econometric approach is adopted to quantify the impacts of market participation on farm 
productivity and household food security. The propensity score matching (PSM) method is used 
to control for the potential endogeneity of the decisions concerning crop output market 
participation, which arises from observed characteristics. 
4.3.1. Market Participation  
The model describing the farm household’s decisions concerning market participation is based on 
the models used in Chapter 3. In a standard agricultural household model, a farm household 
maximizes utility as a function of consumption goods self-produced on the farm or bought from 
markets subject to household income constraints. Under the assumption that markets are perfect, 
prices are exogenously determined, and then the households’ decision concerning production and 
consumption are separable in household behavior of maximizing profits. However, the markets 
are imperfect in the reality. In imperfect markets, according to the non-separable model the 
decision prices are endogenously affected by market prices and factors influencing transaction 
costs in the markets. These decision prices are household-specific prices and heterogeneous 
across farm households and cannot be observed (Owande et al. 2015). As mentioned in Chapter 
3, due to the heterogeneity of farm households, the empirical model of market participation in 
this study is built on the non-separable model.  
In the non-separable model, a farm household decides to produce crops for home 
consumption or/and sale in markets. According to Barrett (2008), the household decisions 
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whether to enter or not enter markets as a seller get made based on the decision prices determined 
by household-specific and location-specific transaction costs. Then, the decision prices depend on 
public goods and services, household location characteristics, and household characteristics 
affecting information search costs such as family head’s education level and information asset 
ownership. According to theoretical model of market participation decision developed by Key, 
Sadoulet, an de Janvry (2000) and Barrett (2008) reviewed in Chapter 3, a farm household is 
considered entering markets as a seller if making a positive crop sale volume defined as total 
outputs less own consumption (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ).  
Let assuming that farm household i, where i = 1, 2…, N and N denotes the total sample, 
receives treatment (Mi = 1) if participating in markets, and does not receive (Mi = 0) if not 
participating in markets. Let denote T is the subsample of treated farm households, and C the 
subsample of controls. As specified in Chapter 3, the regression equation that defines a market 
participation model can be therefore written as follows: 
                                                 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖                                                                        (1) 
                                                 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = �1, if 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 00, if 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0    
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖∗ is the probability that farm household i enters crop markets (also known as the latent 
variable). 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is the vector of crop quantity sold by the household. M is equal to 1 for a farm 
household that generates positive crop quantity sold (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 0) and 0 for a farm household that 
makes no sale (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ 0). 𝛼𝛼 is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝑣𝑣 is error term under 
the assumption that 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1). Zi includes household characteristics that can capture transaction 
costs, farm characteristics, village public transportation conditions, agro-ecological risks, and 
legal land rights captured by land ownership documents, following Chapter 3.  
4.3.2. Modeling Socio-Economic Effects of Market Participation  
The particular interest of the current study is to quantify the effects of farm households’ market 
participation on farm productivity and household welfare. Participation in markets would allow 
the farm households to produce on-farm crops in a more efficient way and to increase household 
earnings. The study hypothesizes that participation in markets exerts positive effects on farm 
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productivity and household food security. To assess the socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm productivity and household food security, a commonly used model in the 
literature on effect evaluation is written as follows:   
                                            𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                                                    (2) 
where Yi represents the household’s farm productivity in terms of crop yield per hectare and per 
working-age household member, gross margin per hectare and per working-age household 
member and household food security in terms of food consumption per capita and household 
dietary diversity score. Xi is a vector of household and farm characteristics and other factors that 
are expected to affect Yi. Mi is a dummy for market participation, and then 𝛾𝛾 is the coefficient 
capturing the effects of market participation on farm productivity and household food security.  
However, the estimation of this coefficient using the ordinary least square (OLS) method 
may yield biased and inconsistent estimate because participation in markets is potentially 
endogenous. The decision of whether to participate or not participate in markets is voluntary and 
more likely based on self-selection of farm households into the market participant group (Asfaw 
et al. 2012; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Seng 2015a and b). If, for example, more productive farmers 
who are wealthier and more motivated, and/or have great entrepreneurial skill are very likely to 
enter markets, the impacts would be overestimated (Seng 2015a and b). Moreover, farm 
productivity and household food security may both affect participation in markets as well as be 
affected by participation; thus, farm productivity, household food security and participation in 
markets may be jointly determined, and this could also lead to endogeneity bias. 
4.3.3. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Approach 
The current study addresses the above mentioned econometric challenges by adopting the PSM 
approach. Nevertheless, one has to recognize that the PSM has a limitation because it assumes 
that the selection is based on observed factors; it cannot account for unobserved confounders 
which affect both the outcome variables and the decision to participate in markets.22
                                                             
22 Alternatively, to address the unobservable selection bias issue, one can adopt the IV approach. However, due to a 
lack of appropriate identification strategy, the current study cannot purse this approach, i.e. strong and plausible 
instruments to be employed in the estimation cannot be found in dataset used in the study. 
 
102 
 
Unlike the instrumental variable (IV) approach, the matching models assume that sample 
selection bias is eliminated because of conditioning on observed variables (Heckman and 
Navarro-Lozano 2004). In the matching models, the conditions of an experiment are created by 
allowing the participants and nonparticipants in markets to be randomly assigned, thus 
identifying a casual relationship between the decision of whether to participate in markets and 
outcome variables. Let Y1i be the potential outcomes (i.e. gross margin per hectare, gross margin 
per working-age household member, and per capita food consumption) of the treated households 
(Mi = 1) and Y0i be the potential outcomes of the control households (Mi = 0). Then, the treatment 
effects for household i can be defined as: 
                                                                    ∆𝑖𝑖= 𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖                                                                       (3) 
The parameter that has attracted the most attention in the literature on effect evaluation is the 
average treatment effects on the treated T (ATT), which is defined as: 
                   𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇(∆𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖|𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)                             (4)  
where Zi is a set of observed factors that affect the likelihood of participation in markets. While, 
the mean post-treatment outcomes 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) are observed, the mean counterfactual 
outcomes 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) are not. Hence, one needs to choose a proper substitute for 
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) to construct the counterfactual outcomes for estimating the ATT. The only 
information that can be used is 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖). However, employing the mean outcomes of 
the untreated households in non-experimental studies is very likely to be subject to the fact that 
factors determining the treatment decision equally determine the outcome variables of interest, 
leading to a self-selection bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). In this case, the estimate can 
produce unbiased and consistent ATT if only if 
                                                𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)                                                      (5) 
To construct both counterfactual outcomes  𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) and 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖|𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), the 
PSM approach introduced by Rosembaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) is adopted. The PSM is 
defined as an algorithm matching the treated (market participants) and untreated households 
(nonparticipants) based on the conditional probability of market participation (i.e. the propensity 
score), given the observed characteristics (Essama-Nssah 2006, p. 5). That is, the PSM constructs 
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a group of statistical comparison by matching every individual observation of market participants 
with an observation of non-participants with similar characteristics from the non-participant 
group. The propensity score is the probability of participating in markets  Pr(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) which 
will be estimated using either the probit or logit model, the choice of which model is the best is 
less discussed in the literature when the treatment is binary (Caliendo and Kopeining 2008). 
Following the majority of previous studies, the current study uses the logit model to estimate the 
propensity score.      
However, the PSM procedure is valid, relying in part on four fundamental assumptions: (i) 
conditional independence assumption (CIA), (ii) sufficient region of common support, (iii) 
participants and nonparticipants from the same data source, and (iv) the access of participants and 
nonparticipants to the same markets (Heckman et al. 1998). 
(a) Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)  
A possible identification can be provided with the assumption that potential outcomes and 
treatment assignment are independent given a set of observed variables Zi which are not 
influenced by the treatment. Thus, the CIA, unconfoundedness given Xi, can be written as: 
                                                          (𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 ,𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶) ⊥ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖                                                                 (6) 
Equation (6) implies that the potential outcomes of treatment and controls are independent of 
treatment conditional on a set of observed covariates Zi. That is, the condition for Equation 5 is 
met (𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)). The CIA suggests that given Zi, the nonparticipants 
can achieve the same mean outcomes as the participants would do if they had not entered 
markets. That is, the selection is only determined by observed factors, and all covariates affecting 
participation in markets and potential outcomes are simultaneously observable to researchers 
(Asfaw et al. 2012). 
(b) Common Support or Overlap Condition 
The second fundamental assumption is the sufficient region of common support or overlap 
condition, which requires that the propensity score be strictly between zero and one. That is, 
                                                        0 < 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) < 1                                                          (7)    
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Equation (7) requires that the probability of being participants and nonparticipants for farm 
households with similar characteristics Xi be strictly positive. Under the overlap condition, 
observations of the treatment have comparison observations nearby in the distribution of 
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman et al. 1998). This suggests that the 
effectiveness of PSM is also dependent on a large and approximately equal number of treated and 
untreated households so that the common support area can be sufficiently substantial. In general, 
there are two common approaches to determining the common support region. The first approach 
is based on a comparison between the minima and maxima of the score in both groups. The basic 
criterion is to eliminate all observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum and 
lower than the minimum in the opposite group (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The second one is 
based on an estimation of the density distribution in both groups and uses a trimming method to 
determine the region of common support (Smith and Todd 2005). If Equations (6) and (7) are 
valid, the PSM method is a plausible approach to estimating unbiased and consistent ATT 
(Asfaw et al. 2012).   
Nevertheless, conditioning on covariates Zi could cause “a curse of dimensionality” if vector 
Xi has a high dimension (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). For example, if Zi has k dichotomous 
covariates, the number of potential matches will be equal to 2k. To address this problem, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest conditioning the matching on the propensity score in lieu 
of the covariates, by proving that the potential outcomes are equally independent of treatment 
conditional upon the propensity score if (they are) independent of treatment conditional upon 
covariates Zi. Then, the first condition expressed in Equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten as 
unconfoundedness given the propensity score and common support conditional on the score as 
follows: 
                                                             (𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 ,𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶) ⊥ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)                                                        (9) 
                                                        0 < 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) < 1                                                  (10)  
(c) Estimation of Effects  
Given that the CIA assumption is satisfied and there is overlap between the participant and 
nonparticipant groups, strong ignorability is constituted (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Then, the 
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PSM estimator for unbiased and consistent ATT given by Equation (4) under the condition given 
by Equation (5) can be rewritten as:  
          𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇(∆𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖))            (11)  
and                            𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖))                                         (12) 
Equation (11) suggests that the PSM estimator for ATT is a mean difference in outcomes 
within the common support region, weighted by the propensity score distribution of market 
participants. Hence, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002), the PSM estimator for ATT expressed 
by Equation (11) can be rewritten in general as: 
                        𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇(∆𝑖𝑖 |𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)) = 1𝑇𝑇 ∑ �𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑊𝑊(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗)𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗=1 �𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1                        (13) 
where T is the total number of treated households (participants in markets), while C is the total 
number of control households (nonparticipants in markets). Y1i is the post-treated outcomes of 
treated household i, while Y0ij is the outcomes of jth control household that matches the ith treated 
household. W(i,j) is a weight function with positive value. 
4.3.4. Summary of PSM Implementation 
In general, there are five steps in implementing the PSM. In step 1, the propensity score is 
estimated. Step 2 selects matching algorithm. Step 3 checks the overlap or common support 
condition. Step 4 evaluates the quality of matching or checks the balancing property. However, 
steps 3 and 4 can be done together (see e.g., Asfaw et al. 2012). Step 5 checks the sensitivity of 
the estimation of effects to unobserved confounders.  
(a) Propensity Score Estimation 
The propensity score is the probability of participating in markets  Pr(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) which will be 
estimated using either the probit or logit model, the choice of which model is the best is less 
discussed in the literature when the treatment is binary (Caliendo and Kopeining 2008). 
Following the majority of previous studies, the current study uses the logit model to estimate the 
propensity score. The logit model describing the probability of participating in markets is 
specified following Equation (1).     
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(b) Matching Approaches 
Several matching methods have been developed in the literature, which can be used to match the 
market participants with the nonparticipants that have very similar propensity scores to the scores 
of the participants. These matching methods include nearest neighbor, stratification and interval, 
caliper and radius and kernel matching among others. All matching approaches should 
asymptotically produce the same outcomes. Nevertheless, in practice, one tends to face trade-offs 
in terms of bias and efficiency once preferring one method to the other (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008). However, in the literature, there is not a clear guidance about which method is the best and 
the adoption is very likely to depend on the question to be investigated.  
Following Asfaw et al. (2012), the current study adopts the nearest-neighbor matching 
(NNM) and Kernel matching (KM) methods.23
Given that the matching conditions on the propensity score in lieu of covariates, it is necessary to 
check whether the matching approach can balance the distribution of the covariates in the treated 
and control groups. In doing so, one needs to compare the estimated results before and after 
matching and, then, check whether any differences in the covariates of the two groups in the 
matched sample still exist after conditioning on the score (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
 The NNM matches outcomes of each participant 
with outcomes of nonparticipants with a propensity score that is closest to the score of the 
participants, and is carried out with replacement (𝑛𝑛 ≥ 1). Thus, this approach allows for 
matching a given comparison unit (matched control) with more than one treated unit. Similar to 
Clément (2011), the current study uses a generalized NNM, the nearest five-neighbor matching 
approach, which takes the average outcomes of the nearest five comparison units as the 
counterfactual for individual treated units. Alternatively, the study also estimates the ATT using 
the KM with Gaussian type (normal) and bandwidth parameter fixed at 0.06 (following Clément 
(2011)), in part, to check the robustness. The KM estimates the ATT by matching each treated 
unit with a weighted sum of comparison units, assigning the greatest weight to comparison units 
with the nearest propensity score (Heckman et al. 1998).  
(c) Common Support Restriction and Balancing Property  
                                                             
23 The current study uses the psmatch2 Stata command proposed by Sianesi (2004) to estimate the matching results.  
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Normally, the balancing test is conducted after matching to verify that the differences in 
covariates have been discarded, in which the comparison group that has been matched can be a 
credible counterfactual. There are several techniques of balancing test in the literature; however, 
the mean absolute standardized bias between the participants and the nonparticipants proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is commonly used. Furthermore, Sianesi (2004) suggested 
comparing the pseudo-R2 and p-values of the likelihood ratio test of the joint nonsignificance of 
all the covariates from the estimated logit model before and after matching samples. The 
structural differences in covariates distribution between the two sample groups should not exist 
after matching. Thus, the pseudo-R2 should decrease and the joint nonsignificance of the 
covariates should be accepted (or the p-values should not be significant after matching). 
(d) Sensitivity  
Although the PSM approach compares the differences between the outcome variables of 
participants and nonparticipants with similar characteristics, it is unable to correct unobservable 
bias due to only accounting for observed factors. That is, it is almost impossible to test the 
unconfoundedness assumption conditional either on covariates or propensity score. This 
assumption could not be easily satisfied if unobserved confounders simultaneously affect the 
potential outcomes and the decision regarding market participation. Thus, it is also important to 
perform a robustness check or sensitivity check of the estimated results subject to hidden bias. 
The robustness check of estimated results has been an increasingly important assignment in the 
empirical literature on effect evaluation (Becker and Caliendo 2007). The estimated results might 
not only sensitive to unobserved factors but also to different specifications although some studies 
argue that the results of matching are independent of the specifications (Zhao 2005).  
There are several approaches used in the literature to check the sensitivity of the estimated 
results. For example, the “nnmatch” procedure proposed by Abadies et al. (2004) and the bounds 
method introduced by Rosenbaum (2002) can be adopted to check the sensitivity. However, the 
Rosenbaum approach is easier to be implemented and commonly used in most of empirical 
literature on effects evaluation. Recent implementations of the Rosenbaum approach can be 
found in Aakvik (2001), DiPrete and Gangl (2004), Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2005), 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) or Clément (2011). The approach is briefly outlined as follows. 
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Now, let’s assume that unobservable factors 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  simultaneously influence the potential 
outcomes and treatment. Therefore, with the presence of  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , the CIA can be written as follows:  
                                                �𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 ,𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶� ⊥ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 |𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖), 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                                         (14) 
The probability of being in the treatment (participating in markets) is given by: 
                                    𝑃𝑃�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)� = 𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)                                             (15) 
where Zi is a set of observed covariates, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is a set of unobserved confounders, and F(.) is the 
logistic distribution function. 𝜓𝜓 is zero if the estimated results are not subject to hidden bias; that 
is, the treatment assignment is only conditional on or determined by the observed covariates. 
Let’s further define 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)/(1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) and 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 )/(1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ))  as the odd of being in the 
treatment group and control group, respectively. Then, the odd ratio can be derived as follows: 
                    𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)/(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖))
𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 )/(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ))=𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ))𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 )(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖))=𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖+𝜓𝜓𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖))𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 (𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗+𝜓𝜓𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 ))                        (16) 
Under the CIA condition, Zi and Zj should be the same to ensure that units with similar 
characteristics take equal chance of receiving the treatment (more extensive discussion can be 
found in Rosenbaum (2002)). Thus, Equation (16) can be rewritten as follows: 
                             𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ))
𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 )(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝[𝜓𝜓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 )]                                           (17)      
Equation (17) shows that the CIA is not satisfied if 𝜓𝜓 ≠ 0 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 . But, the estimates are 
free of hidden bias if the odd ratio is equal to 1. From Equation (17), 𝜓𝜓 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗  can be 
computed to determine how strong the unobserved confounders undermine the matching 
estimates. Therefore, by assuming that  Γ = 𝑒𝑒𝜓𝜓 , the Rosenbaum bounds can be given by: 
                              1
Γ
≤
𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗))
𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗)(1−𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)) ≤ Γ                                                             (18)  
If Γ = 1 or  𝜓𝜓 = 0, it means that hidden bias does not happen. If the values of Γ increase, it 
implies that there is the increasing effects of unobserved confounders in the treatment selection. 
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For the different values of  Γ, the Rosenbaum bounds approach employs matching estimates to 
compute confidence intervals of the treatment effects. If the lowest Γ yielding an interval of 
confidence that encompasses zero is relatively small, the estimated treatment effects are very 
likely to be subject to such an unobserved confounder (Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012). 
According to the literature on the application of PSM approach, if the lowest Γ, which is less than 
2, produces a confidence interval encompassing zero, the estimates are sensitive to unobserved 
confounders (see e.g., Aakvik 2001; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Keele 2010; Clémont 2011; 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012). 
4.3.5. Variables and Data Used in Empirical Analysis 
The outcome variables include crop yield per hectare and working-age household member, gross 
margin per hectare and per working-age household member, household food consumption per 
capita and household dietary diversity score (HDDS). According to Swindale and Bilinsky 
(2006) and FAO (2011), the household food security can be represented by HDDS. The HDDS 
measures a household’s economic ability to consume a variety of foods. Several empirical studies 
indicate that an increase in dietary diversity is associated with socio-economic status and 
household food security (availability of household energy) (see e.g., Hatloy et al. 2000; Hoddinot 
and Yohannes 2002; Swindale and Bilinsky 2006; FAO 2011). Following Swindale and Bilinsky 
(2006), FAO (2011) and Asfaw et al. (2011), the HDDS in this chapter is built on the availability 
of data from the CSES conducted in 2009, which is shown in Table 4A.1 in the appendix. There 
are 15 food groups that are the most important for human energy; therefore, the total score is 15 
points.  
The dependent variable in the logit model is a dummy for participation in crop output 
markets, with the value equal to 1 if a farm household participates in market and 0 if the farm 
household does not participate. As defined in Chapter 3, a household is considered entering 
markets as a seller if making positive market surplus (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ). The study uses aggregate values 
evaluated at village prices to compute the market surplus. This aims at using all information in 
the data such as the information on farmers who sell other crops than rice or maize, which are 
more likely important to the farm households’ livelihoods. Using the aggregated quantities with 
multiple crops is impractical. However, the drawback of this aggregation is that it may conceal 
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differences in mechanisms of causality related to decisions on individual crops due to different 
views of farmers about different crops. Yet, because Cambodia’s agriculture is characterized by 
mono-cropping with predominant paddy, aggregating crops is basically the aggregation of paddy 
crops in wet and dry seasons (Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012).24
As discussed earlier, the validity of the PSM approach is dependent on the CIA, requiring 
that outcomes of treatment and controls are not determined by the treatment assignment 
conditional on a set of observed covariates. Then, to properly estimate the propensity score, a set 
of covariates are necessarily exogenous to the treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The 
covariates are a set of variables used as explanatory variables in the double hurdle model of 
Chapter 3. Those variables include household characteristics and households’ endowments that 
potentially affect the transaction costs, farm characteristics, agro-ecological conditions, 
availability of transportation in the village, and legal land rights. To make it easier to follow the 
analysis, all variables and outcome variables used in this Chapter are summarized in Table 4.5. 
Household characteristics include household head’s age, gender, education level, household size, 
and dependency ratio. As described in Chapter 3, household head’s age is used to capture the life 
cycle effects on participation in markets. After reaching a certain age, a person would gradually 
start reducing production due to a decrease in energy and motivation, thus affecting market 
surplus (𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ). Household head’s education level captures the effects of household human capital 
and information on agriculture. Moreover, well educated persons would have easier access to a 
large amount of information and be able to have better networks in the community (Key, 
Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012). Dependency ratio can produce 
mixed effects on the farm households’ market participation. On the one hand, with higher 
dependency ratio in a farm household, high household incomes are needed to satisfy food 
consumption and other necessary expenditures. On the other hand, the farm households with the 
higher ratio need to spend more time taking care of the dependents, reducing the time available 
for on-farm employment. However, older members may help care for children, possibly allowing 
the parents to engage in on-farm production (Seng 2015a). Larger household size needs high 
household earnings to meet household expenditure. In addition, it can allow the farm households 
 Hence, it is unlikely that the 
aggregation would create serious problem for this study. 
                                                             
24 See also Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3. 
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to have more access to information on markets, thus more likely to encourage the farm 
households to produce market-oriented crops. In Chapter 3, these household characteristics are 
found to determine the farm households’ likelihood of participating in markets. Thus, the 
household characteristics are also expected to affect the probability of entering markets in the 
logit model of the PSM.    
The farm households’ endowments such as transportation equipments capturing proportional 
transaction costs, and TV & radio and telephone capturing fixed transaction costs are very likely 
to affect the farm households’ decision of participating in markets through influencing 
transaction costs as explained and found in Chapter 3. Other endowments such as landholding 
and modern agricultural equipments are the most important to the agricultural production. The 
results in Chapter 3 indicate that these factors promote the commercialization of agriculture. 
Farm characteristics are captured by a dummy for availability of irrigation infrastructure in the 
village. The availability of irrigation infrastructure in the village is very important for the farm 
households, allowing them irrigate cultivated areas, thus inducing them to produce more and 
participate in crop output markets. A dummy for yield damage caused by drought, rot, birds/other 
insets and/or rodents is used to capture the effects of agro-ecological risks. Farmers reported yield 
quantity loss from such an agro-ecological factor from the previous year to the time of interview. 
Because some farmers produced multiple crops, the use of aggregate quantities of damaged crops 
to capture such effects is impracticable. Moreover, due to the unavailability of information on 
rainfall levels, the study constructs the yield damage dummy, with the value equal to 1 if a farm 
household suffered post-harvest damage caused by the above factors and 0 if the farm household 
did not suffer such damage. Because the risks negatively affect crop yields, they would affect 
farm households’ market surplus and market participation.  
As used and described in Chapter 3, a dummy for availability of public transportation in the 
village is also used to capture transaction conditions in the village. The public transportation 
availability can facilitate travel back and forth between farm gates and marketplaces and connect 
rural economies to the entire economy of Cambodia, apparently encouraging the farm households 
to produce crops for commercial purposes. Better public transportation development in the 
village makes also a tremendous contribution to the reduction in transportation costs (Rao and 
Qaim 2011).     
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Table 4.6 Summary definition of variables used in the analysis 
Variables   Description   
Outcome variables    
    - Crop yield per hectare Crop yield per hectare = Total crop yield/cultivated land area 
    - Crop yield per worker  Crop yield per hectare = Total crop yield/Number of working age (15 – 64) members  
    - Gross margin per hectare  Gross margin per hectare = (output values – production costs)/cultivated land area  
    - Gross margin per worker  Gross margin per working-age family member = (output values – production costs)/Number of working age (15 – 64) members 
    - Food consumption per capita  Per capita household expenditure on food consumption   
    - HDDS Household dietary diversity score 
Independent variables       - Village average price of paddy    Natural log of  village average price of paddy 
    - Household head’s age   Natural log of household head’s age   
    - Household head’s      Natural log of household head’s schooling years   
    - Household size  Total household member  
    - Dependency ratio  Household member no.<15 + no.>64/Number of working age (15 – 64)  
    - Ethnicity   =1 if the farm household head is Khmer  
    - Household head’s gender =1 if the farm household is male-headed 
    - Foreign language   =1 if any household member can use other language than Khmer language  
    - Transportation equipment  =1 if the farm household owns transportation equipments such as car, Van/Jeep, motorcycle, bicycle etc.  
    - TV & radio  =1 if the farm household owns TV & radio (capturing fixed transaction costs) 
    - Telephone  =1 if the farm household owns telephone (capturing fixed transaction costs) 
    - Landholding per worker    Natural log of landholding per working-age household members in hectares   
    - Modern agricultural equipment 
=1 if the farm household owns modern agricultural equipments 
such as harrow/rake/spade, hand tractor, rice mill and water 
pump etc. 
    - Yield damage      =1 if the farm household suffered post-harvest damage caused by drought, rot, birds/other insets and/or rodents etc. 
    - Cultivated land damage   =1 if the farm household experienced cultivated land loss caused by  caused by excessive rainfall/flood  
    - Irrigation availability     =1 if the farm household lives in the village where irrigation infrastructure is available for cultivation   
    - Village public transportation      =1 if the farm household lives in the village where there is public transportation such as taxi, bus and motorbike taxi etc.  
    - Legal land rights      =1 if the farm household receives land ownership documents issued by the authorities 
Source: Author 
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Furthermore, holding a legal document to certify the land ownership, the farm households 
can secure their land rights that provide incentives for them to make more investments in 
agricultural technologies and production, a main factor in the improvement of the productivity 
(Pingali and Rosegrant 1995). As figured out in Chapter 3, the legal land rights represented by 
land ownership documents issued by the government can encourage the farm households to 
undertake medium- and long-term investments in land such as soil improvements or irrigation. 
Furthermore, the legal land titles may formalize land markets, facilitating transfer of land from 
nonproductive users to more productive users or from one generation to the next generation that 
may be more productive. The use of this variable is motivated by the estimated results in Chapter 
3 and the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the economic advantages of land titles 
(see e.g., Feder 1988; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Feder and 
Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989, 2000; Otsuka and Place 2001; Smith 2004; Deininger et al. 2008; 
Markussen 2009; Deininger et al. 2015).  
4.4. Results and Discussion 
This section starts with a description of summary statistics of main variables used in the analysis 
and a descriptive statistical analysis of the differences between the farm households that 
participate in markets and those that do not participate in terms of farm productivity and 
household food security. The section ends by presenting the econometric analysis results. 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis  
Table 4.7 describes general differences between the market participants and nonparticipants in 
terms of crop yields and gross margin per hectare, crop yields and gross margin per working-age 
household member, per capita food consumption expenditure and HDDS. The summary statistics 
reported in Table 4.7 indicate some remarkable differences between the participants and 
nonparticipants in terms of these outcome variables, which are confirmed by simple statistical 
tests of difference in means. For example, the participant households enjoy on average crop yield 
per hectare of approximately 6100 thousand riels or $US 1525 and yield per worker of 
approximately 3946 thousand riels or $US 987, while the nonparticipant households enjoy the 
average yields of approximately 1546 thousand riels or $US 387 and the average yields per 
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worker of 316 thousand riels or $US 79.25
Table 4.7 Comparison between market participants and nonparticipants 
 This result suggests that the participants’ farm 
productivity is significantly higher than the nonparticipants’ productivity in terms of yields per 
hectare and worker.  
  Participants   Nonparticipants Difference 
Variable Mean SD   Mean SD in Means 
Crop yields per hectare 6100.701 1529.85 
 
1546.265 90.461 4554.436*** 
Crop yield per worker 3945.504 1763.128 
 
315.523 254.521 3629.982** 
Gross margin per ha 5071.037 1526.436  693.534 37.454 4377.502**  
Gross margin per worker 3415.442 1762.674  125.61 328.126 3289.833 
Food consumption/capita 45,152.280 11,878.110 
 
20,984.00 1,247.586 2,4168.270* 
HDDS 8.754 2.471   8.187 2.719 -0.567*** 
Note: Crop yields and gross margin values are in thousand riels (Cambodian currency). Household food consumption 
per capita is per capita expenditure on food consumption in Cambodian currency (Riel) within 7 days. *, ** and *** 
denote statistically significant difference at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 4.7 also shows that the participants’ average gross margin per hectare of 
approximately 5071 thousand riels or $US 1268 is significantly higher than that of the 
nonparticipants, which is approximately 694 thousand riels or $US 174. Nevertheless, there are 
no significant differences in gross margin per worker between the participants and the 
nonparticipants. With an average per capita household expenditure on food consumption of 
approximately 45,147 riels or $US 11.29 per week, the farm households who participated in 
markets could enjoy significantly higher per capita household food consumption than those that 
did not participate, with an average of approximately 20,984 riels or $US 5.25. This result 
suggests that the farm households participating in markets are very likely to enjoy higher 
household food security in terms of food consumption per capita than the farm households that 
do not participate. Furthermore, the participant households enjoy the average HDDS of 
approximately 9 points, while the nonparticipant households enjoy the average HDDS of 
approximately 8 points. This result indicates that the participants’ household food security is 
significantly and statistically higher than the nonparticipants’ household food security in terms of 
HDDS. 
                                                             
25 All amounts are converted into US dollar at the exchange rate of 1 USD = 4000 riels. 
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However, these descriptive statistic results do not necessarily show that participation in 
markets promotes the productivity and household food security due to such issues as the 
endogeneity of the farm households’ decision to participate in markets resulting from selection 
bias and household heterogeneity.      
4.4.2. Econometric Analysis 
The descriptive analysis indicates significant differences in yields per hectare and worker, gross 
margin per hectare, per capita household food consumption expenditure and HDDS between the 
farm households that participate in markets and those that do not participate. However, the 
differences cannot necessarily indicate the beneficial socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm households due to the endogeneity issues. To properly evaluate the socio-
economic effects of participation in markets on farm households, as outlined in Section 3, the 
PSM approach is used.  
The PSM approach accounts for the endogeneity of the decisions to participate in markets 
resulting from observed characteristics of households and of their farms. The primary approach in 
this Chapter is to identify again different factors determining the farm households’ participation 
in markets so that the propensity score can be estimated for the matching, thus allowing us to 
quantify the causal effects of participation in markets on farm productivity and household food 
security. To implement the PSM procedure, in general the econometric analysis is carried out in 
two steps. First, the logit model describing the probability of participating in markets is estimated 
and reported. Second, the effects of participation in markets are estimated by using the KM and 
NNM methods and presented. 
(a) Determinants of Market Participation: logit model 
The propensity of participating in markets is estimated by using the logit model whose the 
estimated results are presented in Table 4.8. The significantly positive coefficient of village 
average price of paddy suggests that the farm households’ supply of crops in the markets 
positively responds to the price of commodity, in particular paddy. As figured out in Chapter 3, it 
is plausible for the positive supply response to the village average price of paddy because the 
agriculture in Cambodia is characterized by mono-cropping with predominant paddy.  
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Table 4.8 Determinants of market participation: logit model 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Err.  P-value  
Village average price of paddy 1.351*** 0.139 0.000 
Household head’s age  0.559 2.261 0.805 
Household head’s age squared  -0.110 0.303 0.717 
Household head’s gender  -0.084 0.099 0.395 
Household head’s education   0.025** 0.013 0.048 
Ethnicity -0.090 0.229 0.695 
Household size 0.021 0.023 0.353 
Dependency ratio -0.444*** 0.062 0.000 
Foreign language 0.035 0.107 0.742 
Modern transportation equipments 0.129* 0.072 0.074 
TV & radio ownership 0.087 0.080 0.279 
Telephone ownership 0.060 0.074 0.421 
Landholding per worker 0.807*** 0.060 0.000 
Modern agricultural equipments 0.374*** 0.083 0.000 
Yield damage  -0.350*** 0.076 0.000 
Cultivated land damage in ha -0.117*** 0.040 0.003 
Availability of village irrigation infrastructure  0.813*** 0.100 0.000 
Availability of village public transportation 0.210** 0.101 0.037 
Legal land rights 0.181*** 0.065 0.005 
Constant  -8.228* 4.274 0.054 
Pseudo R2   0.1454   
LR Chi2(19)  977.43   
Log likelihood   -2873.114   
KM method    
Untreated     (off support)   [on support]  1986 (2) [1984] 
Treated         (off support)   [on support]  3019 (35) [2984] 
Total  observations 5005 37 4968 
NNM method    
Untreated     (off support)   [on support]  1986 (1249) [737] 
Treated         (off support)   [on support]  3019 (1990) [1029] 
Total observations 5005 3239 1766 
Note: Off support and on support are presented in parentheses and square brackets, respectively. *, ** and *** are 
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
The coefficient of education level is significantly positive and a little bit higher than that in 
Chapter 3. Once again, this result suggests that farm households with better-educated heads are 
very likely to participate in markets. Farm households with better-educated head are very likely 
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to produce crops for marketing purpose. This result is consistent with that in Chapter 3 and the 
findings by the earlier studies on determinants of market participation (see e.g., Key, Sadoulet, 
and de Janvry 2000; Neven et al. 2009; Rao and Qaim 2011; Azam, Imai, and Gaiha 2012). 
Generally, better-educated farmers are more innovative and entrepreneurial, and then more likely 
to participate in market supply chains. This is plausible, because education can help farm 
households to better adapt to new production technologies and market requirements. Moreover, 
better-educated farmers would have easier access to high level of information and be able to have 
better networks in community (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Azam Imai, and Gaiha 2012), 
thus facilitating entrance to markets. 
Consistent with the result reported in Chapter 3 and the earlier findings by Azam, Imai, and 
Gaiha (2012) and Owande et al. (2015), the likelihood of participating in crop markets is very 
likely to be reduced by the high dependency ratio, which is confirmed by the significantly 
negative coefficient of dependency ratio in Table 4.8. The farm households with high dependency 
ratio may see the shortage of labor force for their farming, in particular when some family 
members get aging. The households with more dependents need to spend more time taking care 
of these dependents, reducing the time available for nonfarm activities (Seng 2015a and b). In 
addition, the farm households with higher dependency ratio may produce crops in a less 
productive way than the farm households with lower dependency ratio. This is because 
Cambodia’s agricultural production characterized by traditional techniques might exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale. 
In a similar fashion, the legal land rights have a significantly positive relationship with 
market participation, indicating that its potential role in stimulating the commercialization of 
agriculture. This result is also consistent with the estimated result of the double hurdle model 
reported in Chapter 3, suggesting the robustness of the estimated results on the effects of legal 
land rights on market participation. In Cambodia, due to land dispute, the legal land rights may 
have a crucial role in securing the farmers’ rights to their land, providing incentives for them to 
make more investments in farming. Legal land titles may encourage the farmers to undertake 
medium- and long-term investments in land such as soil improvements or irrigation as discussed 
in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the legal land titles may formalize land markets, facilitating transfer of 
land from nonproductive users to more productive ones. Therefore, the estimated results are very 
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robust, being very likely to support the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the 
socio-economic advantages of legal land titles in promoting the commercialization of agriculture 
(see e.g., Feder 1988; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Feder and 
Nishio 1999; de Soto 1989, 2000; Otsuka and Place 2001; Smith 2004; Deininger et al. 2008; 
Markussen 2009; Deininger et al. 2015).  
Quite similar to the estimated results of the first hurdle in Chapter 3, Table 4.8 also show that 
agro-ecological conditions captured by a dummy for yield damage and cultivated land damage in 
hectares is very likely to affect the likelihood of entering markets. Unfavorable agro-ecological 
conditions put the farm households at high risk, thus discouraging the farm households from 
engaging in market-oriented farming. This result suggests that the farm households in Cambodia 
are very vulnerable to agro-ecological conditions such as climate change.  
 In general, the estimated results are consistent with the estimated results of the first tier of 
the double hurdle in Chapter 3, suggesting that the estimations of factors determining the 
commercialization of agriculture produce the very robust results. The likelihood of participating 
in markets is significantly dependent on the village average price of paddy, the farm household 
head’s education level, dependency ratio, landholding in hectares, modern agricultural 
equipments, modern transportation equipments, the availability of infrastructure in the village, 
the public transportation conditions in the village, and agro-ecological conditions. Moreover, 
legal land rights, the main variable of interest in the analysis of the determinants of 
commercialization of agriculture, still have the significantly positive correlation with the 
probability of entering markets.     
(b) Common Support and Matching Quality 
The particular interest of this Chapter is in the effects of market participation on farm 
productivity in terms of crop yields per hectare and worker, gross margin per hectare and per 
worker, and on household food security in terms of household food consumption expenditure per 
capita and HDDS. The descriptive analysis indicates the significant differences in crop yields per 
hectare and worker, gross margin per hectare and per capita food consumption and HDDS but 
insignificant difference in gross margin per worker between the market participant households 
and nonparticipants.  
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As mentioned earlier, the differences cannot, however, necessarily indicate that the farm 
households’ participation in markets enhances the productivity in terms of crop yields and gross 
margin, and improve their household food security in terms of food consumption and HDDS due 
to the endogeneity issues that cannot be accounted for by such a simple descriptive statistic 
approach. Hence, as outlined in Section 2 of this Chapter, the PSM approach is adopted to 
properly verify if these differences are still unchanged after accounting for all observed 
confounding factors that can lead to the endogeneity of the decisions of whether to participate or 
not participate in markets.  
Before proceeding to the estimated results of the effects of participation in markets on the 
outcomes (farm productivity and household food security), the common support condition and 
the quality of matching are checked and briefly discussed. As discussed in Section 2 of this 
Chapter, after estimating the propensity scores for the participants and nonparticipants, one needs 
to check the overlap condition to ensure the sufficient region of common support.26
 
 A visual 
investigation of the density distribution of the estimated scores for both the participant group and 
the nonparticipant group presented in Figures 4.14 and 4.15 shows that the common support 
condition is satisfied for both the KM method and the NNM method. As indicated in Figures 4.14 
and 4.15, there is sufficient overlap in the propensity score distribution of both groups. The 
densities are on the vertical axis. The upper half of the graphs presents the propensity score 
distribution for the market participants, and the bottom half refers to the nonparticipants.  
  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 The common support region is carried out, following the example of Leuven and Sianesi (2003), deleting 
observations with propensity score higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of 
nonparticipants from the participant group. 
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Note: PS distribution and common support for the PS estimation with bandwidth = 0.06.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: PS distribution and common support for PS estimation with k-nearest neighbor (k = 5).  
Of note, a main objective for estimating the propensity score is to balance the distribution of 
covariates between the market participants and the nonparticipants so that a plausible matching 
quality is ensured. The results of balancing tests for both before and after matching are reported 
in Table 4.9. For the KM method, the difference in standardized mean for all observed covariates 
Figure 4.14 Propensity score distribution and common support: kernel matching (KM) 
Figure 4.15 Propensity score distribution and common support: NNM 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated: On support Treated: Off support
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employed in the score decreases from approximately 19% before matching to approximately 
4.20% after matching. Similarly, for the NNM method, the difference in standardized mean for 
all observed covariates employed in the propensity score is reduced from approximately 19% 
before matching to approximately 2.90% after matching. In addition, in the appendix, the 
differences in standardized means for individual covariates used in the propensity score 
estimation are also reported in Table 4A.2 and Table 4A.3 for the KM method and NNM method, 
respectively. 
Table 4.9 Matching quality  
 
Pseudo-R2 
before 
matching 
Pseudo-R2 
after 
matching 
𝑝𝑝 > 𝜒𝜒2 
before 
matching 
𝑝𝑝 > 𝜒𝜒2 
after 
matching 
Mean bias 
before 
matching 
Mean bias  
after 
matching 
Var.  
before 
matching  
Var.  
after 
matching 
KM 0.145 0.011  0.000 (976.32)  
 0.000 
(94.04)   18.90 4.20 63.00 32.00 
NNM 0.145 0.007  0.000 (976.32)  
0.347 
(20.82)  18.90 2.90 63.00 26.00 
Note: Likelihood ratios are in parentheses. Mean bias is the mean standardized bias.  
These results reveal that there is a substantial reduction in total bias through matching; 
however, different from the earlier findings by Clémont (2011), the NNM method is more 
plausible in terms of bias reduction and variance after matching. For both matching methods, the 
pseudo-R2 is significantly reduced, from approximately 15.50% before matching to 
approximately 1.10% and 0.70% for the KM method and NNM method, respectively after 
matching. However, the p-value of likelihood ratio tests of the joint significance of the covariates 
are nonsignificant after matching, while they are significant before matching, only for the NNM 
method. The low mean standardized bias, low pseudo-R2 and the nonsignificant p-values after 
matching demonstrate that the NNM method’s balancing property is more satisfied than the KM 
method’s balancing property, thus the specification of the propensity score is more plausible for 
the NNM method than for the KM method. 
(c) Socio-Economic Effects of Market Participation on Farm Households 
The estimated ATT results of the effects of participation in markets on farm productivity and 
household food security based on the KM and NNM methods are presented in Table 4.10. The 
results indicate that by controlling for observed confounding factors that can lead to the 
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endogeneity of the decisions regarding market participation, the market participants enjoy 
significantly higher farm productivity and household food security than do the nonparticipants for 
both the KM and NNM methods.  
In Table 4.10, the ATT results from the KM method show that on average the farm 
households that participate in markets enjoy crop yields per hectare of approximately 3325.308 
thousand riels or $US 831, while those that do not participate enjoy the yields per hectare of 
approximately 1059.662 thousand riels or $US 265.27
The ATT results from the NNM method suggest that on average the market participants 
enjoy crop yields per hectare of approximately 2696.204 thousand riels or $US 674, while the 
nonparticipants enjoy the yields per hectare of approximately 1119.762 thousand riels or $US 
280. Moreover, the participants enjoy crop yields per worker of approximately 1039.523 
thousand riels or $US 260, while the nonparticipants enjoy the yields of approximately 397.510 
thousand riels or $US 99. These results indicate that the market participants’ average gains in 
 Moreover, on average the market 
participants enjoy crop yields per worker of approximately 1649.459 thousand riels or $US 412, 
respectively, while the nonparticipants enjoy the yields per worker of approximately 392.757 
thousand riels or $US 98. These result suggest that the farm households can make average gains 
in terms of crop yields per hectare and crop yields per worker of approximately 2265.646 
thousand riels or $US 566 and 1256.703 thousand riels or $US 314 from participating in markets.    
Furthermore, the ATT results from the KM method indicate that on average the market 
participants enjoy gross margin per hectare of approximately 2344.526 thousand riels or $US 
586, while the nonparticipants enjoy the gross margin of approximately 413.715 thousand riels or 
$US 103. Moreover, the participants enjoy gross per worker of approximately 1118.687 thousand 
riels or $US 280, while the nonparticipants enjoy the gross margin of approximately 125.661 
thousand riels or $US 31. These results indicate that the market participants’ average gains in 
gross margins per hectare and per worker of approximately 1930.811 thousand riels or $US 482 
and 993.025 thousand riels or $US 248, respectively, are made from participating in markets. In 
addition, the KM results reveal that by participating in markets, the farm households can enjoy 
significantly higher household food security in terms of HDDS.  
                                                             
27 All amounts are converted into US dollar at the exchange rate of 1 USD = 4000 riels. 
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yields per hectare and per worker of approximately 1576.442 thousand riels or $US 394 and 
642.013 thousand riels or $US 161, respectively, are made from participating in markets. As far 
as the gains in gross margin are concerned, when participating in markets the farm households 
can make the average gains in gross margins per hectare and per worker of approximately 
1285.341 thousand riels or $US 321 and 515.315 thousand riels or $US 129, respectively. In 
relation to the household food security, the NNM results demonstrate that on average the market 
participants enjoy per capita food consumption of approximately 29,425 riels or $US 7 per week, 
while the nonparticipants enjoy the consumption of approximately 20,616 riels or $US 5 per 
week. This results show that the farm households can benefit from participating in markets in 
terms of food consumption per capita, with a gain of approximately 8809 riels or $US 2 per 
week. Moreover, the participants enjoy HDDS of approximately 9 points, while the 
nonparticipants enjoy the HDDS of approximately 8 points, suggesting that the participants can 
increase significantly the HDDS when producing crop for commercial purpose. 
Based on the ATT results from the KM and NNM methods, the estimated results on the 
effects of market participation on farm productivity and household food security are very likely 
robust in terms of significance level. However, except the food consumption per capita, the gains 
from participating in markets based on the results from the KM approach seem to be larger than 
those based on the results from the NNM approach. Yet, following Asfaw et al. (2012), the result 
with variance reduction after matching is preferable. By looking at Table 4.9, it is clearly shown 
that the NNM method can substantially reduce not only bias but also variance vis-à-vis the KM 
method. Thus, the NNM results are more plausible because with this approach the total bias is 
substantially reduced from 63 before matching to 26 after matching. 
These results support the earlier studies that found that the commercialization of agriculture 
promotes farm productivity in terms of crop yields per hectare (see e.g., Govereh and Jayne 1999; 
Strasberg et al. 1999; Barrett 2008). In addition to these studies, the current study demonstrates 
that the commercialization enhances farm productivity in terms of crop yields per worker, gross 
margins per hectare and per worker. Furthermore, the estimated results of the food security 
effects of market participation also confirm the earlier study by Asfaw et al. (2012) that found 
that participation in input markets increases the market participants’ HDDS. In addition to their 
findings, the current study indicates that participation in markets augments the market 
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participants’ household food consumption per capita. Thus, the study confirms the hypothesis 
that the commercialization of agriculture enhances farm productivity and household food 
security.   
Table 4.10 Socio-economic effects of market participation 
PSM 
Methods Outcome Variables 
Outcome Means       
Participants Nonparticipants Difference (ATT) Std. Err. t-Statistic 
KM       
 Crop yields per ha 3325.308 1059.662 2265.646*** 419.141 5.410 
 Crop yields per worker 1649.459 392.757 1256.703*** 110.541 11.370 
 Gross margin per ha 2344.526 413.715 1930.811*** 330.617 5.840 
 Gross margin per worker 1118.687 125.661 993.025*** 107.702 9.200 
 Food consumption/capita 33,959.781 29,174.219 4785.561 3920.115 1.220 
 HDDS 8.796 8.372 0.424*** 0.122 3.460 
NNM       
 Crop yields per ha 2696.204 1119.762 1576.442*** 256.317 6.150 
 Crop yields per worker 1039.523 397.510 642.013*** 139.835 4.590 
 Gross margin per ha 1817.218 531.876 1285.341*** 243.915 5.270 
 Gross margin per worker 699.656 184.341 515.315*** 138.515 3.720 
 Food consumption/capita 29,425.075 20,616.316 8808.759*** 3035.727 2.900 
  HDDS 8.683 8.424 0.260** 0.132 1.970 
Note: Crop yields and gross margin values are in thousand riels (Cambodian currency). Food consumption per capita 
is household per capita expenditure on food consumption in riel within 7 days. ** and *** are statistically significant 
at 5% and 1% level respectively.  
The improvement in farm productivity can explain the fact that the market participants can 
not only reach economies of scale and use technologies but also can produce goods they are adept 
at producing and exchange the surplus for other goods they are not (Barrett 2008). This argument 
is also consistent with the arguments in the literature on international trade that exporting firms 
tend to enjoy higher productivity than nonexporting firms (see e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1999; 
Bernard and Wagner 2001; Wagner 2007; Urata 2014). The market-oriented farming tends to 
have comparative advantages over the subsistence, thus potentially increasing farm household 
earnings (Kennedy and Cogill 1987; and Dorsey 1999). The increased earnings from selling 
crops in markets allow the farm households to undertake more investments in productive inputs, 
thus spurring farm productivity growth. They also reduce credit constraints faced by farmers by 
increasing household net worth and, thus, enable them to get easier access to credit for their 
125 
 
medium- and long-term investments. Furthermore, entrance into markets would likely generate 
learning-by-selling effects. The participants can learn from market demand by improving farming 
techniques or making specific investments in a specific production for the demand. That is, they 
can learn how to produce more efficiently in a way that their crops meet market requirements. 
The market participants’ household food security improvement can explain the fact that the 
commercialization of agriculture enhances farm household earnings and, thus, improve rural 
living standards. Therefore, to promote the rural livelihoods, a special attention should be given 
to the enhancement of the market-oriented farming.       
(d) Sensitivity  
Following Clémont (2011) and Aakvik (2001), the study also analyzes the sensitivity of matching 
estimates to unobserved confounders by using Rosenbaum bound approach.28
Tables 4A.4 and 4A.5 show that the estimated effects of market participation on yields per 
hectare and per worker and the estimated effects on gross margin per hectare and per worker are 
not sensitive to hidden bias arising from unobserved factors. Nonetheless, for the estimation of 
the effects on household food consumption per capita and HDDS, the lowest Γ value producing a 
95% interval of confidence that encompasses zero is 1.5, meaning that individual households 
with the same covariates differ in the odds of participation in markets by a factor of 50%. This 
result suggests that the estimated effects of market participation on per capita food consumption 
and HDDS are sensitive to hidden bias due to unobserved confounders. This sensitivity issue may 
be because of the inclusion of some variables that influence simultaneously the participation and 
the consumption as well as HDDS in the estimation of the propensity score. In addition, the 
sensitivity may result from the fact that the estimation of the propensity score does not account 
 The results are 
reported in Tables 4A.4 and 4A.5 in the appendix corresponding to the KM method and the NNM 
method, respectively. As discussed in earlier Section, the Rosenbaum bound approach that uses 
the matching estimates to compute confidence intervals of the treatment effect with different  Γ 
values is adopted to conduct the sensitivity test. 
                                                             
28 Becker and Caliendo (2007) proposed “mhbounds” Stata command to conduct the Rosenbaum bounds test. 
Nevertheless, the Mantel-Haenszel statistics produced by the mhbounds can be only applied to binary outcome 
variables. Because the outcome variables of interest in the current study are continuous, the current study employs 
rbounds Stata command to conduct the sensitivity test, following Clémont (2011) and Aakvik (2001). 
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for unobserved confounders such as household wealth, entrepreneurial skills and motivation that 
can also have effects on both the participation and outcome variables. 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter addresses the question of how farm households’ participation in markets contributes 
to improving their household living standards. In doing so, the study analyzes the effects of 
participation in crop output markets on farm productivity and household food security in rural 
Cambodia by using data from the CSES carried out in 2009. The productivity is measured by 
crop yields per hectare and per worker, gross margin per hectare and gross margin per worker, 
and the household food security is measured by household food consumption per capita and 
HDDS. The study uses the propensity score matching method to control for the endogeneity of 
the decisions regarding crop output market participation, which arises from observed 
characteristics in the estimation of the effects. The logit model is used to estimate the propensity 
score of market participation.  
The estimated results of logit model are consistent with the estimated results of market 
participation in the first hurdle of the double hurdle model used in Chapter 3, suggesting that the 
estimated results on the determinants of decisions to participate in markets are robust. The 
likelihood of participating in markets is significantly determined by the village average price of 
paddy, the farm household head’s education level, dependency ratio, landholding in hectares, 
modern agricultural equipments, modern transportation equipments, the availability of 
infrastructure in the village, the public transportation conditions in the village, and agro-
ecological conditions. In particular, legal land rights, the main variable of interest in the analysis 
of the determinants of commercialization of agriculture, are very likely to stimulate the farm 
households’ decision to participate in markets.   
The estimated results of treatment effects confirm that participation in markets have positive 
effects on farm productivity in terms of crop yields per hectare and per worker, gross margin per 
hectare and per worker, and  household food security in terms of household expenditure on food 
consumption per capita and HDDS. However, the results of Rosenbaum bound test show that the 
estimated effects of market participation on household food consumption per capita and HDDS 
are sensitive to hidden bias resulting from unobserved factors. In general, these findings confirm 
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the hypothesis that the farm households’ participation in markets promotes farm productivity and 
household food security. Thus, the commercialization of agriculture contributes to the 
improvement in household livelihoods through the enhancement of farm productivity and 
household food security.  
To improve the study, further studies should obtain accurate data such as two-period data. 
With such a time series of data, one can account for the remaining selection bias with the 
estimation of difference-in-difference (DID) effects in lieu of the ATT that compares only the 
productivity and household food security of the participants with those of the nonparticipants. 
The DID estimators compares changes in the productivity of and household food security of the 
farm households within n years after participating in markets with those of corresponding 
households who have not entered markets. That is, with the DID estimators, one can examine the 
dynamic effects of market entrance on farm productivity as well as household food security 
within a given period of time.  
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Appendix 
Table 4A.1 Household dietary diversity score 
Food Groups (15 Groups) Yes=1 No=0 
A. Cereals (rice, bread, corn, wheat flour, rice flour, corn meal, rice cakes,  noodles, 
biscuits, etc.) 1/0 
B. Fish (fresh fish, salted and dried fish, canned fish, shrimp, prawn, crab, etc.) 1/0 
C. Meat & poultry (beef, buffalo, mutton, lamb, pork, chicken, duck, innards, spleen, 
dried beef) 1/0 
D. Eggs (chicken egg, duck egg, quail egg, fermented/salted egg, etc.) 1/0 
E. Dairy products (fresh milk, condensed or powdered milk, ice cream, cheese, other dairy 
products, etc.) 1/0 
F. Oil and fats (rice bran oil, vegetable oil, pork fat, butter, margarine, coconut/frying oil, 
etc.) 1/0 
G. Fresh vegetables (trakun, onion, shallot, cabbage, spinach, carrot, beans, chili, tomato, 
etc.) 1/0 
H. Tuber (cassava, sweet potato, potato, traov, sugar beet, etc.) 1/0 
I. Pulses and legumes (green gram, dhal, cowpea, bean sprout, other seeds, etc.) 1/0 
J. Prepared and preserved vegetables (cucumber pickles, other pickles, tomato paste, etc.) 1/0 
K. Fruit (banana, orange, mango, pineapple, lemon, papaya, durian, water melon, grape, 
apple, canned and dried fruits, etc.) 1/0 
L. Dried nuts and edible seeds (coconut, cashew nut, lotus nut, peanut, gourd seed, other 
nuts) 1/0 
M. Sugar, salt and spices (sugar, jaggery, salt, chocolate, candy, coriander, red pepper 
spice, garlic, ginger, soy sauce, fish sauce, monosodium glutamate, etc.) 1/0 
N. Non-alcoholic beverages (canned or bottled soft drinks, mineral water, fruit juice, fruit 
syrup, etc.) 1/0 
O. Other food products (fried insects, peanut preparation, flavored ice, ice, other food 
products) 1/0 
Total Points 15 
Source: Author 
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Table 4A.2 Matching quality: KM method 
Variables  
Unmatched Mean     t-test V(T)/ 
Matched Treated Control %Bias %Bias Reduction t p > |t| V(C) 
Average price of paddy U  6.68 6.59 28.50   9.67 0.00 1.49* 
 M  6.66 6.66 0.90 96.80 0.40 0.69 1.42* Household head’s age  U  3.74 3.73 4.00   1.38 0.17 0.97 
 M  3.74 3.75 -1.20 69.30 -0.48 0.63 1.02 Head’s age squared  U 14.09 14.00 3.90   1.34 0.18 0.97 
 M 14.09 14.12 -1.20 70.10 -0.45 0.65 1.01 Head’s gender  U 0.89 0.86 8.80   3.09 0.00 0.82* 
 M 0.89 0.89 -1.80 80.00 -0.73 0.47 1.05 Head’s education   U 5.68 5.37 11.80   4.09 0.00 0.99 
 M 5.67 5.63 1.30 89.10 0.48 0.63 0.85* Ethnicity U 0.98 0.98 -1.40   -0.49 0.62 1.09* 
 M 0.98 0.97 1.70 -21.50 0.65 0.51 0.90* Household size U 4.93 5.02 -5.00   -1.72 0.09 1.03 
 M 4.94 5.00 -3.20 35.00 -1.25 0.21 1.04 Dependency ratio U 0.70 0.77 -11.30   -3.94 0.00 0.93* 
 M 0.70 0.68 2.20 80.40 0.88 0.38 1.04 Foreign language U 0.14 0.11 8.70   2.99 0.00 1.22* 
 M 0.14 0.18 -13.00 -48.30 -4.51 0.00 0.81* Modern transport equip. U 0.54 0.43 20.90   7.22 0.00 1.01 
 M 0.54 0.55 -2.30 89.20 -0.87 0.39 1.00 TV & Radio ownership U 0.80 0.74 15.80   5.51 0.00 0.82* 
 M 0.80 0.79 1.70 89.00 0.70 0.48 0.97 Telephone ownership U 0.43 0.34 17.20   5.92 0.00 1.08* 
 M 0.42 0.40 5.60 67.40 2.13 0.03 1.02 Landholding per worker U -0.78 -1.45 70.50   24.12 0.00 1.27* 
 M -0.80 -0.83 3.40 95.20 1.26 0.21 0.99 Modern agri. equip. U 0.33 0.17 37.80   12.78 0.00 1.58* 
 M 0.33 0.33 -0.20 99.40 -0.08 0.94 1.00 Yield damage  U 0.74 0.77 -7.60   -2.63 0.01 1.10* 
 M 0.74 0.75 -2.20 71.50 -0.83 0.41 1.02 Cultivated land damage  U 0.12 0.07 5.80   1.93 0.05 2.83* 
 M 0.12 0.29 -21.60 -270.60 -5.16 0.00 0.39* Irrigation infrastructure  U 0.19 0.10 27.20   9.14 0.00 1.76* 
 M 0.19 0.24 -14.50 46.60 -4.77 0.00 0.84* Village public transport U 0.67 0.37 62.10   21.56 0.00 0.94 
 M 0.67 0.67 -0.90 98.60 -0.35 0.73 1.01 Legal land rights U 0.53 0.48 10.80   3.74 0.00 1.00 
  M 0.53 0.53 0.30 96.80 0.14 0.89 1.00 
* if variance ratio outside [0.93; 1.07] for U and [0.93; 1.07] for M 
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Table 4A.3 Matching quality: NNM method 
Variables  
Unmatched Mean     t-test V(T)/ 
Matched Treated Control %Bias %Bias Reduction t  p > |t| V(C) 
Average price of paddy U  6.68 6.59 28.50   9.67 0.00 1.49* 
 M  6.62 6.62 -0.70 97.60 -0.23 0.81 1.12 Head’s age  U  3.74 3.73 4.00   1.38 0.17 0.97 
 M  3.74 3.74 -0.40 90.60 -0.09 0.93 1.08 Head’s age squared  U 14.09 14.00 3.90   1.34 0.18 0.97 
 M 14.06 14.06 0.00 98.80 -0.01 0.99 1.07 Head’s gender  U 0.89 0.86 8.80   3.09 0.00 0.82* 
 M 0.89 0.86 8.30 6.20 1.88 0.06 0.83* Head’s education   U 5.68 5.37 11.80   4.09 0.00 0.99 
 M 5.36 5.48 -4.70 60.50 -1.09 0.28 0.9 Ethnicity U 0.98 0.98 -1.40   -0.49 0.62 1.09* 
 M 0.98 0.97 1.30 8.00 0.29 0.77 0.93 Household size U 4.93 5.02 -5.00   -1.72 0.09 1.03 
 M 4.93 4.98 -2.90 41.00 -0.65 0.51 1.03 Dependency ratio U 0.70 0.77 -11.30   -3.94 0.00 0.93* 
 M 0.70 0.71 -1.30 88.10 -0.32 0.75 1.18* Foreign language U 0.14 0.11 8.70    2.99 0.00 1.22* 
 M 0.13 0.12 2.60 70.40 0.59 0.55 1.06 Modern transport. equip. U 0.54 0.43 20.90   7.22 0.00 1.01 
 M 0.48 0.50 -2.80 86.60 -0.63 0.53 1.00 TV & radio ownership U 0.80 0.74 15.80   5.51 0.00 0.82* 
 M 0.79 0.78 1.90 87.60 0.45 0.65 0.97 Telephone ownership U 0.43 0.34 17.20   5.92 0.00 1.08* 
 M 0.38 0.37 2.20 87.10 0.50 0.62 1.01 Landholding per worker U -0.78 -1.45 70.50   24.12 0.00 1.27* 
 M -0.96 -0.98 2.30 96.80 0.81 0.42 1.20* Modern agri. equipment U 0.33 0.17 37.80   12.78 0.00 1.58* 
 M 0.20 0.22 -4.50 88.00 -1.07 0.29 0.94 Yield damage  U 0.74 0.77 -7.60   -2.63 0.01 1.10* 
 M 0.75 0.74 2.50 67.50 0.55 0.58 0.97 Cultivated land damage U 0.12 0.07 5.80   1.93 0.05 2.83* 
 M 0.09 0.05 4.10 30.60 1.17 0.24 14.09* Irrigation infrastructure  U 0.19 0.10 27.20   9.14 0.00 1.76* 
 M 0.11 0.10 4.40 84.00 1.13 0.26 1.14* Village public transport U 0.67 0.37 62.10   21.56 0.00 0.94 
 M 0.65 0.66 -2.60 95.90 -0.58 0.56 1.02 Legal land rights U 0.53 0.48 10.80   3.74 0.00 1.00 
  M 0.49 0.52 -6.30 41.30 -1.44 0.15 1.00 
* if variance ratio outside [0.93; 1.07] for U and [0.88; 1.13] for  
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Table 4A.4 Sensitivity analysis - Rosenbaum bounds: KM method 
  
Gamma 
Hodges-Lehmann point 
estimates 95% confidence intervals 
  Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Crop yields per ha 1 983.62 983.62 927.41 1041.52 
 1.5 724.86 1287.89 675.50 1358.95 
 2 564.20 1539.21 517.39 1625.08 
 2.5 450.38 1761.71 405.34 1863.65 
  3 363.81 1965.51 319.48 2084.48 
Crop yields per worker 1 598.98 598.98 559.72 640.22 
 1.5 428.74 819.68 398.88 874.90 
 2 334.58 1015.61 308.89 1083.17 
 2.5 273.03 1193.20 249.74 1276.33 
  3 228.99 1359.48 207.09 1454.86 
Gross margin per ha 1 752.89 752.89 708.34 798.94 
 1.5 548.18 994.59 508.78 1051.36 
 2 420.54 1194.62 383.75 1262.36 
 2.5 329.97 1368.35 293.71 1447.60 
  3 260.19 1525.69 224.23 1616.94 
Gross margin per worker 1 422.23 422.23 393.34 453.38 
 1.5 295.72 600.62 273.28 647.99 
 2 224.88 767.57 205.57 822.33 
 2.5 178.49 904.83 160.63 963.18 
 3 144.48 1019.54 127.53 1083.25 
Food consumption/capita 1 -2263.62 -2263.62 -2995.27 -1518.48 
 1.5 -5744.90 1558.56 -6443.95 2418.79 
 2 8064.86 4561.35 -8759.80 5549.19 
 2.5 -9792.37 7085.60 -10,502.70 8211.09 
 3 -11,179.20 9324.04 -11,938.90 10,591.10 
HDDS 1 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.49 
 1.5 -0.03 0.84 -0.12 0.93 
 2 -0.32 1.15 -0.41 1.24 
 2.5 -0.55 1.38 -0.65 1.48 
  3 -0.74 1.58 -0.83 1.68 
Note: The lowest critical values of  Γ  of Hodges-Lehmann point estimate and 95% confidence levels encompassing 
zero are in bold. 
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Table 4A.5 Sensitivity analysis - Rosenbaum bounds: NMM method 
  
Gamma 
Hodges-Lehmann point 
estimates 95% confidence intervals 
  Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Crop yields per ha 1 750.71 750.71 672.10 832.23 
 1.5 536.96 995.76 466.33 1092.60 
 2 401.78 1189.90 334.52 1300.89 
 2.5 305.48 1353.55 238.89 1482.27 
  3 230.81 1498.98 164.56 1645.85 
Crop yields per worker 1 305.49 305.49 275.54 336.86 
 1.5 224.62 401.28 198.81 440.42 
 2 174.97 481.24 150.58 529.25 
 2.5 139.90 551.89 116.45 608.69 
  3 113.65 616.34 90.61 682.01 
Gross margin per ha 1 539.78 539.78 474.94 607.25 
 1.5 363.00 741.28 304.36 819.27 
 2 250.95 899.49 194.82 990.55 
 2.5 170.59 1032.76 115.92 1135.92 
  3 109.23 1149.05 54.60 1270.47 
Gross margin per worker 1 216.82 216.82 192.90 242.38 
 1.5 152.00 294.40 130.59 326.21 
 2 110.92 359.38 90.24 398.47 
 2.5 81.17 417.43 60.95 464.29 
 3 58.43 470.42 38.38 524.13 
Food consumption/capita 1 1976.38 1976.38 751.01 3234.95 
 1.5 -1402.44 5724.2 -2528.22 7160.01 
 2 -3589.76 8618.82 -4699.19 10261.8 
 2.5 -5182.94 11,025.6 -6305.5 12,912.8 
 3 -6446.08 13,150.7 -7593.86 15,298.4 
HDDS 1 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.40 
 1.5 -0.20 0.70 -0.40 0.90 
 2 -0.60 1.10 -0.73 1.20 
 2.5 -0.80 1.30 -1.00 1.50 
  3 -1.00 1.50 -1.20 1.70 
Note: The lowest critical values of  Γ  of Hodges-Lehmann point estimate and 95% confidence levels encompassing 
zero are in bold.  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
Over these two decades, Cambodia’s economic growth has made tremendous contribution to the 
overall poverty reduction, in particular in rural areas. By taking a look at the role of the growth 
by economic sectors in alleviating poverty, the impressive growth in agriculture over the last 
decade has been a main contributor to the poverty reduction in Cambodia. The RGC considers 
agricultural development as a crucial component in the government policy to promote the rural 
households’ livelihoods and poverty reduction. To realize this fact, the government adopted 
agricultural development policy to spur agricultural growth. The enhancement of agricultural 
productivity, the commercialization of agriculture and the land reforms are prioritized in the 
government policy on agricultural development. According to the 2014-2018 strategic plan of 
agricultural development formulated by the government, over the last two decades, the 
agriculture has roughly increased on average by approximately 3% per annum. Nonetheless, the 
desirable growth has not yet been achieved to sustain the economic growth and reach rural 
poverty reduction goal that requires the agricultural growth rate of approximately 5% per year 
due to the limited commercialization of agriculture. The commercialization of agriculture is 
commonly recognized by academia and policymakers alike to contribute to increasing the farm 
households’ earnings. In this regard, an analysis of factors that influence the commercialization 
of agriculture is very crucial to the formulation and implementation of agricultural development 
policy. 
Several studies analyze factors determining farm households’ participation in markets in 
various developing countries, focusing on transaction costs and found that high transaction costs 
constrain farm households, in particular small-scale farmers, from getting out of subsistence 
farming. That is, it is matter for the commercialization. Moreover, when it comes to the 
enhancement of agricultural commercialization, one should also pay attention to agricultural land 
security. The previous literature on land titles that secure land ownership shows that the legal 
land titles are very likely to affect agricultural growth and development. This reveals that the 
security of land rights would be likely one of the main factors contributing to promoting the 
commercialization of agriculture. Nonetheless, according to some studies on the roles of formal 
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land titling in promoting agricultural growth and development, formal land titles may have 
unfavorable effects on agricultural growth and development. Therefore, a special attention should 
be given to the legal land rights when analyzing factors determining the commercialization of 
agriculture.   
As far as the household livelihoods are concerned, although Cambodia’s poverty headcounts 
were significantly reduced, the vulnerability and the risk of getting back to the poverty trap are 
still relatively high. The number of vulnerable people has been remarkably increasing, raising 
concerns over food security issues, in particular in rural communities. The small-scale farm 
households, with cultivable land areas of less than one hectare, are found among the most 
vulnerable. Small-scale farm households find it hard to integrate themselves into the emerging 
modern food value chains and consume health-friendly foods because their earnings have 
increased slower than the price of such a food. This largely increased number of vulnerable 
suggests that a special attention should be given to the agricultural development conducive to the 
improvement of farm productivity. Given the high potential for the agriculture in Cambodia, the 
sustained growth in agriculture is necessarily needed to reduce the risk and vulnerability. 
Nonetheless, when participating in markets, farm households may, in particular small-scale 
farmers, get worse off if they cannot take advantage of the markets due to high production costs 
and market entry barriers such as high transaction costs and competitive market environment. 
Then, the farm households’ livelihoods, smallholders in particular, may not get improved much 
and even worse when the revenue from the sales of agricultural products is too low to cover the 
costs of production. To provide further evidence on the socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm households, the study extends previous studies, going beyond the 
determinants of market participation by analyzing the effects of market participation on farm 
productivity and household food security.   
   This dissertation makes two main contributions to the literature. First, by analyzing the 
impacts of legal land rights, defined as state-issued land ownership documents, on the 
commercialization of agriculture in a country where the effects have so far not been studied at the 
household level, in particular Cambodia, the study shows that legal land rights promote the 
commercialization of agriculture. Second, it reveals that the commercialization produces the 
productivity-enhancing effects and the food-security-enhancing effects on farm households. 
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Moreover, the dissertation contributes to the government’s policy on agricultural development 
and enhancement of rural livelihoods by providing evidence that land titling and certification 
programs can be effective policy measures to promote the commercialization through which the 
rural livelihoods can be enhanced.    
Cambodia is the main interest of the study because of its special circumstances. 
Approximately 80% of the population lives in rural areas, relying on agricultural activities. And a 
priori whether the formal land rights can be effective in terms of promoting the 
commercialization of agriculture has yet to be evidenced. Traditional and formal institutions and 
property rights were completely destroyed by Khmer Rouge rule, civil war and social chaos, on 
the one hand. In this regard, the introduction of formal land rights would be very likely important 
for the agricultural growth, in particular the commercialization of agriculture. On the other hand, 
after the first election in 1993, formal institutions and institutional arrangements have remained 
poor due to the government’s limited capacity. If the authorities’ capacity to enforce the 
introduced rights is limited, the introduction of formal land rights would be ineffective in terms 
of promoting the agricultural development. At the policy level, the findings in this study 
contribute to the implementation of agricultural development policy which is prioritized by the 
government to promote rural livelihoods and reduce poverty.          
This dissertation consists of two main empirical studies, following the general introduction 
and literature review in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. Chapter 3 addresses the question of why 
some farm households produce crops for commercial purpose, but some others do not by 
analyzing particularly the effects of legal land rights on the farm households’ market 
participation. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how farm households’ participation in markets 
contributes to improving their household livelihoods by analyzing the effects of market 
participation on farm productivity and household food security at the household level. Chapter 5 
summarizes the dissertation and concludes the study coming up with policy recommendation.  
5.2 Summary of Chapter 2 
This chapter overviews the literature on agricultural development issues, in particular the 
determinants of commercialization of agriculture and the socio-economic effects of market 
participation on farm households. Related to the determinants of commercialization, the chapter 
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discusses the issues, focusing first on the institutional effects on economic development and 
second the institutional effects on agricultural development. The discussion about the institutional 
effects on the agricultural development puts the emphasis on three main aspects: transaction costs 
and commercialization of agriculture, legal land titles and commercialization of agriculture, and 
the socio-economic effects of commercialization on farm households.  
The existing literature shows that high transaction costs which consist of variable transaction 
costs and fixed transaction costs are stumbling block to the integration of farmers into markets in 
various developing countries. Moreover, the literature on the effects of legal land titles on 
agricultural growth and development shows two opposite arguments. The proponents of land 
titling programs argue that land tiles promote the agricultural growth and development, while the 
opponents argue that the legal land titles may produce unfavorable socio-economic effects.  Poor 
landholders with legal land titles may lose main productive assets and get vulnerable through 
distress sales of their land to wealthier actors at low prices. Moreover, using legal land titles as 
collateral can allow land owners to make benefits only if they have a realistic opportunity and the 
capacities necessary to get involved in beneficial business activity. Worse still, the failure in 
investments secured by a farm households’ productive agricultural land will lead to 
impoverishment rather than enrichment. The benefits of land titling are based on the assumption 
that legally titling land is to substitute pre-existing informal systems that were not already 
effective in terms of providing for tenure security, access to credit and a means of transferring 
assets. Nevertheless, if the informal institutions already provided such benefits, the advantages of 
formally titling land will be limited. Furthermore, practically land titling schemes have often 
produced sub-optimal results, in particular for poor and marginal families and in rural 
communities. 
As far as the socio-economic effects of commercialization on farm households are 
concerned, the existing literature shows that participation in markets is very likely to have the 
socio-economic effects on farm households by promoting farm diversity, increasing yields, 
improving farm household nutrition and enhancing household earnings. Nonetheless, one is still 
concerned about small-scale farmers’ ability to compete in markets due to their limited access to 
productive assets and market standard requirements. In this case, small-scale farmers can make 
less benefit from their participation in markets. 
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5.3 Summary of Chapter 3 
This chapter addresses the question of why some farm households produce crops for commercial 
purpose, but some others do not. The empirical model is built on non-separable household model 
to identify the theoretical determinants of farm households’ market participation. To conduct the 
empirical analysis, the study applies the double hurdle model to data from the CSES conducted in 
2009 to identify factors that determine the farm households’ market participation, with a main 
focus on legal land rights issues. The analysis is conducted on all crops combined, and then by 
separating paddy from non-paddy to examine how the determining factors affect the farm 
households’ behavior towards each agricultural market.  
The findings suggest that the legal land rights captured by land ownership documents issued 
by the government authorities are very likely to promote the farm households’ participation in 
markets. The farm households with legal land rights are very likely to produce crops for 
commercial purposes. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the legal land rights promote the 
commercialization of agriculture through the facilitation of the farm households’ access to credit. 
The formal land rights are unlikely to be important to the farm households’ access to credit. 
However, the legal land rights might promote the commercialization through other channels as 
argued by the proponents of land titling programs. In Cambodia, due to land disputes, the legal 
land rights may secure the farmers’ rights to their land, providing incentives for them to make 
more investments in farming. For example, the legal land rights may encourage the farm 
households to undertake medium- and long-term investments in land such as soil improvements 
or irrigation. Furthermore, the legal land titles may formalize land markets, facilitating the 
transfer of land from nonproductive users to more productive ones as well as from one generation 
to the next generation that are more productive. In addition, the legal land rights can be an 
effective means to reduce land disputes, making the households with legal land rights feel that 
their land is secured. This implies that reducing the costs of land titling and land registration and 
facilitating the process of land registration to promote the acquisition of the legal land titles can 
contribute to enhancing the commercialization of agriculture. However, the effectiveness of legal 
land rights in enhancing the commercialization is likely to depend on the quality of institutions 
and institutional arrangements in individual countries. 
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Nevertheless, one should recognize that the variable of legal land rights used in the double 
hurdle model is potentially endogenous, possibly causing over/under-estimate of the effects. For 
example, the endogeneity resulting from the effects of market participation on the farm 
households’ ability to acquire legal land titles representing the legal land rights, which cannot be 
controlled for by the model.  
Although the legal land rights are very likely to contribute to the commercialization of 
agriculture in Cambodia, one should not overlook the adverse socio-economic effects raised by 
the opponents of the legal land titles. The registration of land and land titling schemes are more 
often plagued by asymmetries of information between the haves and the have-nots, which give 
elites opportunity to acquire land at the expense of usufruct rights holders. Asymmetrical 
knowledge that gives the elites a chance to mobilize land from the poor households under titling 
schemes may also lead to sub-optimal land use, because those who acquire the land titles may be 
engaging in speculative activities, rather than in productive activities such as production. If the 
programs produce unwanted outcomes, speculative rather than productive land acquisition by the 
minority of elites in the society, such schemes will not be effective in promoting the agricultural 
commercialization. Thus, the land titling programs can also cause wealth inequalities and 
undermine living standards of the poor and venerable, if one fails or ignores to address poor 
institutional arrangements that can lead to asymmetrical knowledge and power differentials in 
localities. 
In addition, the farm households’ participation in markets is determined by the commodity 
price. Furthermore, non-price factors such as the ownership of modern transportation means, 
modern agricultural equipments, landholding, irrigation infrastructure, public transportation in 
the village and agro-ecological conditions are also the main determinants of commercialization of 
agriculture in Cambodia. The lack of modern farming tools, limited access to irrigation and agro-
ecological risk are obstacles to the transformation of subsistence agriculture into market-oriented 
agriculture.  
However, this study has its limitation: first, related to the transaction costs, it is hard to 
measure the costs in practice due to the unavailable data and relevant information. The study 
considers only the factors that are expected to affect the transaction costs following the previous 
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studies. Second, regarding the legal land rights, the variable (land titles) used in the analysis may 
be endogenous as earlier mentioned. However, due to the limited data, appropriate instrumental 
variables cannot be found to address the endogeneity problem. Therefore, the finding of the 
effects of legal land rights on the farm households’ participation in markets is indicative rather 
than conclusive.  
5.4 Summary of Chapter 4 
This chapter addresses the question of how farm households’ participation in markets contributes 
to improving their household livelihoods. In doing so, the study quantifies the effects of 
participation in crop output markets on farm productivity and household food security in the rural 
communities of Cambodia by using data from the CSES carried out in 2009. The productivity is 
measured by crop yields per hectare and per worker, gross margin per hectare and per worker. 
The household food security is measured by household food consumption expenditure per capita 
and HDDS. The study employs the propensity score matching method to control for the 
endogeneity of the decisions regarding crop output market participation, which result from 
observed characteristics in the estimation of the effects. The logit model is used to estimate the 
propensity score of market participation.  
The estimated results of logit model show that the farm households’ participation in markets 
is significantly determined by the village average price of paddy, the farm household head’s 
education level, dependency ratio, landholding in hectares, modern agricultural equipments, 
modern transportation equipments, the availability of infrastructure in the village, the public 
transportation conditions in the village, and agro-ecological conditions. Furthermore, legal land 
rights, the main variable of interest in the analysis of the determinants of commercialization of 
agriculture, are one of the main factors simulating the farm households to participate in markets.  
These results are consistent with the estimated results of market participation in the first hurdle of 
the double hurdle model used in Chapter 3, suggesting that the estimated results on the 
determinants of decisions to participate in markets are robust. 
Moreover, the estimated results of treatment effects indicate that the farm households that 
participate in markets enjoy significantly higher crop yields per hectare and per worker, gross 
margin per hectare and per worker as well as significantly higher food consumption per capita 
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and HDDS. These results support the earlier studies that found that the commercialization of 
agriculture promotes farm productivity in terms of crop yields per hectare (see e.g., Govereh and 
Jayne 1999; Strasberg et al. 1999; Barrett 2008). In addition to these studies, the current study 
demonstrates that the commercialization enhances farm productivity in terms of crop yields per 
worker, gross margins per hectare and per worker. The estimated results of the food security 
effects of market participation also confirm the earlier study by Asfaw et al. (2012) that found 
that participation in input markets increases the market participants’ household food security in 
terms of HDDS. In addition to their findings, the current study indicates that participation in 
markets augments the market participants’ household food consumption per capita. The current 
findings confirm the hypothesis that participation in markets produces productivity-enhancing 
effects and the food-security-improving effects on farm households. Therefore, the 
commercialization of agriculture contributes to improving the farm households’ livelihoods 
through the enhancement of farm productivity and household food security. However, the results 
of Rosenbaum bound test show that the estimated effects of market participation on household 
food consumption per capita and HDDS are likely sensitive to hidden bias resulting from 
unobserved confounders. 
To improve the study, further studies should obtain accurate data such as two-period data. 
With such a time series of data, one can account for the remaining selection bias with the 
estimation of difference-in-difference (DID) effects in lieu of the ATT that compares only the 
productivity and household food security of the participants with those of the nonparticipants. 
The DID estimators compare changes in the productivity and household food security of the farm 
households within n years after participating in markets with those of corresponding households 
that have not entered markets. That is, with the DID estimators, one can examine the dynamic 
effects of participation in markets on farm productivity as well as household food security within 
a given period of time.  
5.5 Policy Implications  
The findings indicate that land titling and certification programs can serve as effective policy 
measures to enhance the farm households’ livelihoods through the commercialization of 
agriculture in Cambodia. This does not mean that the government’s capacity to enforce the rule 
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of law that ensures a high quality of the institutions is not important, but the programs are 
potentially related to policy instruments at the early stage of institutional development of the 
country. In addition, low transaction costs of market entrance, adequate development of irrigation 
infrastructure in the village, modern agricultural tools, and access to public transportation in the 
rural communities have also main role to play in promoting the commercialization of agriculture. 
Furthermore, the findings also demonstrate the essential roles played by the 
commercialization of agriculture in promoting rural households’ livelihoods through its 
contribution to enhancing farm productivity and household food security. These results have 
important policy implications for the enhancement of rural living standards through the 
promotion of the commercialization of agriculture in Cambodia. Therefore, to promote the 
commercialization of agriculture, the following policy measures should be taken into 
consideration: 
First, the government should further and make more efforts to re-implement the ongoing and 
large scale land titling scheme under the LMAP project backed by the World Bank from 2000 to 
2009, ensuring the effective systematic land titling program and land registration system. In 
doing so, the following action should be put in place:   
• Establishing the effective system of cadastral commissions that ensures land titling and 
land registration system with low financial costs and less time-consuming operation and 
without corruption and nepotism. 
• Promoting public awareness and community participation (involvement of civil society 
organizations in information dissemination and community participation) in the titling 
program. TV & radio can be also helpful in promoting the program.   
• Strengthening mechanism for effective land dispute settlement, titling and registering the 
disputed land as soon as possible after completing the resolution of disputes.  
• Allowing specialized legal NGOs to engage in the mechanism by providing assistance to 
disadvantaged individuals and communities so that the disputes can be settled 
transparently and effectively.  
Second, the government should play main role in providing information on agricultural 
markets, more possibly in cooperation with specialized NGOs. Moreover, the government should 
142 
 
enhance the adequate development of irrigation infrastructure in the rural communities and 
transportation infrastructure connecting the farm households to markets.   
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